ETHIOPIA: DAS SWAN URGES GOE TO MOVE FORWARD ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 001484

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

AF FOR DAS SWAN AND A/S FRAZIER
DRL FOR DAS KRILLA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM ET ER
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA: DAS SWAN URGES GOE TO MOVE FORWARD ON
RELEASE OF DETAINEES

REF: ADDIS 1420

Classified By: Pol/Econ Counselor Kevin Sullivan for reason 1.4 (b) and
(d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: AF DAS Jim Swan urged Minister Bereket
Simon, Public Relations advisor to Prime Minister Meles, to
seize the opportunity presented by a written apology from
detained CUD leaders to release them. Bereket clearly took
the point on board, but offered the standard GOE reply that
the legal process must take its course. Bereket also briefed
Swan on current difficulties in the inter-party dialogue on
democratic reforms, noting that the major opposition groups
had pulled out "because they did not get 100 percent of what
they wanted." Pol/Econ Counselor suggested that the Embassy
might intercede with opposition leaders to bring them back to
the table; Bereket welcomed the initiative. He also argued
that ruling party discussions with youth leaders were
"changing the public atmosphere" and that most Ethiopians
were NOW far more concerned about the cost of living and
public services than in the fate of the CUD detainees.
Bereket also suggested that Ethiopians continued to support
the GOE's efforts in Somalia. Comment: the GOE is NOW in a
good position to release the CUD leaders if they wish to do
so, and DAS Swan's message from the Department on this point
was extremely useful. It may be useful for other Department
officials to reinforce this message. Concerning the current
breakdown in the inter-party dialogue, however, most of the
blame probably goes to opposition leaders who have walked out
over questionable issues, rather than finding compromise
solutions. Post has already begun trying to jawbone them
back to the table. END SUMMARY.


2. (SBU) On May 11, AF DAS Jim Swan called on Bereket Simon,
Public Relations Advisor to the Prime Minister with the rank
of Minister and the GOE's senior representative in political
talks with the opposition. Bereket was joined by EPRDF
international affairs rep Sekuture Getachew. Pol/Econ
Counselor, Deputy and visiting Amb. John Yates accompanied
Swan.

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SWAN ASK GOE TO SEIZE OPPORTUNITY OF APOLOGY LETTER
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3. (C) After noting that the main purpose of his visit to
Addis was to discuss cooperation with the GOE on Somalia, DAS
Swan told Bereket that he was also interested in discussing
Ethiopia's internal situation. He said that progress on
President Bush's global "freedom agenda" in Ethiopia was of
great interest both to the Administration and to Congress.
Swan asked specifically about recent developments on
democratic reforms under discussion with the opposition, as
well as about efforts by a group of Ethiopian elders (reftel)
to broker the release of detained leaders from the Coalition
for Unity and Democracy (CUD). He remarked that the
detainees remained an important symbolic issue, and "putting
the problem behind you" would represent a dramatic step
forward. The DAS noted that the two best-known leaders of
the CUD, party chairman Hailu Shawel and Addis Mayor-elect
Berhanu Nega, had signed a letter apologizing for damage
caused during riots in November 2005 and committing
themselves to respect the Constitution and the democratic
process. Swan urged the GOE to seize the opportunity of this
letter, rather than seeking something further from the
detainees, to deflect criticism of Ethiopia's human rights
record and get democratization moving forward again.


4. (C) Bereket agreed that both democratic reforms and the
situation of the detainees were important for both the USG
and the GOE. Both governments needed to work together to
advance their common interests on these matters. After
reviewing key developments during and after the 2005 national
election campaign, Bereket concluded that the opposition had
refused to accept the results of the election and had instead
sought to stage a "coup" by exploiting unemployed youth in
the cities. Since then, the GOE had pursued two main goals:
1) restore law and order; and 2) create a new, wider space
for the opposition. In the new, post-election political
environment, the "ruling party decides, and the opposition
has a right to be heard," Bereket said.


5. (C) The PM's advisor told Swan that the GOE had pursued

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negotiations with the opposition prior to the "showdown" in
November 2005, but that once the November strikes and
demonstrations had sought to overthrow the EPRDF by force,
the GOE had pursued a legal/judicial approach to the problem.
The GOE had subsequently made its case in court, and the
court's initial ruling had found merit in the charges of
subversion against CUD leaders. Bereket said that "it is in
our interest to see the judicial process run its course." He
noted that the initiative undertaken by the elders to broker
clemency for the detainees had experienced ups and downs, but
had been frustrated in the end. He could not say what the
future of the process would be. DAS Swan pressed on whether
the GOE truly supported the elders initiative or was simply
committed to the trial, to which Bereket responded that the
Prime Minister was handling the discussions directly, but
that in the meantime the detainees were being offered a
speedy, fair trial. He added that when some participants in
recent town hall meetings in Addis had tried to raise the
issue of the detainees, others had complained, wanting to
talk instead about inflation or other more practical concerns.


6. (C) Swan concluded on this issue by noting that as long
the detention of CUD leaders continued, it would remain a
focal point for concerns about democratization and could
overshadow progress in other areas. He suggested that the
GOE do a careful cost/benefit analysis concerning the
situation and reconsider the idea of releasing the detainees
based on the letter they had submitted to the elders.

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REFORM TALKS STALLED -- CAN POST HELP?
--------------


7. (C) Concerning talks on democratic reform, he thanked Swan
for the help that the USG had provided through USAID-funded
studies on parliamentary rules, national election board (NEB)
and the draft media law. The current issue at hand was a
draft electoral law and the appointment of a new, nine-member
NEB. Bereket said that the GOE had accepted nearly all the
suggestions offered in the donor study of the NEB, but that
opposition leaders were demanding that "100 percent of their
proposals be adopted, or they would walk out." Among the
most contentious issues was the question of foreign election
observation, which opposition leaders said must be mandated
in the new law. The GOE, for its part, maintained that
domestic observers had a right to monitor polls, but the GOE
would determine when to issue invitations to international
observers. Bulcha Demeksa of the OFDM, who had been assigned
to coordinate the NEB vetting process, had pulled his party
out of talks over this disagreement, probably at the urging
of the UEDF, which had already walked out over the vetting
process itself, Bereket suggested.


8. (C) Pol/Econ Counselor acknowledged Bereket's point that
the GOE had come a long way on the NEB vetting process and
agreed that the opposition had been somewhat inflexible and
quick to abandon the reform talks. He offered the U.S.
Embassy's assistance in bringing opposition leaders back to
the table for further discussion. Bereket welcomed Post's
help on this score.

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BEREKET -- PUBLIC SUPPORT ON SOMALIA REMAINS SOLID
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9. (C) Amb. Yates, head of Embassy Nairobi's Somalia Unit,
asked Bereket about Ethiopian public opinion with respect to
the GOE's military intervention in Somalia. Bereket replied
that the ruling party had built a solid case for the
existence of a real, immediate threat in Somalia. Internal
pressure on Ethiopia's continuing military presence there had
been too great, he said, although Al Jazeera propaganda had
not been helpful. In fact, international media opinion had
posed a far greater challenge than domestic political
opinion. Bereket also claimed that people understood the
need for a strong GOE response to other recent security
issues, including the abductions of Ethiopians and
international tourists in the Afar Region and the attack
against the Chinese oil facility in the Ogaden.


10. (C) Bereket did acknowledge that the financial burden of
Ethiopian military operations in Somalia was considerable.
"We are carrying the burden of Africa," he said. "This

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should have been the African Union's issue." Nonetheless,
the GOE realized that failing to secure Ethiopia against the
threat (of the Islamic Courts) would have been even more
costly in the long run. He also noted that the biggest
security threat for Ethiopia remained Eritrea, although it
did currently have the military capacity to attack.

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COMMENT: RELEASE AND DIALOGUE NEEDED BEFORE ELECTIONS
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11. (C) The GOE is NOW in a good position to release the CUD
leaders if they wish to do so, and DAS Swan's message from
the Department on this point was extremely useful. It may be
useful for other senior USG officials to reinforce this
message again. Concerning the current breakdown in the
inter-party dialogue, however, most of the blame probably
goes to the opposition leaders who have walked out over
questionable issues, rather than finding a compromise
solutions. Post has already begun trying to jawbone them
back to the table and will continue to do so. It will be
difficult to hold successful local elections in Ethiopia
within the next 6-8 months without both the release of the
CUD detainees and significant progress on Ethiopia's
electoral law and institutions.


12. (C) DAS Swan cleared on this message.
YAMAMOTO