ETHIOPIA ETHNIC INSURGENCY (C-AL7-01035):

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ADDIS ABABA 002027

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/E, DRL:S.JOSEPH, AND INR/AA
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER
CJTF-HOA AND USCENTCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/27/2017
TAGS: PGOV PHUM MOPS EAID ET
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA ETHNIC INSURGENCY (C-AL7-01035):
COUNTERINSURGENCY IN OGADEN RAISES HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS

REF: A. ADDIS ABABA 1745 (AND PREVIOUS)

B. STATE 88346 (NOTAL)

Classified By: ERIC WONG, ACTING POL-ECON COUNSELOR. REASON: 1.4 (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY. In separate briefings to Embassy officers,
representatives of Medecins Sans Frontieres (Doctors Without
Borders),as well as USG-funded researchers conducting a
regional assessment of Somali issues, have highlighted
concerns that the Government of Ethiopia's ongoing
counterinsurgency campaign against suspected Ogaden National
Liberation Front (ONLF) rebels in Ethiopia's Somali Region
may lead to a significant humanitarian crisis. MSF and
others report that Ethiopia's federal government has not
delivered any food aid to the Somali Region since November
2006, despite having identified at least 500,000
beneficiaries. Current military operations by the Ethiopian
National Defense Force (ENDF) have resulted in restrictions
on vehicular movement into the region by humanitarian and UN
agencies, and even commercial food shipments are now
effectively blocked. MSF alleges that the ENDF has burnt
three villages in areas predominantly held by ethnic Ogadeni;
there are also unconfirmed reports that the ENDF may have
forcibly displaced pastoralists and relocated them to larger
enclosed villages, as part of its counterinsurgency campaign.
The ENDF is reportedly using attack helicopters in the ONLF
stronghold of Fik; press reports of systemic rape, however,
have not been substantiated and appear to be unfounded. END
SUMMARY.


2. (C) On June 26, poloff, ORA analyst, and REFCOORD met with
Medecins Sans Frontieres-Belgium Country Coordinator Francois
Calas and Medecins Sans Frontieres-Holland representative
Will Robertson (STRICTLY PROTECT),each of whom has worked in
Ethiopia for approximately 18 months. Both organizations are
conducting humanitarian relief work in Ethiopia's Somali
Region: MSF-Belgium is operating in Gode city and to the
west of Gode, while MSF-Holland has five international staff
operating a maternal and children's health clinic in Warder
(Somali name: Wardheer),the capital of Warder Zone (the
Region's easternmost zone, bordering Galcaio in Somalia). As
Warder is "a garrison town" (i.e., local headquarters for the
Ethiopian military),no ONLF fighters had sought medical
treatment from MSF's facility there, Robertson said. He
added that MSF-Holland had established its presence in Warder
in early 2007, with the approval of the Somali Regional
government as well as the Somali Regional health bureau, but
that it now operated with the authorization of the ENDF, as
federal authorities from the GOE have largely supplanted the
authority of regional officials.

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VILLAGES BURNT; ALLEGED FORCED DISPLACEMENTS
--------------


3. (C) Calas and Robertson expressed concerns about numerous
reports they had received of "coercive displacement" of
populations, from areas where the ENDF was conducting active
military operations against suspected ONLF rebels.
Populations from south and southwest of Warder were allegedly
being moved by Ethiopian security forces to Walwal (north of
Warder),as well as to the towns of Yucub and Wufdug
(southwest of Warder). According to Calas and Robertson,
Ethiopian military operations were directed against ethnic
Ogadeni, around Warder and Kebridehar. According to
Robertson, Ethiopian security forces were arming local
militia against rebels, providing weapons to every male
employed by the Somali Regional government. Robertson
reported large-scale detentions of suspected ONLF rebels, as
well as increased "collective action" against entire villages
suspected of rebel activity or support. MSF representatives
said they had not seen any movement of Somalis from Somalia
to the Somali Region, but noted that distinguishing between
Somalis and ethnic Somali Ethiopians would be difficult.


4. (C) MSF representatives said they had first-hand
information that three villages north of Warder (Jinoole,
Caado, and Qaraboole) had been "burnt," presumably by
Ethiopian security forces; Robertson noted that MSF staff had
traveled through Jinoole en route from Warder. Additionally,

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Robertson said MSF had received second-hand but unconfirmed
reports that more than 15 villages south of Warder (between
Warder and Shilaabo) had also been burnt. The MSF
representatives underscored that as they had not been allowed
direct access to this southern area, they were recommending
to donor embassies and to UNHQ in New York that the UN
dispatch a humanitarian team to these towns in the Ogaden to
conduct a first-hand assessment of the situation. (NOTE.
Separately, USAID-funded researchers reported that an UNOCHA
team would seek to travel from Jijiga. END NOTE.)


5. (C) Calas noted that the GOE had blocked all vehicles,
including those being operated by the International Committee
of the Red Cross (ICRC),from leaving Gode and proceeding
south to the Ogaden. Robertson said that only Ethiopian
military vehicles were traveling along the road south from
Jijiga; the ENDF wanted all NGO vehicles to travel behind the
ENDF, fearing that NGO vehicles traveling in front of
military vehicles would only serve to warn the ONLF of the
ENDF's approach. As an independent humanitarian
organization, MSF rejected the requirement to travel only
with armed escorts from the Ethiopian military. Other
international NGOs operating in the Ogaden included ICRC (in
Gode and Jijiga),Save the Children, and Oxfam, but only MSF
was present in Warder.

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FOOD AID AND COMMERCIAL FOOD SHIPMENTS HALTED TO REGION
-------------- --------------


6. (C) Both government shipments of food aid, as well as
commercial deliveries of food, had been halted by the GOE,
according to the MSF representatives. Calas said all
commercial trucking from Gode had been halted for several
weeks, that no commercial food shipments were being made;
furthermore, no food aid from the federal government's
Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Agency (DPPA) had been
delivered to the Somali Region since November 2006. He noted
that DPPA had allocated food for 500,000 beneficiaries in the
Somali Region, but that the GOE had not authorized the World
Food Programme (WFP) to distribute it. Robertson added that
the Somali Region's border with Somalia was closed; prices of
common consumer goods had risen dramatically, increasing the
economic vulnerability of pastoralists were unable to sell
their livestock. As a result, the safety net of local
communities was being "severely tested."


7. (C) Calas noted that the GOE had conducted earlier
military campaigns against the ONLF (e.g., in 2006),but had
not previously sought to "blockade trade;" the current
restrictions (whether de facto or de jure) on food deliveries
represented "a new control mechanism."


8. (C) Calas concluded that, in MSF's view, the GOE (not the
ONLF) was the "main element of insecurity" in the Somali
Region; the few incidents that MSF had experienced had been
caused by the ENDF. UNDP staff had been arrested and beaten
in Degehabur (the zone between Jijiga and Warder, and
adjacent to Fik). Robertson stated that MSF neither
experienced nor anticipated any interference in its
operations from the ONLF.

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SEPARATE USAID ASSESSMENT ALSO HIGHLIGHTS SUSPENDED FOOD AID
-------------- --------------


9. (C) Separately, Amcit consultants Ken Menkhaus (an
academic researcher of Somali issues, formerly at the
National Defense University) and Willet Weeks, highlighted
similar concerns about lack of food shipments to the Ogaden,
in a June 21 briefing to Ambassador. Menkhaus and Weeks had
conducted field research in Harar, Dire Dawa, and Jimma for a
USAID-funded regional assessment to be completed in July
2007, and had interviewed travelers to and from the Somali
Region. (NOTE. The researchers canceled a trip to Jijiga
due to safety concerns; Post issued a travel advisory
recommending against travel to the Somali Region following
the April 24 attack by the ONLF on a Chinese oil facility in
the Ogaden. END NOTE.) The USAID-funded researchers
expressed concern that the GOE was either deliberately "using

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food as a weapon," or had implemented several
counterinsurgency tactics that were inadvertently
exacerbating food insecurity. There was a risk of
"accidental but monumental humanitarian crisis."

-- ALL FOOD SHIPMENTS BLOCKED: According to Menkhaus, the
humanitarian situation in the Somali Region was growing
"worse" and threatened to result in a "sizable humanitarian
disaster quickly." Menkhaus expressed concern that DPPA food
aid had not been provided by the GOE to the Somali Region
since November 2006, despite some 1.1 million individuals who
required food assistance; commercial food shipments had also
been blocked. At the same time, the ENDF had bought up
remaining food stocks itself, he said. Like the MSF
representatives, Menkhaus also reported that ethnic Ogadeni
administrative zones in the Somali Region were under
"lockdown," and that Gode town had been completely shut down
to any vehicular traffic as of mid-June; the GOE had also
restricted the movement of UN and international aid
organizations. Hundreds of individuals had been arrested in
the regional capital, Jijiga, prompting a de facto curfew at
night.

-- PUBLIC REACTION TO COUNTER-INSURGENCY: Menkhaus observed
that as 40-50 percent of the Somali Region's population was
not ethnic Ogadeni, views of the ONLF were mixed; however, as
a result of feeling the impact of the de facto economic
embargo, most were broadly sympathetic to the ONLF. Some
believed that the April 24 attack on the Chinese oil facility
was a result of inter-clan rivalry, despite the ONLF's public
claim of responsibility. There was a popular view that the
GOE was indiscriminately engaging in "collective punishment"
of the populace, and that the Ethiopian military was
targeting its own citizens, not foreigners. Many residents
felt that over the last decade, the Somali Region had become
more economically integrated with the highland regions
(Amhara and Tigray) than with Somalia, and that the
counterinsurgency could adversely impact the development of
the Somali Region. Many held the USG "indirectly
accountable" for the GOE's actions. Menkhaus said
Somali-Ethiopians interviewed had expressed "fear and
concern," principally blaming the ENDF for insecurity, but
acknowledging that some "security incidents" had been caused
by elements who may not be affiliated with the ONLF.
Menkhaus assessed that the ONLF likely could not stop "new
actors," such as al-Shabaab militia affiliated with Somalia's
Council of Islamic Courts (CIC),from crossing the border
into the Somali Region. Rebels from the United Western
Somali Liberation Front also operated in the Region, but "not
enough to be a growing concern," Menkhaus commented. Willet
Weeks highlighted that even stable areas within Ethiopia
faced pressure as a result of Ethiopian security operations;
Jimma's majority Muslim population was quiet "but nervous."
Cross-border consequences were also a concern: authorities at
Mandera faced pressure from the GOE to keep the
Kenya-Ethiopia border sealed.

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ALLEGED FORCED VILLAGIZATION AND DISPLACEMENT BY ENDF
-------------- --------------


10. (C) Prof. Menkhaus said he had received unconfirmed
reports that the ENDF was "collecting villagers" and removing
them to larger towns, forcing pastoralists to live in larger
enclosures, as part of the GOE's counterinsurgency campaign
against the ONLF in the Somali Region. Menkhaus cautioned
that a policy of concentration and establishing protected
villages, such as that pursued in northern Uganda, threatened
to "decimate herds" of livestock, and would create a
large-scale humanitarian disaster.

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AERIAL BOMBARDMENT POSSIBLE; BUT SYSTEMIC RAPE UNCONFIRMED
-------------- --------------


11. (C) Menkhaus reported that the ENDF was using attack
helicopters in Fik. MSF representatives had no information
to corroborate recent press reports of ENDF aerial
bombardment in the Ogaden, noting that Gode Zone and Fik
(which had a significant ONLF guerrilla presence) were areas

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where MSF did not operate. They confirmed that ENDF
helicopters had been used to medevac wounded troops.


12. (C) MSF representatives said they had not/not received
any reports of systematic rape in the Somali Region (as
alleged recently by the New York Times),but added that
Muslim women would be unlikely to discuss such incidents
openly, in the event they occurred. Menkhaus said he had
heard of widespread detentions in Jijiga, but had not/not
received reports from any interviewees on the use of systemic
rape by GOE or regional security authorities.


13. (C) COMMENT. Both USG-funded researchers and
international NGOs thus separately assert that desperately
needed food, whether in the form of food assistance provided
by the central government or commercial food shipments from
vendors, has been blocked from delivery to the Somali Region,
due to the ongoing counterinsurgency campaign. GOE officials
have publicly stated that their campaign against the ONLF
will continue for at least three months, thus likely
increasing the vulnerability of an already economically
underdeveloped pastoralist population. Post will raise
concerns with GOE principals and continue to monitor the
situation closely. Embassy is convening a meeting early next
week with representatives of UNOCHA, other UN agencies, and
NGOs operating in the Ogaden. Ambassador raised deep concern
about these issues with GOE Minister of Defense Kuma Demeksa
on June 27, and will meet with Prime Minister Meles soon on
this issue. END COMMENT.
YAMAMOTO