SOMALIA: AF DAS SWAN CONSULTATIONS WITH EU ENVOY

C O N F I D E N T I A L ADDIS ABABA 001549 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF AND AF/E LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER CJTF-HOA AND USCENTCOM FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/22/2017 TAGS: PREL KISL ET SO SUBJECT: SOMALIA: AF DAS SWAN CONSULTATIONS WITH EU ENVOY JEAN-CHRISTOPHE BELLIARD REF: A. ADDIS ABABA 1531 ¶B. ADDIS ABABA 1457 ¶C. NAIROBI 2098 (NOTAL) Classified By: ERIC WONG, DEPUTY POL-ECON COUNSELOR. REASON: 1.4 (B) A ND (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. On May 11, Jean-Christophe Belliard, Personal Envoy for Somalia of EU High Representative for Foreign and Defense Policy Javier Solana, informed visiting AF DAS Jim Swan and Special Envoy to Somalia-designate Ambassador John Yates of recent consultations held separately with Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles and with former Council of Islamic Courts Consultative Committee Chairman Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys. According to Belliard, Meles believed that Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG) President Abdullahi Yusuf was committed to political engagement of Somali leaders from Hawiye sub-clans, but that TFG Prime Minister Ghedi lacked the necessary political skills to foster support among his own Hawiye clan. Belliard said Meles strongly objected to the possible participation in the upcoming National Reconciliation Conference of Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, Adan Hashi Ayro, al-Itihaad al-Islamiya (AIAI) leader Hassan Abdullah Hersi al-Turki, and hard-core al-Shabaab elements of the CIC. In contrast, however, the League of Arab States and Egypt were actively promoting political engagement with Aweys, who remained in Somalia. Belliard commented that within the EU, Italy exercised the de facto lead on Somalia issues, just as the UK did on Sudan, and that EC Development Commissioner Louis Michel was a "free agent." END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) DAS Swan reviewed the aims of his consultations with GOE officials (ref B),and the need to urge Yusuf to take concrete actions within the next 10-14 days to further political accommodation of Hawiye clan leaders prior to the upcoming June 14 National Reconciliation Conference (NRC). The approach to Yusuf was intended to reinforce messages delivered earlier during AF A/S Frazer's meeting with Yusuf in Baidoa. The GOE agreed that Somali reconciliation required a political solution but could push harder, Swan said, noting that while the GOE had initiated its own talks with Hawiye leaders, it had defended the recent appointment of warlords (ref B). Amb. Yates observed that interlocutors from the Somali "Horn Afrique" broadcasting company considered Hawiye leaders involved in talks with the TFG to be representative of the Hawiye. ¶3. (C) The issue of property rights (especially for Hawiye/Habr-Gedir/Ayr sub-clan members who had occupied property formerly belonging to others) could be addressed as part of a longer-term process during the transition, Swan said. Belliard responded that the Habr-Gedir sub-clan had been a "spoiler" for the last decade; its clan structure comprised numerous elders but no clear leader, Belliard said. Belliard noted that while Yusuf was a member of the Darod clan, he hailed from Somalia's Mudug region were the Hawiye/Habr-Gedir sub-clan had been dominant, and therefore should have some understanding of Habr-Gedir dynamics. -------------- -------------- MELES BACKS TFG PRESIDENT YUSUF, BUT NOT PM GHEDI -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) Belliard discussed his two-hour-long meeting on Somalia and Eritrea earlier in the day with Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi. Belliard said Meles assessed that TFG President Yusuf was committed to the "4.5" formula of Somali representation (i.e., Darod, Dir, Hawiye, and Rahanweyne, with the remainder held by minority constituencies),and that Yusuf was actively engaging Hawiye and Hawiye/Habr-Gedir/Ayr clan leaders in political consultations. In contrast, Meles had complained that TFG Prime Minister Ali Mohammed Ghedi "has not delivered" and lacked any political following; if the upcoming NRC aimed to provide new leadership, Ghedi was not the appropriate individual. ¶5. (C) While the TFG had accepted the "4.5" formula, it was necessary to identify the appropriate representatives, Belliard said. He agreed that PM Ghedi lacked necessary political skills, and that one of Ghedi's key advisors was a French veterinarian, Daniel Bourzat, whom Ghedi had befriended when he too had been a professional veterinarian. Ghedi had written to the President of France proposing that Bourzat be named French ambassador to Somalia, Belliard added, but Bourzat was not qualified. Nevertheless, France continued to fund Bourzat. Belliard said he recognized how Ghedi found it politically expedient to appoint Mohamed Dhere as mayor of Mogadishu, as Dhere had delivered security in Jowhar, but that Dhere had to be replaced. ¶6. (C) Belliard said Meles strongly objected to the possible participation in the NRC of former Council of Islamic Courts (CIC) Consultative Committee Chairman Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, Adan Hashi Ayro, al-Itihaad al-Islamiya (AIAI) leader Hassan Abdullah Hersi al-Turki, and hard-core al-Shabaab elements of the CIC. Belliard commented that "Meles' red-line is Aweys." Meles had underscored that the CIC had been defeated, but that Aweys had others continually sought to re-open the political process, which was now unacceptable. Meles did not consider CIC representatives in Asmara representative of the Somali people, Belliard added. On the other hand, according to Belliard, Meles did not object to former CIC security chief Sheikh Yusuf Mohamed Siad Indho-Adde participating in the NRC. -------------- -------------- ARAB LEAGUE BACKING FORMER CIC LEADER SHEIKH AWEYS -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Belliard noted that the League of Arab States was not only in contact with Aweys, but was also (with Egypt) actively promoting political engagement with Aweys, who was not a member of the al-Shabaab but influenced them. Belliard related that within minutes of concluding a meeting with League of Arab States representatives, he had received a phone call from Aweys, who was in Somalia. During their telcon in Arabic, Aweys had objected to the presence of both Ethiopian troops and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces, considering them to be equivalent, but welcomed the Jeddah initiative (i.e., the initiative adopted by the Arab League Summit in Riyadh to "boost the national reconciliation process in Somalia in conformity with the national reconciliation plan of the TFG", as referenced by the April 13 IGAD ministerial communique). Arab states sought to arrange a meeting or political process between the TFG and Aweys (and others),Belliard said. Belliard said he planned to meet the Saudi ambassador in Nairobi, to discuss whether Saudi Arabia could deliver CIC moderates or provide financial assistance to AMISOM. ¶8. (C) Amb. Yates observed that the International Contact Group on Somalia would meet soon to discuss the inclusion of Egypt and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) as members; Canada, the Netherlands, and South Africa also wanted to join. Belliard responded that the Contact Group should be kept small; if the OIC, Egypt, and others were allowed to join, why not include Ethiopia? According to Belliard, Meles had asserted that Egypt was using the Somalia issue to counter Ethiopia because of tensions over disputed Nile water resources. ¶9. (C) Commenting on other external actors seeking to play a role in Somalia, Belliard said that he planned to meet with AU Commission Chairperson Alpha Oumar Konare, who had participated in the Arab League Summit. Within the EU, Belliard said Italy took the de facto lead on Somalia issues, just as the UK did on Sudan, while EC Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid Louis Michel was "a free agent." Special Representative of the UN SYG (SRSG) for Somalia, Francois Fall, had been extended for one year. DAS Swan observed that neither the AU Special Envoy Mohamed Ali Foum nor UN SRSG Fall had been as active on Somalia as they should be. ¶10. (C) On Eritrea, Belliard said that PM Meles had not objected to EC Commissioner Michel meeting with Eritrean President Isaias, but did object to Michel's public remarks welcoming Isaias as a partner, especially given Eritrea's destabilizing role in Somalia. Belliard said he believed that Michel did raise Somalia with Isaias privately, but not Eritrea's internal situation. Eritrea was an "absolutist state," Belliard said, and Isaias had "not delivered" on eastern Sudan (despite harboring Sudanese rebels in Asmara). DAS Swan noted that in terms of addressing Ethiopia-Eritrea border tensions, the U.S. was now taking the approach of letting other parties who had better relations with Isaias engage him. ¶11. (C) COMMENT. Jean-Christophe Belliard's observations highlight his active consultations on Somalia with PM Meles and others, as well the divergence of views (e.g., on the role of Ethiopia and Eritrea in Somalia) between EU High Representative Solana and the more outspoken EC Commissioner Louis Michel. PM Meles's remark that Egypt uses differences in Somalia policy to counter Ethiopia may explain, to some degree, the AU's limited role in fostering political engagement of Somali actors, as both Ethiopia and Sudan are members of the AU's 15-member Peace and Security Council (AU PSC). Meles' support for TFG President Yusuf, but criticism of TFG Prime Minister Ghedi, is consistent with the GOE non-paper subsequently presented on May 15 to Ambassador Yates (ref A) and Ethiopian State Minister for Foreign Affairs Tekeda Alemu's observation that except for Yusuf, there were no "sacred cows" among the TFG leadership. END COMMENT. ¶12. (U) AF DAS Swan cleared this cable. YAMAMOTO