ADDIS ABABA RESPONSE - SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

UNCLAS ADDIS ABABA 002606 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR: DS/IP/AF, DS/IP/ITA, AF/E E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ASEC PTER ET SUBJECT: ADDIS ABABA RESPONSE - SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE QUESTIONNAIRE (SEPQ) FALL 2007 REF: STATE 110310 NOTE: Responses are keyed to questions in reftel. -------------- ¶1. (SBU) DEMONSTRATIONS -------------- ¶A. Yes, there is a sizable Muslim population throughout Ethiopia as well as ethnic Somalis. Generally, there is very little if any anti-American sentiment among the majority of the population in Ethiopia. Only small segments of the general population within Ethiopia are prone to extremism. There have not been any anti-American demonstrations in Ethiopia for the past several years. ¶B. No; since June 2005, the GOE has not permitted public demonstrations. ¶C. No. ¶D. N/A. ¶E. N/A; there have not been any anti-American demonstrations over the past year. ¶F. In June and November 2005, there were demonstrations/riots throughout Addis Ababa protesting the results of national elections. The Ethiopian police and security services responded with force to quell the situation. Approximately 200 Ethiopian civilians were reported to be killed in Addis Ababa. ¶G. No, the above demonstrations and riots primarily focused on GOE facilities. Some passing USG vehicles were struck by projectiles and sustained minor damage. ¶H. No. ¶I. No. ¶J. No. The Embassy is located in close proximity (1/2 mile radius) to several educational institutions and GOE facilities. The 2005 demonstrations/riots following national elections occurred within this radius. In early 2007, student demonstrations (not directed at the USG) at Addis Ababa University (located on the same road as the Embassy) hindered Embassy personnel coming/departing the compound. No Embassy locations or personnel were directly involved or impacted by this situation. ¶K. N/A. No anti-American demonstrations within the past year. ¶L. With the exception of the post-election demonstrations in June and November 2005, and Addis Ababa University student demonstrations in early 2007, demonstrations and large public gatherings in Addis Ababa tend to be peaceful and well controlled. ¶M. No. See Item G above. -------------- ¶2. (SBU) MACRO CONFLICT CONDITIONS -------------- ¶A. Yes. In response to threats to its security posed by extremist elements, in December 2006 the GOE intervened militarily in Somalia on behalf of the Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG),in order to oust the Islamic fundamentalist Council of Islamic Courts (CIC). Ethiopia is also engaged in a border dispute with Eritrea; a United Nations peacekeeping mission (UNMEE) is stationed along their common border. There are also allegations the Eritrean Government has planned or supported terrorist attacks within Ethiopia, as well as provided support to various anti-Ethiopian groups. Internally, the GOE is currently engaged in an active counter-insurgency campaign in the Ogaden area of Ethiopia's Somali Region against the Ogadeni National Liberation Front (ONLF). Other internal opposition groups include the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), which has been accused, along with the ONLF, of conducting hostile attacks (bombings) within Ethiopia in the past. ¶B. Intrastate conflict occurs in most regions of Ethiopia. In 2006, the GOE accused internal opposition groups of responsibility for a series of bombings (hand grenade attacks) within Addis Ababa, resulting in some property damage, injuries and loss of life. ¶C. There are no U.S. diplomatic facilities located outside of Addis Ababa. The Embassy maintains 4 official locations (Embassy, USAID, CDC and GSO/Warehouse) and approximately 115 residential locations spread out over a 7-mile radius within Addis Ababa. Peace Corps Volunteers will establish facilities in Addis Ababa later this year. Some of these locations are located in close proximity to the 2005 and 2006 demonstration and bombing sites, although none were directly targeted or involved. ¶D. No, although some groups associated with the conflict involving Somalia and Eritrea are not necessarily favorable toward Americans. Anti-American sentiment rarely manifests itself in Ethiopia. -------------- ¶3. (SBU) HOST COUNTRY CAPABILITIES -------------- ¶A. Although Ethiopian law enforcement and security services fall short of meeting Western standards in regards to professionalism and training, they are reasonably good in comparison to other countries in the region. ¶B. GOE security services have received training from the USG, to include: leadership development, major case management, travel documents, anti-counterfeiting, land border security, protective security detail operations, cyber-crimes, post-blast investigation, physical security of vital installations, preventing attacks on soft targets, and a variety of courses provided by the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Botswana. Ethiopians tend to be enthusiastic students and eager to learn. The training provided was appreciated and well received by the host country government and the individual students. Future training opportunities provided to the GOE will be worthwhile and appreciated. ¶C. As with most African nations, there is some corruption within the GOE's law enforcement and security services. Unlike many African countries, the level of corruption among GOE security and law enforcement services does not stymie efforts to enforce the law and ensure general security. Corruption within Ethiopia can be characterized as petty and involving cronyism. ¶D. Generally, GOE intelligence services are reasonably professional and capable of deterring terrorist actions within the limitations of their resources and abilities. The GOE claimed to foil a terrorist attack by Eritreans targeting the African Union Summit in December 2006. During 2007, the GOE claimed to foil at least two separate terrorist attacks within Addis Ababa by internal opposition groups. ¶E. GOE intelligence and law enforcement services tend to be extremely cooperative and responsive to the Embassy's requests for information and support, within the limitations of their resources and abilities. ¶F. Yes. In response to threats to its internal security posed by extremist elements based in Somalia, in late 2006 the GOE launched military operations into Somalia and diminished the capabilities of various individuals and organizations involved in terrorism. During 2007, the GOE claimed to uncover and foil at least two terrorist operations targeting Addis Ababa by internal opposition and Eritrean groups. ¶G. Yes, within the limitations of their abilities and resources. ¶H. Relative to other countries on the continent, security at Ethiopia's major airports is generally good. While access control and security screening to the civil aviation terminal is quite good, there are concerns regarding vulnerabilities of access control and security screening to the cargo terminals and service areas. State-run Ethiopian Airlines is a government monopoly (the foreign minister is among its board of directors),and Ethiopia is one of the few African countries to receive a "Category I" rating from FAA for safety and security; TSA officials have provided training for airport personnel. ¶I. Customs and immigration controls at Ethiopia's major airports and land border crossings are good. Ethiopia lacks the resources to adequately ensure the security of its large land borders, especially in desolate/remote areas. In response to concerns to its security, the GOE has established and operates security checkpoints on all major roads leading to Addis Ababa. Most commercial and some private vehicles are stopped and subject to inspection. While this effort is better than nothing and has yielded some success, it is impossible to reasonably inspect all vehicles, goods and individuals coming to Addis Ababa. The GOE has expressed concern to Embassy officials regarding the integrity of border security on its border with Somalia. There are reports of trading routes that circumvent major roads and established checkpoints. The Embassy has encountered problems on a regular basis involving the integrity of Ethiopian passports and identity documents. It is not difficult for individuals inclined to do so to obtain fraudulent passports and identity documents. ¶J. Ethiopia has a vast border, neighboring five other African nations (Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia and Kenya). Border patrol forces are reasonably effective at major/formal border crossing areas. However, a significant portion of Ethiopia's land borders are assessed as open and porous. -------------- ¶4. (SBU) INDIGENOUS TERRORISM - ANTI-AMERICAN TERRORIST GROUPS -------------- ¶A. No. However, after Ethiopia's December 2006 military intervention in Somalia, Al-Qaeda publicly declared Ethiopia to be a viable target. ¶B. N/A. ¶C. No. ¶D. N/A. ¶E. No. ¶F. No. ¶G. N/A. ¶H. N/A. -------------- ¶5. (SBU) OTHER INDIGENOUS TERRORIST GROUPS -------------- ¶A. No. The GOE considers several indigenous groups active in Ethiopia to be terrorist organizations (e.g., the Ogadeni National Liberation Front and the Oromo Liberation Front); however, they have not been designated as terrorist organizations by the USG. These groups have been reported to carry out attacks on Ethiopian government interests and are of concern to the GOE. ¶B. See above. ¶C. In 2007, the ONLF claimed responsibility for an attack against a Chinese oil drilling facility in the Ogaden region, resulting in the deaths of approximately 75 individuals, including Ethiopian troops guarding the facility as well as Ethiopian and Chinese civilian workers. ¶D. See above. ¶E. No. ¶F. No. ¶G. The ONLF has primarily carried out attacks in the Ogaden (i.e., the Somali Region of eastern Ethiopia). ¶H. N/A. -------------- ¶6. (SBU) TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM -------------- ¶A. Yes, foreign terrorist groups present in Ethiopia include al-Itihaad al-Islamiya (AIAI),also known as the United Western Somali Liberation Front. In 1996, an Egyptian extremist group attempted to assassinate the visiting Egyptian president in Addis Ababa. ¶B. Post assesses that AIAI's presence includes operational cells. ¶C. No, the GOE is not sympathetic to AIAI, and its December 2006 military intervention in Somalia on behalf of the TFG was aimed at ousting extremist elements. In 1996, AIAI placed and detonated bombs at two large hotels and attempted to assassinate the GOE Minister of Transportation in Addis Ababa. ¶D. Unknown ¶E. Ethiopia hosts a large ethnic Somali population, some of whom are possibly inclined to support extremist groups affected by Ethiopian military operations in Somalia. Nearly half of Ethiopia's population is Muslim. ¶F. There have not been any anti-American terrorist attacks in Ethiopia in recent history. Iran, Syria, Sudan, Serbia, North Korea, and Cuba maintain diplomatic missions in Addis Ababa, and likely have accompanying security/intelligence officers among their diplomatic staff. ¶G. Weapons and explosives are readily available in Somalia, and could be easily smuggled into Ethiopia through the vast, open, and porous land border. There has been information Eritrea has provided weapons and explosives to various groups that do not view the Ethiopian government favorably. Weapons and explosives are available within Ethiopia through underground suppliers. On a recent trip to a local market, Embassy personnel reported observing live hand grenades for sale at a market stall. Weapons and explosives are also available within Kenya, Sudan, and Djibouti through underground sources, and could be smuggled into Ethiopia through the vast, open, and porous land borders. YAMAMOTO