(C-AL7-01035) ETHIOPIA: EMERGENCY FOOD RELIEF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ADDIS ABABA 002343 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/E, AND INR/AA USAID FOR AFR, FFP, AND OFDA LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER ROME FOR USUN ROME CJTF-HOA AND USCENTCOM FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2017 TAGS: PREF PGOV PINS PHUM EAGR EAID ET SUBJECT: (C-AL7-01035) ETHIOPIA: EMERGENCY FOOD RELIEF DELIVERED ONLY TO ZONES OUTSIDE OGADEN REF: A. STATE 102381 (NOTAL) ¶B. STATE 83346 (NOTAL) ¶C. ADDIS ABABA 2285 (AND PREVIOUS) Classified By: ERIC WONG, ACTING DCM. REASON: 1.4 (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. UNOCHA Head of Office Paul Hebert reported that government officials had decided on July 21 to allow emergency food relief to be delivered to the 5 zones in the Ogaden area of the Somali Region where military operations against the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) were ongoing. However, the exact modalities of such distribution (e.g., distribution points, and whether convoys would be required to have military escort) remained to be determined. The food relief currently approved for the Somali Region is only a one-month ration (15 kg per person),and targets only one-eighth of the region's population of 4 million, over half of whom are in the security-restricted zones; thus, lifting government restrictions on commercial food deliveries is critical to alleviating a crisis in the Ogaden. In addition to food insecurity, UNOCHA officials highlighted concerns about the Ethiopian military restricting access to water, about the outbreak of cholera, and internal displacement. UNOCHA officials could not/not confirm reports of cantonment camps, and noted that some IDPs were "moving of their own volition," due to insecurity and lack of food. According to UNOCHA, the GOE ordered the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on July 23 to leave its offices in the Somali Region; also, heavy fighting following an ONLF attack on a military installation has reportedly prompted MSF-Belgium to withdraw from Warder, one of the 5 zones where military operations continue. Separately on July 24, Prime Minister Meles informed Ambassador that humanitarian deliveries to all 8 zones requiring food aid, including those in the Ogaden, would be allowed, but primarily with military escort. Meles further added that commercial food shipments would be allowed, but not to those areas were insurgents were moving from Somalia, which would remain temporarily "off-limits." END SUMMARY. ¶2. (SBU) On July 24, Ambassador, A/DCM, poloff and REFCOORD Pickering Fellow met with UNOCHA Head of Office and Deputy to the Humanitarian Coordinator, Paul Hebert, and with UNOCHA Information and Advocacy officer Gregory Beals. UN agencies sought approval from the GOE for enhanced access to the Ogaden, in order to monitor food distribution, assess humanitarian conditions, and to provide direct assistance in non-food areas, Hebert said. Hebert was due to depart on July 25 for Jijiga, capital of the Somali Region, to discuss modalities for the resumption of humanitarian food deliveries to the region's Ogaden area, with Somali Regional President Abdullahi Hassan and other regional state authorities. Hassan had recently completed consultations in Addis Ababa with federal officials, including the PM's National Security Advisor Abay Tsehaye. -------------- -- FOOD RELIEF DELIVERED TO 3 ZONES OUTSIDE OGADEN -------------- -- ¶3. (SBU) According to Hebert, on July 21, President Hassan had ordered that humanitarian food relief be released from warehouses for distribution to the Ogaden. Two weeks earlier, the GOE had agreed to the distribution of a one-month emergency food ration to a total of 530,000 beneficiaries in the entire Somali Region, who had been identified during a March 2007 assessment. Eight of the region's 9 zones were thus to receive food relief (all except Jijiga Zone, which had not been assessed as requiring food aid this year): 5 zones where military operations by Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) continued, and 3 zones outside the conflict area. Emergency food distribution had begun 10 days ago--and was now completed--in Shinile and Afder Zones, and was ongoing in Liben Zone (southwestern Somali Region). Food aid to Afder and Shinile came from WFP warehouses in Nazret (near Addis Ababa) and Dire Dawa respectively. However, food had not/not yet been delivered to approximately 290,000 beneficiaries in the 5 conflict ADDIS ABAB 00002343 002 OF 004 zones (i.e., Fik, Degehabur, Gode, Korahe, and Warder Zones). Hebert noted that there was no shortage of food in WFP warehouses, as (until 10 days ago) no distribution of emergency food relief had been distributed in the Somali Region--WFP's largest recipient area--since the beginning of the year. -------------- UN OPPOSES MILITARY ESCORT OF FOOD CONVOYS -------------- ¶4. (SBU) The federal government's Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Agency (DPPA),the regional-level Disaster Prevention and Prevention Bureau (DPPB),the World Food Program (WFP),and the ENDF were to discuss the modalities of delivering food relief to the 5 zones where military operations continued, UNOCHA said. Issues included selecting distribution points (to ensure rural populations, as well as those in towns, received food),and whether the GOE would require military escort of humanitarian convoys. Normally, food relief was distributed only by GOE officials (the DPPA and DPPB),with the UN's role limited to monitoring. ¶5. (C) Hebert said he had requested a meeting with the ENDF military commander in Harar, but did not anticipate approval of his request. The ENDF stated that it was not restricting international agencies' access to the Somali Region; however, ICRC representatives had been required to provide the ENDF command in Harar with 3-days advance notification of any movement. Hebert underscored that UN agencies needed to be allowed to enter the Ogaden without any military escort; the UN assessed that the ONLF would welcome, not target, UN agencies. -------------- -------------- ONLF ATTACK PROMPTS DEPARTURE OF MSF; ICRC EXPELLED -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) Security was also an issue; Hebert noted that the UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) would likely permit the temporary presence of UN officials at Kebridehar or Degehabur. -- Hebert reported that the ONLF had attacked the garrison town of Warder in the middle of the night, and had withdrawn by the morning of July 24; while casualties were unknown, heavy fighting had prompted Medecins Sans Frontieres-Holland (Doctors Without Borders) to decide independently to withdraw its 3-person international team from a health facility in Warder. -- Separately, UNOCHA reported that ICRC had been asked by the GOE on July 23 to leave the Somali Region; ICRC had been located at Gode and Jijiga. -------------- -------------- FOOD AID TARGETS ONLY ONE-EIGHTH OF REGION'S POPULATION -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Hebert underscored that the provision of humanitarian food relief would not/not alleviate a crisis in the Ogaden, and that lifting restrictions against the resumption of commercial food deliveries was critical. Sources on the ground reported that the ENDF's counterinsurgency would continue for at least 3 additional months, which risked turning the population to support the ONLF. While there was no immediate crisis, he noted the danger that would be posed "within weeks" by "coping mechanisms breaking down," especially to children under age 5. -- The one-month ration approved by the GOE comprised only 15 kg per person; furthermore, the 530,000 beneficiaries identified by the March 2007 assessment in the entire region (of which over half--200,000--are in security-restricted areas) represented a fraction of the 1.1 - 1.3 million beneficiaries in the Somali Region who previously received food aid. (NOTE: The total population of the Somali Region is estimated at 4 million. END NOTE.) Due to lack of food ADDIS ABAB 00002343 003 OF 004 and trade, individuals were subsisting only on milk and tea. Very little food was reaching rural areas, and the normal trade of cattle or livestock was not occurring. MSF-Holland was reporting that the military was restricting acess to water points. -- Any additional food aid would be determined by seasonal assessment teams in the region. Whereas UN agencies and humanitarian NGOs participated in teams that visited the 3 zones outside where ongoing military operations continued, the teams currently permitted to enter the 5 conflict zones were comprised primarily of GOE officials (e.g., DPPA, DPPB, and officials from local health, agriculture, and water bureaus); the only external representatives were from Save the Children-UK. In Degehabur Zone, the assessment team was comprised entirely of GOE officials, Hebert said. -- GOE officials asserted that they were not restricting food per se, only illegal trade. During the previous week, 8 trucks had been allowed to deliver food to Fik; however, individuals trying to leave Fik with food had had their food confiscated at military checkpoints. -- Beals reported that authorities had confiscated livestock from pastoralists and given them lists of suspected ONLF members; if no response was given to the lists, the livestock was kept. Hebert asserted that such policies led local officials to protest, especially the regional assembly's proposal to divert funds for development assistance to peace and security, which had been pushed strongly by federal officials. ¶8. (U) Acute watery diarrhea (AWD),or cholera, was also a concern: whereas AWD had been reported in all 5 zones prior to the ENDF's current counterinsurgency campaign, the UN had not been able to receive any reports all for the last two months. Deaths in Jijiga from AWD now reached an alarming 3 per cent, Hebert said. -------------- -------------- INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT: CANTONMENT CAMPS UNCONFIRMED -------------- -------------- ¶9. (C) International humanitarian law was "being violated by both sides," Hebert said. Reports of cantonment camps had been received from relatives of UN staff, Hebert said, but remained unconfirmed. The military were moving people to certain areas where they could be controlled; however, people were also "moving of their own volition". Some men moved "into the bush" with their livestock; women and children were moving to towns. Displaced men and boys were congregating in Jijiga, despite reports of mass arrests in towns of those suspected of being either ONLF collaborators or sympathizers. There had been some population movement reported from the Ogaden to neighboring Somaliland, but specific numbers were not available. ¶10. (C) Hebert said reports had been received of foreign fighters "in some areas," but that the ONLF did not support them, and had, in fact, ousted them to Somalia. Beals attributed fighting in the Boreni and Guji Zones of neighboring Oromiya Region to conflict between the ONLF and others. ¶11. (C) Hebert noted the ONLF's "real willingness" to engage in negotiations with the GOE. Ambassador responded that the ONLF's refusal to renounce violence or to abandon targeting civilians remained a concern. ¶12. (C) COMMENT. Whether to deliver emergency food aid with military escort will likely be the focus of discussions between UNOCHA officials and the GOE. Separately on July 24, Prime Minister Meles informed Ambassador that humanitarian deliveries to all 8 zones requiring food aid, including those in the Ogaden, would be allowed, but primarily with military escort. While naming no specific organizations, Meles asserted that the GOE was gathering evidence that certain NGOs and international groups were assisting the ONLF, and ADDIS ABAB 00002343 004 OF 004 that alleged abuses in the Ogaden were exaggerated. Meles further added that commercial food shipments would be allowed, but not to those areas were insurgents were moving from Somalia, which would remain temporarily "off-limits." END COMMENT. YAMAMOTO