Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ADDISABABA2196
2007-07-13 15:43:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Addis Ababa
Cable title:  

(C-AL7-01035) UN AGENCIES AND NGOS DISCUSS

Tags:  PGOV PHUM PINS EAID EAGR MOPS ET 
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VZCZCXRO2258
OO RUEHDE RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHDS #2196/01 1941543
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 131543Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6980
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNSOM/SOMALIA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 ADDIS ABABA 002196 

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/E, DRL:S.JOSEPH, AND INR/AA
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER
CJTF-HOA AND USCENTCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/13/2017
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINS EAID EAGR MOPS ET
SUBJECT: (C-AL7-01035) UN AGENCIES AND NGOS DISCUSS
POTENTIAL FOOD INSECURITY RESULTING FROM COUNTERINSURGENCY
IN OGADEN

REF: A. STATE 88346 (NOTAL)

B. ADDIS ABABA 2027

C. ADDIS ABABA 1308

Classified By: ERIC WONG, ACTING DCM. REASON: 1.4 (D).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 ADDIS ABABA 002196 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/E, DRL:S.JOSEPH, AND INR/AA LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER CJTF-HOA AND USCENTCOM FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/13/2017 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINS EAID EAGR MOPS ET SUBJECT: (C-AL7-01035) UN AGENCIES AND NGOS DISCUSS POTENTIAL FOOD INSECURITY RESULTING FROM COUNTERINSURGENCY IN OGADEN REF: A. STATE 88346 (NOTAL) ¶B. ADDIS ABABA 2027 ¶C. ADDIS ABABA 1308 Classified By: ERIC WONG, ACTING DCM. REASON: 1.4 (D). ¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY. Ambassador convened a meeting on July 3 of UN agencies and USAID-funded NGOs operating in the Ogaden area of Ethiopia's Somali Region, as well as major development partners, to exchange information on current security and humanitarian conditions in the Ogaden and to separate fact from fiction. The UN cautioned that press misinformation was advancing the false impression that the Ogaden was like unchecked genocide in Darfur. The group found no evidence of genocide, of systematic rape as reported by the New York Times, or compelling evidence of burnt villages and Vietnam-style cantonment camps. However, it was clear that the situation in the Ogaden is serious and on the verge of a humanitarian crisis, because of the lack of emergency food deliveries since January 2007 and recent restrictions on commercial deliveries, in response to heavy fighting between insurgents coming from Somalia (including foreign fighters) and the Ethiopian military. The Ambassador and staff have raised the Ogaden, as not only a major public affairs problem but also a serious humanitarian crisis, with senior GOE officials, including the Foreign Minister, National Security Advisor and other officials; Post will also raise the issue with PM Meles. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (SBU) On July 3, Ambassador hosted a meeting of UN agencies and USAID-funded NGOs working in the Ogaden area of Ethiopia's Somali Region. UN participants included UNDP Resident Representative Fidele Sarassoro, and representatives of UNDSS, OHCHR, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNOCHA, and WFP. NGOs included ICRC, International Medical Corps (IMC), International Rescue Committee (IRC),Save the Children-UK, and Save the Children-USA. USAID, USAID OFDA, and Emboffs also attended the meeting, as did poloffs from the embassies of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, and the UK. Ambassador reviewed recent developments that may have prompted the Ethiopian military's six-week-long counterinsurgency operations in the Region's Ogaden are
a, including: GOE concerns about insurgents and foreign fighters fleeing from neighboring Somalia (36 of whom had been captured and brought to Addis Ababa),the large-scale April 24 attack on a Chinese oil facility for which the ONLF publicly claimed responsibility (ref C),and concerns about foreign threats to Ethiopia (e.g., from Eritrean-sponsored rebel groups). Ambassador underscored the need for pursuing a dual track of political engagement (not just military operations) against rebels, and on obtaining credible information on the situation in the Ogaden. -------------- --- UN AGENCIES CITE RESTRICTIONS BUT LACK FIRSTHAND INFORMATION ON ALLEGED HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES -------------- --- ¶3. (SBU) UNDP ResRep Sarassoro noted UN agencies' hampered ability to deliver humanitarian items to the Ogaden. Local workers faced restrictions, and some had been arrested by the Ethiopian military. There had been no distribution of food since the beginning of 2007, with officials citing ongoing military operations. UN agencies lacked firsthand information but had received reports of alleged human rights abuses. Sarassoro said he had raised these concerns with Deputy Prime Minister Addisu Legesse (who also serves as Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development),and had underscored the need for credible, firsthand information from the GOE. Sarassoro called for briefings by Foreign Minister Seyoum to the international community, as lack of direct information "fuels rumors." Sarassoro called for further collaboration among international partners, especially on security issues, and highlighted the need to monitor food prices and to gauge their impact. Raising concerns with PM Meles would also be helpful. ¶4. (SBU) Other UN officials highlighted the non-delivery of ADDIS ABAB 00002196 002 OF 005 food (both food aid and commercial),lack of firsthand information, travel restrictions imposed by the military, and the ONLF's possible use of child soldiers: -- WFP: World Food Program Country Director Mohamed Diab explained that WFP provided two types of food aid to the region: Targeting supplementary feeding had occurred in February and May 2007, although limited in target and scope. As for emergency food aid, WFP had decided in January 2007 to provide relief on the basis of case-by-case assessments. WFP had identified 500,000 beneficiaries in Ethiopia's Somali Region, and had developed an allocation plan; however, this emergency food aid remained confined in Gode town. An interagency assessment (which included WFP) had just been allowed to travel to Jijiga; officials from the regional government's Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Bureau (DPPB) were traveling to other areas in the Region not accessible to the UN. Diab observed that prices of consumer goods had risen as a result of recent GOE restrictions on the movement of commercial trucks into the Somali Region; food prices had risen "substantially," highlighting the population's need for humanitarian support. Diab said Deputy PM Addisu had pledged to work with the Ethiopian military to release humanitarian relief to "safe areas," to be delivered by the federal government's Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Agency (DPPA). WFP officials from offices in Jijiga were prepared to move into others when safe, Diab added. -- UNHCR: UNHCR Deputy Representative Comos Chanda said that UNHCR had deployed teams in Ethiopia's Somali Region (at Gode and Jijiga) as part of the implementation of refugee contingency plans following Ethiopia's December 2006 military intervention in Somalia. Chanda reported that UN staff faced "serious restrictions in Gode," but that UNHCR sought to collaborate with local NGOs, who were readily accepted, in order to assist refugees from neighboring Somalia and those in "refugee-like status." UNHCR's Gode-based Emergency Coordinator, Ron Mponda, added that information required assessment prior to drawing solid conclusions. -- UNICEF: UNICEF Early Warning and Preparedness Officer, Marc Rubin, observed that UNICEF had established an office in Gode. He underscored the Somali Region's "chronic marginalization" by the federal government based in Addis Ababa, citing the ENDF's confiscation of the regional government's vehicles when regional authorities sought to conduct an immunization campaign. Reports of "very young combatants" among rebel forces was a possible indication of child soldiers in the ONLF, he said. -- OHCHR: Frej Fenniche, Regional Representative of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, said he had received secondhand reports (from NGOs and the media) alleging abuses similar to those that occurred in Darfur in 2003: the burning of villages, extrajudicial killings, rapes, population movements as the result of military operations, and detentions. He highlighted that he had no confirmation of any of these allegations, and appealed for additional information. -- UNDSS: UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) Security Adviser for Ethiopia, Sorrien Scott, reported that UNDP staff had been detained and "slapped around" by the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF),having been accused of connivance with the insurgent Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). The ENDF believed that all ethnic Ogadeni staff were members or supporters of the ONLF, who utilized the UN's communications system and diplomatic plated vehicles to advance ONLF aims. Scott acknowledged that as the UN did employ some Ogadeni staff, who likely were sympathetic to the ONLF, perhaps UN and other humanitarian agencies needed to consider replacing Ethiopian staff with international hires. As the ENDF had informed the UN of the "high risk" in Fik and Degehabur (where ONLF and ENDF activity was high),UN activities there had been restricted. Scott reported that the Ethiopian military had "enclosed" Gode town, and that UN movement to other areas, with prior notification, was "open ADDIS ABAB 00002196 003 OF 005 to discussion". UNDP ResRep Sarassoro added that the UN was nevertheless not/not in the process of raising the security level for the Somali Region, as threats were only unconfirmed rumors. (NOTE: Sarassoro explained that the UN currently rated the Somali Region as "Phase 3"; Phase 4 would impose additional restrictions but still allow humanitarian agencies to operate, while Phase 5 would call for ending such operations. END NOTE.) -------------- -------------- DESPITE DIFFICULTIES, ICRC MAINTAINS ACCESS TO REGION -------------- -------------- ¶5. (SBU) ICRC Deputy Head of Delegation Jurg Eglin highlighted that the "blockage of traffic" around Gode and elsewhere in the Somali Region was a significant concern, as the local population depended on it, even if perhaps 80 percent of such traffic was illegal. Despite difficulties, ICRC continued to have "humanitarian space" and was being allowed access to areas, if prior notification was given to the ENDF. ICRC had teams in Degehabur, Gode (toward Kebredehar),and Shilabo, Eglin said. ICRC sought to raise allegations of human rights abuses with authorities; "the door are not fully closed, but must be pushed," Eglin said. -------------- --- USAID-FUNDED NGOS OPERATING IN THE OGADEN REPORT NO CURRENT CRISIS, BUT CONCERNED ABOUT FUTURE -------------- -- ¶6. (SBU) The general consensus of USAID-funded NGOs operating in the Ogaden area was that the Somali Region was not/not currently experiencing a humanitarian crisis, at least in terms of food insecurity, but that dramatic increases in grain prices raised concerns about the future. NGOs confirmed the suspension of food deliveries, and reported restrictions by the ENDF, but lacked firsthand information about alleged human rights abuses. -- IRC: International Rescue Committee Country Director David Murphy said IRC had been operating south of Jijiga for several years and had long been "routinely" stopped by either the ENDF, ONLF, or by unidentified gunmen. The ONLF suspected IRC of siding with the ONLF, due to its access in the area; but the ENDF suspected IRC of aiding the ONLF, as well. Citing secondhand reports of "daily" military engagements, Murphy reported significant military activity south of Degahabur, and confirmed the suspension of commercial food delivery to the Somali Region. While IRC had seen some internal displacement northward, Murphy concluded there was "not a humanitarian crisis now, but something to watch." He said IRC had anticipated such a response from the GOE and ENDF to the ONLF's April 24 attack on a Chinese oil facility guarded by the ENDF (ref C). -- Save the Children-UK: Operations Manager Philip Upson concluded that there was no humanitarian crisis now, but expressed concern about a potential crisis in the future. SC-UK staff's main role was to monitor food security. Upson reported that the most recent information (from one month ago) showed no food insecurity; however, a continued blockage was a concern, as grain prices had already risen 200-300 percent, and the military's "clampdown on food is total," with even SC-UK staff prevented from bringing in food. Despite ongoing military operations, his NGO was still able to conduct a USAID-funded drought management program in two of the Somali Region's zones, including Fik. A SC-UK vehicle had been stopped only once. However, Upson said he doubted whether SC-UK's partner, who remained in eastern Fik, was operating. DPPA officials had gone to Degehabur (i.e., east of Fik),and SC-UK staff had wanted to travel to Warder Zone (adjacent to Degehabur Zone),but were reluctant to approach ENDF commanders on the ground to obtain permission. SC-UK was participating in the ongoing interagency assessment. SC-UK had only secondhand information about the human rights situation, primarily from Jijiga. -- Save the Children-USA: Representative Adrian Cullis, whose ADDIS ABAB 00002196 004 OF 005 NGO was conducting a livelihoods program in 10 districts of the Somali Region, expressed concern that inflated grain prices had already tripled; previous closures of export markets (e.g., during the 2003 flood, from which the Region was still recovering),has shown a "significant impact." -- IMC: International Medical Corps Assistant Country Director Dr. Mesret Shiferaw observed only that IMC had phased out its program in the Somali Region in March 2007. -- FEWSNET: Famine Early Warning System Network Country Representative Nigist Biru added that with no field presence in the Somali Region, FEWSNET relied on secondhand information. Biru agreed that the situation was not a crisis now, but was a situation meriting monitoring. Biru said FEWSNET had received reports of internal displacements, but that the military was not allowing local residents to move out. ¶7. (SBU) USAID Senior Policy Advisor observed that the Ogaden benefited this year from good rainfall; the 4 zones (out of 9 in the Somali Region) that were not in the Ogaden area were not experiencing food insecurity. However, there were up to 1 million destitute within the Ogaden, dependent on food aid that had not been delivered since December 2006. Grain prices in Fik, Degehabur, and Kebridehar, had increased 95-200 percent within one month, which were potentially "a famine indicator." Projected flooding, and the possible outbreak of acute watery diarrhea (i.e., cholera) could exacerbate humanitarian conditions, he added. -------------- -------------- DONOR REPRESENTATIVES HAVE LITTLE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION -------------- -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Key donor representatives shared concerns about the Somali Region but had little additional information (with the exception of the UK, which had discussed the situation with PM Meles): -- Canada: Canadian poloff said Canada had imposed travel restrictions on the entire Somali Region; no Canadian NGOs operated there. -- France: French DCM expressed shared concern about military operations in the Somali Region, but said France had no firsthand information. The international community needed to differentiate between the direct and indirect impact of the counterinsurgency against the ONLF: blocking commercial traffic was not an immediate human rights violation, but risked creating serious consequences over the long term. Even without concrete evidence, partners should express their concern to the GOE, she said. -- Germany: German poloff reported GTZ basketweaving projects but not humanitarian or NGO operations in the Somali Region. Germany noted that that there had been many arrests of suspected ONLF, but "no proof" of such affiliation. Germany had warned against traveling south or west of Jijiga. -- Italy: Italian Charge reported that an Italian NGO had been trapped in Kelafo (Gode Zone) when the ONLF had surrounded the town earlier this year in an attempt to capture the town administrator (suspected of corruption); the ONLF had occupied Kelafo when ENDF troops there had departed for training. Italy was recommending that the NGO relocate to Gode. -------------- CONCERNS RAISED WITH SENIOR GOE PRINCIPALS -------------- ¶9. (SBU) UK poloff said the UK had raised the issue of restrictions in the Somali Region with PM Meles, and had urged that they be temporary. The UK was looking for evidence to substantiate Meles' claim that the ENDF was also engaged in dialogue with clan leaders. While the UK understood that "a marked increase in ONLF activity" required ADDIS ABAB 00002196 005 OF 005 a response, the significant GOE response risked driving non-ethnic Ogadeni to support the ONLF, and the conflict was spreading west to the adjacent Oromiya Region. The UK had received reports of extrajudicial killings, confiscation of cattle, and demands by ENDF to hand over suspected ONLF (despite "inaccurate" lists of ONLF members). While it was difficult to verify claims of Eritrean support for the ONLF, the ONLF was now echoing Eritrea government statements, by publicly calling for resolution of the Ethiopia-Eritrea border dispute. The UK had restricted travel east of Gode, and to the Fik-Warder-Gode triangle that was the ONLF stronghold. ¶10. (C) In a separate meeting on July 10 with Abay Tsehaye, National Security Advisor to the PM, visiting AF DAS Swan and Ambassador underscored concerns about the situation in the Somali Region. In response, Tsehaye acknowledged that "security problems" had affected humanitarian delivery, and said that the GOE was now working with both local elders and the army to escort and distribute food "in peaceful areas." Tsehaye noted that the issue had been discussed recently by SIPDIS Deputy PM Addisu, Tsehaye, and ENDF Chief of General Staff Lieutenant General Samora Yonus (CHOD). The army had no problem providing escorts to ensure delivery; however, securing areas to allow distribution was the challenge. Tsehaye stressed the need to inform regional administrators. SIPDIS -------------- -------------- UNABLE TO CONFIRM ALLEGATIONS OF GRAVE HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES -------------- -------------- ¶11. (C) COMMENT. Deliberations among key UN agencies in Ethiopia (such as UNOCHA, WFP, UNICEF, and UNHCR), USAID-funded NGOs with direct operations in the Ogaden area, and with major donor countries, thus underscore that a key concern about the ongoing counterinsurgency in the Somali Region is the potential for food insecurity, primarily due to the suspension of commercial and emergency food deliveries and the subsequent increase in grain prices. Neither UN agencies nor NGOs are able to confirm allegations of burnt villages, forcible displacement, cantonment, or systematic rape, reported separately by Medecins Sans Frontieres (ref B) or by media. Post understands that the GOE has recently decided to allow international assessment teams access to the Somali Region. Post will continue to monitor the situation closely, in collaboration with international humanitarian agencies and NGO partners, and to raise concerns with the GOE. ¶12. (S/NF) The Ambassador and staff have raised the Ogaden problem as not only a major public affairs problem but also a serious humanitarian crisis with senior MFA officials from the Foreign Minister, National Security Advisor and other officials. We will see the Prime Minister next week specifically on the Ogaden issue. We are working with the GOE on opening corridors for humanitarian food relief to areas of heavy fighting. The Embassy continues to work closely with the GOE on information sharing on insurgent infiltration into Ethiopia from Somalia, presence of foreign fighters and threat assessment to Ethiopia, the US and others. END COMMENT. YAMAMOTO

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