AF DAS SWAN CONSULTATIONS ON SOMALIA WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 001457 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF AND AF/E LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/14/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER SO ET EG SUBJECT: AF DAS SWAN CONSULTATIONS ON SOMALIA WITH ETHIOPIAN STATE MINISTER TEKEDA REF: A. ADDIS ABABA 40 ¶B. NAIROBI 1905 Classified By: ERIC WONG, DEPUTY POL-ECON COUNSELOR. REASON: 1.4 (B) A ND (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. In May 11 consultations with AF DAS Swan and Ambassador Yates, State Minister for Foreign Affairs Tekeda Alemu agreed that the current success of military operations in Somalia afforded a short-term opportunity for Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG) President Abdullahi Yusuf to elevate his political outreach to Hawiye clan representatives, and that the U.S. and Ethiopia should act in tandem to present a joint message to Yusuf underscoring the necessity for immediate action to promote Somali political reconciliation long before the formal convening of a National Reconciliation Conference. DAS Swan presented a non-paper proposing specific, concrete steps Yusuf could take to assure Hawiye leadership, ranging from publicly announcing a joint ceasefire, to privately soliciting a short-list of Hawiye-endorsed candidates to replace TFG Prime Minister Ghedi. While accepting the immediate need for political accommodation of Hawiye clan members, Minister Tekeda cautioned against undermining the TFG, and asserted that external threats represented an equally formidable challenge to Somali stability. Tekeda criticized the role Arab League countries (especially Egypt and Saudi Arabia) and Italy sought to play in Somalia. Tekeda affirmed that Ethiopia's fundamental objective was ensuring that Somalia did not become a terrorist safehaven, and supporting a Somali government that coexisted with others in the region in accordance with principles of international law. At Minister Tekeda's request, Ambassador Yates will meet again with Tekeda on May 15. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (U) On May 11, AF Deputy Assistant Secretary Jim Swan, Counselor for Somali Affairs Amb. John Yates, Ambassador, and deputy pol-econ counselor (note-taker) met with Ethiopia's State (i.e., deputy) Minister for Foreign Affairs Takeda Alemu, Acting Chief of the Minister's Cabinet Abdeta Dribssa, and MFA Director of Europe and the Americas Tebege Berhe. -------------- PROPOSING A JOINT MESSAGE TO THE TFG -------------- ¶3. (C) DAS Swan explained that as a follow-up to FM Seyoum's April 23 meeting in Washington with AF A/S Frazer, his visit aimed at coordinating policy on Somalia and joint messages to be conveyed to TFG President Yusuf. The military campaign's recent success in Somalia afforded an opportunity for the TFG to advance political reconciliation, particularly power-sharing with the Hawiye clan. Yusuf urgently needed to immediately make visible, concrete gestures to reach out to the Hawiye community, in order to ensure that current Hawiye interlocutors did not lose credibility, and that residual extremist elements did not gain influence, Swan said. Minister Tekeda responded that the GOE completely agreed with this assessment. ¶4. (C) Swan underscored the need to push the TFG to take a collaborative, cooperative approach, in political consultations with Hawiye leaders. In the absence of concrete gestures, Swan continued, there was a risk that Hawiye would turn to less constructive, alternate representatives. President Yusuf's appointment of two Hawiye former warlords as mayor of Mogadishu and as national police commander (Mohamed Omar Habeb Mohamed Dheere of Jowhar, and Abdi Hassan Awale Qeybdid of north Mogadishu, respectively) was discouraging to Hawiye (ref B),Swan said, as was the possible appointment of other former warlords to cabinet positions, such as Mohammed Afrah Qanyare. Swan and Amb. Yates proposed that the USG and GOE meet jointly with President Yusuf and other TFG leaders, to present a common message on the need for power-sharing and political accommodation. ¶5. (C/REL ET) DAS Swan reviewed specific steps that Yusuf could be urged to take to reach out to Hawiye: -- Publicly announcing that recent appointments, including ADDIS ABAB 00001457 002 OF 003 Mohamed Dheere as Governor of Benadir, are temporary emergency measures, and are not intended as permanent appointments; -- Publicly agreeing to a joint ceasefire and stabilization arrangements, including security arrangements for the National Reconciliation Conference (NRC),cantonment of forces, and interim security arrangements for Mogadishu; -- Inviting the Hawiye community to recommend appointments to the Benadir Administration, following consultations with the community; -- Privately asking Hawiye leaders to provide a short-list of acceptable candidates to replace TFG PM Ghedi, from which Yusuf could choose, with timing for replacement to be negotiated; -- Emphasizing the transitional nature of the TFG, and stressing plans to prepare for a permanent government after elections in 2009; -- Publicly endorsing the NRC, and confirming the TFG's intention to consider and implement recommendations of the NRC; also confirm that the NRC will be independent, with a political (not merely social) mandate, and that each clan will have free choice of its representatives. Consider expanding the NRC to include one additional member acceptable to Hawiye clan elders; -- Reaching out to Islamic moderates in lower-level court structures, or perhaps from within the lower ranks of the former Council of Islamic Courts (CIC),if not extremist-affiliated, to defuse potential appeal by the group of CIC representatives in Asmara for support. ¶6. (C) Joint action was required to ensure that Yusuf urgently took these steps, Swan added. He observed that the NRC would be symbolic: a public conclusion to a process that must be undertaken immediately. Amb. Yates remarked that an inclusive NRC was crucial: a conference of "friends" alone would not be useful. Amb. Yates said Hawiye representatives had appreciated previous gestures by Yusuf, including an April 28 interview expressing concern for civilian casualties in Mogadishu. Following a meeting with Yusuf and Ghedi, the Hawiye Leadership Council had complained about Ghedi's "triumphalism," but had nevertheless appreciated Yusuf's flexibility, Yates added. -------------- -------------- ETHIOPIA CONCERNED ABOUT EXTERNAL CHALLENGES TO TFG -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Minister Tekeda responded that the GOE shared concern about whether the TFG was sufficiently flexible: if the TFG did not take advantage of near-term political opportunities, then the sacrifices made in military operations would have been in vain. The GOE had "no illusion" that successful military operations were adequate to create stability in Somalia; military operations only created the conditions for political success, Tekeda said. Political reconciliation was "a work in progress" that would be proven in the NRC. Ethiopia attached great importance to the NRC, but agreed that the NRC preparatory process was key, as the conference itself was "not a forum where you sort out the nitty-gritty." The GOE understood that Mohamed Dheere and Abdi Qeybdid were not to be long-term appointments, and the GOE had "no desire to treat anyone like a sacred cow." President Yusuf needed to be approached with what the NRC preparatory committee had approved, Tekeda added. The GOE and USG needed to act in tandem to "set the tone" and maintain momentum for political reconciliation in Somalia; later, other parties could be brought in to support what should become a roadmap for the international community. However, success was not guaranteed: noting that President Yusuf was "someone you can't push around," Tekeda cautioned against undermining the confidence of the TFG. ¶8. (C) Tekeda observed that Ethiopia was equally concerned about a second challenge: "terrorists" had been defeated militarily, but some Hawiye/Habr-Gedir/Ayr now in talks with Ethiopia were allied with such terrorists until recently. Thus, individuals such as Mohammed Qanyare were needed in "sensitive positions," as the GOE had "full confidence" in their ability to participate "in the fight against terrorism." It had been politically necessary to disarm ADDIS ABAB 00001457 003 OF 003 Somali warlords in March, but Ethiopian forces "paid for the consequences": Ethiopian troops were not allowed to patrol Mogadishu, and weapons were freely available to terrorists and Ayr extremists. Tekeda expressed concern about "inadvertently" encouraging Ayr who needed to be politically engaged but whose loyalty was questionable. ¶9. (C) Tekeda criticized the role Arab League countries (especially Egypt and Saudi Arabia) and Italy sought to play in Somalia. Despite public statements, Egypt was "not with us." Saudi Arabia, if not handled carefully, could create complications as "late-comers" seeking to play a more proactive role in Somalia, and should be encouraged to support the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and engage moderates. The April 23 IGAD ministerial communique's acknowledgement of the Saudi initiative was "innocuous," Tekeda said. While support from Italy was needed, Italy had been neither helpful nor constructive, Tekeda said, due to individual "idiosyncrasies." These external actors, coupled with the destabilizing activities of Eritrea, presented no less a formidable challenge to the TFG, Tekeda concluded, cautioning against creating opportunities for such external actors to "scatter the process" of rebuilding Somalia. ¶10. (C) Ethiopia's fundamental objective was ensuring that Somalia did not become a terrorist safehaven, and supporting a Somali government that coexisted with others in the region in accordance with principles of international law, Tekeda said. IGAD (in a process chaired by Kenyan mediator Kiplagat),not the GOE, had created the TFG; similarly, AMISOM had been endorsed by consensus (even including Eritrea) in March 2005. Citing Hawiye/Abgal support, Tekeda underscored that opposition to the TFG stemmed from Hawiye subclans, such as the Hawiye/Habr-Gedir/Suleiman and the Hawiye/Habr-Gedir/Ayr, not from the Hawiye clan as a whole. ¶11. (C) DAS Swan acknowledged Tekeda's concerns, but reiterated that failure by Yusuf to take immediate advantage of the current political opportunity would embolden these external actors. The immediate, near-term danger was that failure to assure constructive elements of the Hawiye leadership would lead them to embrace al-Shabaab hard-liners, CIC remnants in Asmara, and others. One lacked the luxury of waiting for the NRC to demonstrate President Yusuf's commitment to political outreach, Swan said. The USG was proposing joint action as it recognized the difficulty of influencing Yusuf. Political accommodation of Hawiye should not be seen as an obstacle to the consultative process; Hawiye could be given political representation, while key portfolios (e.g., security) could be held by those close to Yusuf, Swan said. Swan concluded by urging Tekeda to review specific elements of a message that would be conveyed jointly and privately to President Yusuf, and to explore other areas where the U.S. and Ethiopia could cooperate to advance shared objectives in Somalia. ¶12. (C) COMMENT: While international media highlight Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia, the GOE has consistently sought political engagement with Somali clan leaders, and hosted several rounds of discussions with Hawiye/Habr-Gedir/Ayr representatives in Addis Ababa. Tekeda's observations are consistent with Prime Minister Meles' statement to A/S Frazer that ultimately "war against terrorists will be won or lost on the political front" (ref A),and that the TFG must follow positive statements with positive action. END COMMENT. YAMAMOTO