UNSC-AFRICAN UNION DISCUSSIONS IN ADDIS ABABA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 001960 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER CJTF-HOA AND USCENTCOM FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL KPKO UNSC AU SU SO SUBJECT: UNSC-AFRICAN UNION DISCUSSIONS IN ADDIS ABABA ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. African Union Commission Chairperson Konare urgently requested visiting UN Security Council representatives to provide funding for African peacekeeping forces in Darfur and Somalia. Konare, AU Commissioners, and African Ambassadors highlighted capacity and financial limitations, but asserted that African states were committed to meeting and resolving African crises. Deployment of African troops to Darfur and now to Mogadishu underscore the AU,s ability to act quickly to stabilize a crisis situation, but the AU lacks resources to sustain such deployments and looks to the UN to take over operations and ensure funding. Konare pointed to Burundi operations as an example of successful UN-AU cooperation. AU forces helped stabilize Burundi, brokering an end to a decade-long civil war through a ceasefire and peace accord. The UN followed up with a UN peacekeeping mission, thus demonstrating that the UN and AU working cooperatively can meet Africa's difficult challenges. Sudan and Somalia dominated discussions. Discussions also included the DRC, Cote d,Ivoire, and the Eritrea-Ethiopia border. The large number of participants did not allow for substantive detail discussion of the topics, but did help highlight commitment by the UN and AU to pursue closer cooperation and coordination. END SUMMARY. -------------- AU PLEA FOR FOLLOW-UP -------------- ¶2. (SBU) During a morning session on June 16 with visiting UN Security Council representatives, African Union Commission Chairperson Alpha Oumar Konare and AU Commissioners highlighted areas for closer AU-UN cooperation and coordination in meeting crises in Africa, particularly UN support for funding of contingency operations. The African Union was making progress in organizing members to rapidly respond to crises, AU officials said, citing the initial deployment of 2,000 Rwandan troops to meet urgent humanitarian needs in Darfur. Operations now lasted over ten months, however, and AU member states found it difficult to financially sustain such operations. ¶3. (SBU) More important, Konare pointed out that close cooperation between the UN and AU was important to ensure forward political movement to enable the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to be replaced by the United Nations. The degradation in Chad-Sudan relations, the inability to implement the Abuja Accord, and continued instability, made Darfur operations difficult. ¶4. (SBU) Konare called for greater dialogue with Sudanese President Bashir to find workable solutions. Konare recommended that clear messages of assurance be conveyed to Bashir and the Sudanese that there was no hidden agenda against Sudan. In response to UN representatives' queries on accountability and transparency, Konare asserted that the AU and UN hybrid force could work out a clear command and control structure, and that transparent financial management could be arranged. AU Commissioner for Peace and Security Ambassador Said Djinnit said that time was of the essence: action on a hybrid force had to take place now, not in 2008. ¶5. (SBU) Ambassador Khalilzad outlined the fundamental issues confronting the UN and AU in enhancing closer cooperation. There needed to be a clearly defined timeline and taskings of next steps by the UN and AU. Furthermore, clarity was needed in the command and control structure by the UN, and in transparency and financial management of funding operations. These details, critical to AU-UN coordination in Sudan, had to be laid out quickly. -------------- SOMALIA: THE NEXT UN OPERATION -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Konare articulated the African Union's position that the United Nations now had to take over Somalia operations. The AU had deployed some 1,400 Ugandan troops and now awaited the deployment of Burundian troops to bolster the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The deployment was far short of the ADDIS ABAB 00001960 002 OF 002 8,000 minimum needed to support peacekeeping operations, but the message to Somalia was that the AU was committed to its stabilization. Konare described the importance of Somalia operations in the context of fragile political dialogue in the Middle East affecting East Africa, noting that extremist elements still operated in Somalia. Ethiopian forces had helped neutralize some negative influence and had given Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG) an opportunity to establish itself in Mogadishu. It was necessary for Ethiopian troops to depart, but not before more AU troops were in place to support a smooth transition from Ethiopian forces to AU peacekeepers. ¶7. (SBU) The TFG was weak but the upcoming Somali National Reconciliation Congress could help strengthen stability in Somalia. Konare said the international community had to stop extremism in Somalia and elsewhere in Africa, and neutralize the influence of Jihadist groups. This was why the AU, and hopefully the UN, could help protect the TFG in the short term, and allow for Somalia to stabilize and hold elections for its future leaders. -------------- -- WHY SHOULD THE UN TAKE OVER SOMALIA OPERATIONS? -------------- -- ¶8. (SBU) In the afternoon session, UN representatives pressed Commissioner Djinnit on why the AU should expect the UN to take over Somalia operations. Djinnit noted that AMISOM's current mandate would end in July; while the AU would have to extend AMISOM, it expected the UN to take over operations. He echoed Konare's remarks that UN-AU cooperation in Somalia was key to stability, pointing out Burundi operations as the model for such mutually shared interests. In Burundi, the African Union had deployed Ethiopian and South African forces to stabilize the country. A ceasefire was negotiated, and Tanzania had led peace talks resulting in a peace accord. With a transition government in place in Bujumbura, conditions were met for the UN to take over AU operations. The result had been successful elections, stability, and peace in Burundi. It was hoped that the UN could move into Somalia to help follow-up on AU operations. ¶9. (SBU) UN representatives asked about the prospect for stability in Somalia and the challenges facing the National Reconciliation Congress. Ambassador Khalilzad suggested that if the now-delayed reconciliation congress could not convene, perhaps the AU could help hold several, smaller reconciliation meetings that could eventually lead to a larger comprehensive meeting. -------------- OTHER ISSUES -------------- ¶10. (SBU) UN representatives and African Ambassadors provided brief informational reports on Cote d,Ivoire, the DRC, northern Uganda and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA),the Eritrea-Ethiopia border, and political transition in the Comoros. The reports were brief and void of any controversial remarks. The Belgium UN PermRep's presentation on the Eritrea-Ethiopia border issue was so brief that no issue of contention between the parties was raised. ¶11. (SBU) COMMENT. The day-long meeting at AU headquarters could not delve into substantive detail but did highlight the support for closer AU-UN cooperation and coordination in meeting crises in Africa. UN Security Council representatives first met formally with AU Peace and Security Council (AU PSC) counterparts at AU Commission Headquarters in Addis Ababa in 2006. Significant challenges remain before the UN considers operations in Sudan and particularly Somalia. END COMMENT. ¶12. (U) Ambassador Khalilzad cleared this message. YAMAMOTO