UN ON OGADEN: POCKETS OF CRISIS, ALARMING HUMAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 ADDIS ABABA 002805

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF, OES, AND PRM
USAID/W FOR A/AID
USAID/W DCHA/AA MHESS, GGOTTLIEB
AFR/AA KALMQUIST, WWARREN, JBORNS
DCHA/OFDA KLUU, ACONVERY, PMORRIS, KCHANNELL
AFR/EA KNELSON, BDUNFORD, CTHOMPSON
DCHA/FFP WHAMMINK, JDWORKEN, PMOHAN, SANTHONY, PBERTOLIN
CJTF-HOA AND USCENTCOM FOR POLAD
ROME FOR AMBASSADOR, OHA
BRUSSLES FOR USEU PBROWN
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH, RMA
ROME FOR HSPANOS
USUN FOR TMALY
NSC FOR BJPITTMAN, CHUDSON, AND JMELINE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/13/2017
TAGS: PHUM EAID EAGR PGOV PREF MOPS ET
SUBJECT: UN ON OGADEN: POCKETS OF CRISIS, ALARMING HUMAN
RIGHTS CONCERNS

REF: ADDIS 3226

Classified By: AMBASSADOR DONALD YAMAMOTO FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) Deputy UN Humanitarian Coordinator and head of the UN
Assessment Mission to the Ogaden, Paul Hebert (strictly
protect),briefed Ambassador Yamamoto and Embassy and USAID
staff on September 13 on the findings of the United Nations,
August 30-September 6 Assessment Mission to the Ogaden. The
Mission found that both Government of Ethiopia (GoE) policies
and insurgent attacks by the Ogaden National Liberation Front
(ONLF) area have created &pockets of crisis8 and the
potential for a full-blown crisis throughout the region in
the coming weeks to three months if conditions do not change
soon. The UN Mission traveled to Jijiga, Degehabur,
Kebridehar, and Gode, visiting 10 villages and interviewing
over 100 people. Major findings
include: a) pervasive fear persists for personal security by
the civilian population; b) a serious lack of food in the
conflict-affected areas; c) pockets of humanitarian crisis
already exist with deteriorating health and nutrition
conditions; d) urgent need for humanitarian
access; and e) &alarming8 human rights abuses by all sides
of the conflict.


2. (SBU) The United Nations is expected to release a report
on the Mission's findings formally on Sept. 17 from New York.
A subsequent human rights-oriented report will be released
later to a significantly restricted audience. The Sept. 17
report is expected to note that both the GoE and ONLF are
contributing to the humanitarian impacts in the region and
will pose six recommendations to the GoE and international
community: 1) allow an increased flow of commercial food into
the region, 2) permit food to be transported from towns to
villages and rural areas, 3) allow significantly increased
monitoring of food deliveries, 4) provide dramatically
increased health care resources and medical supplies, 5)
provide open access to
the region for humanitarian food, commercial food, and
livestock transfers, and 6) immediately provide three-months
of food rations for 600,000 people in need in the region.
End Summary.

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DELAY AND INTIMIDATION TACTICS UTILIZED ON THE TEAM
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3. (C) The UN assessment commenced on August 30 in Jijiga to
negotiate modalities of field travel with regional and
security officials. The Somali Region President underscored
to the UN that although the GoE was fighting a war on
terrorism, they did not intend to hurt the civilian
population and did not believe the situation to be abnormal.
Despite the stated commitment to support the assessment team,
GoE security officials significantly harassed the team's
national staff during the two days of negotiations. In
particular, security officials accused two national staff
from OCHA and UNICEF of ONLF links and threatened their
relatives with physical harm if the staff members
participated in the Mission. (Note: The UN felt that these
particular staff were seen as threats for having too many

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local contacts. The UN removed them from the Mission for
their own safety, but refused to substitute out any of the
five other non-Ogadeni Somali staff despite intimidation
tactics).


4. (C) Despite an earlier assertion that the assessment team
would travel without military or government officials, the UN
acquiesced to military escorts to ensure that the Mission
could proceed. Regional officials agreed that the escorts
would not mingle or stay with the team while they were
stopped in villages. The military escort consisted of five
trucks along with an additional vehicle for GoE
administrative and security support. (Note: the UN
highlighted that the escorts were cooperative, but that their
task was clearly to control the assessment team to the extent
possible).


5. (C) Through interviews, the UN learned that an advance
party had been sent to every village to meet with elders and
local populations prior to the UN assessment. Villagers
reported being advised not to meet with the UN; to do so
would mean serious consequences. In some cases,
people were reportedly arrested and some villages by the road
were deserted, as villagers were told to leave prior to the
Mission's arrival. Despite intimidation tactics and death
threats, most people were anxious to speak with the UN about
what was really happening. The UN team attempted to speak
randomly with smaller groups, particularly women and elders,
and villagers were quick to identify which people were
legitimately from the village. The UN relayed that on three
separate occasions, the GoE arranged elders to meet with the
UN team; those elders later indicated to the UN that they had
been told what to say in the official meetings.


6. (C) The UN outlined the challenging aspects of the
assessment and came close to canceling the Mission at
Degehabur. There the UN learned that two people were
immediately arrested after speaking with the UN and 60 other
people had been arrested that day for suspicion of sharing
information. The UN team protested their arrests and advised
military escorts that the UN team would keep track of those
detained with the intent to raise it at the highest political
levels; they were subsequently released.

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KEY UN ASSESSMENT FINDINGS
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7. (SBU) Pervasive Fear: The United Nations assesses the
situation in the Ogaden to be serious and a cause for alarm
on the humanitarian and human rights fronts. Pervasive fear
clearly persists for personal security by the civilian
population. People fear both the GoE and ONLF and told the
UN team that being sandwiched between the two sides is having
a significant impact on movement and daily livelihoods.


8. (SBU) Pervasive Lack of Food: Although the situation has
slightly improved in the last few weeks due to approximately
10 trucks that have gone to Degehabur and Kebridehar, it only
reflects a small percentage of the need. It is clear that
the military is involved in all
aspects of food aid delivery, ensuring that food does not go
to &anti-peace8 elements or communities perceived to
support insurgents. The UN observed one location where four
trucks filled with WFP-provided food was stored in a military

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compound. The UN team also encouraged food distribution and
noted that only a small proportion of the overall designated
food stocks were distributed and distribution modalities were
suspect.


9. (SBU) Although there has been minimal disruption of
commercial transport in the non-Ogadeni areas, the impact of
the lack of commercial food in the Ogaden, particularly in
the rural areas, is profound. Even if small amounts of
commercial food is available in towns, villagers reported
that the military confiscates any food found to be
transported from towns to rural areas ) and in some cases,
the perpetrators are shot. The situation also applied to
rural populations trying to enter urban areas to sell milk or
other products; it is forbidden. The starvation tactics used
by the military in the area are resulting in visible signs of
pre-famine indicators. The UN reported that people are
surviving by collecting wild grasses and grains and
slaughtering livestock.


10. (SBU) Pockets of Crisis Already Exist: The Team assesses
that it will only be a matter of weeks, and certainly no more
than three months, before a large scale crisis emerges if
conditions do not improve substantially. Market prices of
food have doubled over the last three months and livestock
prices have declined by roughly 33 percent. The poorest have
left urban centers since there are no casual jobs linked to
commercial trade and have reportedly moved into the interior,
to Jijiga or out of the Ogaden to other areas. Traditional
livestock trade is not occurring; the military is accused of
arbitrarily confiscating livestock for their own use. Cash
will only become available if livestock export reopens, but
none of the traditional livestock traders are present due to
security concerns. The few commercial trucks that have gone
to Degehabur with military escorts have been from the
highlands.


11. (SBU) Urgent Need for Better Humanitarian Access:
Humanitarian access is limited and recent landmine fatalities
underscore the challenge operational humanitarian agencies
are facing. Despite recent GoE press statements urging
agencies to work in Somali Region with
unlimited access, the reality on the ground is much
different. Very few NGOs are operating in the military zones
because almost all movements are restricted due to security
reasons. Access for UN agencies is virtually non-existent in
military areas. WFP noted that although monitoring food aid
deliveries is critical, it is currently impossible due to
underlying security conditions. Although WFP has invited
local NGOs to do monitoring on their behalf, no one has
accepted due to security fears, though agencies are willing
to share the limited information they possess. There have
also been recent reports that certain access to basic
services -- such as the capping of water sources and refusing
delivery of medical supplies -- are being denied in some
villages.


12. (C) Human Rights Conditions are &Alarming8: The UN
characterized the human rights situation as serious and
alarming, equally on the side of the Ethiopian military and
the ONLF. Supporters, or perceived sympathizers, of either
side continue to be targets of the opposite side. Although
the focus of the UN assessment was the humanitarian
situation, protection and human rights issues emerged,
specifically accounts of rape, extrajudicial killings, and

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burning of villages. The UN team visited one of the burned
villages, were advised others that had been burned, and were
given lists of people killed and detained and the names of
burned villages. Hebert said that the numbers of villages
burned and people killed were in the hundreds. (Note: Often
&villages8 are hamlets of a dozen homes build in close
proximity rather than large established villages in the
western sense.) The UN team was also told of forced
desertion of villages along with cases where people left due
to security concerns. In the cases of rape, the medical
doctors on the team were able to confirm that women had been
raped. The UN was told of an incident where the elders who
went to complain to the militia about the rapes
were killed. While the UN Team was hesitant to declare that
human rights abuses were systemic, they did note that the
employment of identical tactics throughout the region (by
insurgent and counter-insurgent forces alike) certainly gave
the impression that human rights abuses were systemic.


13. (C) While Hebert's official read-out to the Ambassador
paints a stark picture of the Ogaden, he was obviously
cautious in timing and presenting his report to Post. On
September 7, a UN security officer who participated in the
Assessment Mission unofficially told Embassy officials that
in Huuraale, the team saw people who were too weak from
hunger to stand. The officer noted the price of grain and
rice had quadrupled since early May while the price of
livestock had fallen significantly as people were trying to
sell off their herds for cash. The team also drove by burned
villages along their route at Huuraale, Lasdencaree,
Kabdinact, Dadine, part of Galadid, and Delaad. Town people
told the team of 53 burned villages and 16 villages where the
residents had been forcibly displaced by the government.
Residents of Dalaad reported to the team of &mass graves8
where civilians were hung by the government for being ONLF
supporters. The reported sites include one eight kilometers
east of the Dalaad with 17 bodies, a second with nine bodies
(unlocated),and a third with three bodies (unlocated). The
UN team was unable to verify the claim of mass graves. The
officer also reported that the
government had detained clan elders in Kebridehar to prevent
them from talking to the UN team and had released food in the
town just prior to the team's visit to make it appear more
normal, but returned the food to the warehouse after the team
departed.

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UN RECOMMENDATIONS AND NEXT STEPS
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14. (SBU) The UN wants to proceed cautiously on extrapolating
the data from their assessment. The UN Humanitarian
Coordinator and UNOCHA met briefly with the Minister of
Foreign Affairs on September 11 to share preliminary results
of the assessment mission, including a draft report. The UN
intends to release the final humanitarian report to the
international community on
September 17 in New York. The UN believes that it would be
better to release the humanitarian and human rights findings
separately. They believe the GoE will be more receptive to
overall findings if the human rights recommendations are
shared on a more confidential basis with a few agencies. The
UN is recommending a separate, more detailed, human rights
mission later.


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15. (SBU) Following the assessment, the UN is recommending:
--Urgently increasing the availability of commercial food and
goods,
--Resumption of some normal livestock trade in the region,
--Immediate additional humanitarian food aid in critical
areas as a short-term solution,
--Increased immediate humanitarian access for partners in all
affected areas for assessment and interventions,
--UN representation full time in larger towns in the region
for better monitoring of the evolving situation,
--Monitoring of humanitarian assistance, particularly food
aid,
--Urgent health, nutrition, livelihood, and other non-food
interventions, and
--Additional technical assessment missions (human rights,
health, nutrition, etc.) particularly in areas of concern.

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COMMENT
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16. (C) The Ambassador fully agrees with the assessment of
the UN and Diplomatic Corps that a food crisis will happen in
the Ogaden and preventive actions will only serve to mitigate
the impacts. In the longer run, sustainable food security in
the region requires broader reconciliation between the
Government and the people of the Ogaden. NGOs have told
Assistant Secretary Frazer and Post that at least 40 percent,
not the previously believed 15 percent, of the region's
population are vulnerable to food insecurity. While
Assistant Secretary Frazer and the Embassy have raised these
concerns with Prime Minister Meles and other GoE officials
and continues to press for greater humanitarian and
commercial food access to the region, USAID/Ethiopia
continues to coordinate contingency planning and emergency
response options with humanitarian partners including the UN
and NGOs. Ambassador Yamamoto continues to lead the
diplomatic community in coordinating a common approach to
press the GoE to minimize the
humanitarian impacts of its legitimate counter-insurgency
efforts. The U.S. is pressing the GoE to establish
modalities to open the region to commercial food and trade
with Somalia, which historically provides up to 80 percent of
the Ogaden's food needs. Agencies are working on modalities
to begin humanitarian interventions in locations as close to
the non-accessible areas as possible in the hope that if/when
more widespread access to the Ogaden is possible, agencies
can be partially pre-positioned. Post continues to dialogue
with DPPA and WFP on the possibility of increased food
dispatches to the region, despite DPPA's reluctance to
respond. Regardless of the possible food and non-food
emergency interventions, access and security are the
underlying constraints that limit response options until
political/military solutions can be negotiated.
YAMAMOTO