ETHIOPIA: SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF USCENTCOM CDR

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 ADDIS ABABA 001406 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF AND AF/E LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER CJTF-HOA AND USCCENTCOM FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/08/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV EAID MASS KDEM ET ER SO SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA: SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF USCENTCOM CDR ADMIRAL WILLIAM J. FALLON Classified By: AMBASSADOR DONALD YAMAMOTO. REASON: 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. U.S. engagement with Ethiopia focuses on the objectives of bolstering democratic institutions and processes and the protection of human rights; enhancing regional security and fighting terrorism; and supporting economic reform and development, breaking the cycle of food insecurity and dependence on humanitarian assistance. The GOE has made a commitment to liberalize Ethiopia's economy, push forward democratic reforms, and cooperate with us on a variety of initiatives. Ethiopia is our most strategic partner in Africa in combating terrorism and promoting regional stability. The USG and Ethiopia have formed a strong partnership in eliminating extremism in Somalia and re-establishing a central government for the first time in 16 years. Your visit will afford a valuable opportunity to reinforce our bilateral cooperation. Our Mission has 150 direct hires and long-term contractors, and an additional 200 temporary staff assisting Ethiopia with pursuing our common security goals in Somalia. END SUMMARY. -------------- DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS -------------- ¶2. (U) May 2005 Elections: The campaign period prior to the May 2005 elections was the most fair and open in Ethiopia's history, and the opposition received significantly more popular support in the election than ever before: winning control of the Addis Ababa city administration, as well over 170 seats in the 547-seat parliament, up from 12 seats previously. While some international observers, such as the European Union, noted electoral irregularities, observers from the Carter Center concluded that the majority of the votes were cast in favor of the ruling Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) coalition. Arguing that the elections were stolen, however, leaders from the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD, the largest opposition party) initially refused to take their seats, even though other opposition parties decided to join the Parliament and Regional Councils. Around 90 of the CUD's MPs eventually later decided to take their seats in Parliament as well, bringing the total opposition presence there to around ¶150. ¶3. (U) Political Crackdown: After boycotting elective office, CUD leaders in October 2005 organized a civil disobedience campaign that turned violent when confronted by security forces. During demonstrations in June and November 2005, security forces opened fire on protesters killing 193 and injuring 763. The government arrested most of the CUD leadership who refused to take their seats, closed a host of opposition-oriented newspapers, and detained over 30,000 civilians incommunicado and without charge for two months. All but a few hundred were eventually released. Authorities charged 111 opposition leaders, journalists, and civil society leaders, including CUD Chairman Hailu Shawel and several U.S. citizen employees of Voice of America, with capital crimes, ranging from treason and genocide to "outrages against the Constitution." The Government later dropped charges against the U.S. citizens, and dropped treason and genocide charges against all defendants. However, as of April 2007, approximately 50 of these defendants remained in detention facing trial on other capital charges. ¶4. (C) Evidence presented to date in the ongoing trial of these political detainees, which is attended regularly by U.S. Embassy officials, has failed to convince most observers. The United States has continued to urge the Ethiopian Government to drop the charges against these individuals as the continuing trial represents a major impediment to an inclusive process of democratization. The USG has supported mediation efforts by Ethiopian elders to broker the release of the CUD and other detainees in return for their taking responsibility for seeking to overthrow the GOE. No resolution has yet been achieved, but talks continue. ¶5. (C) Moving Forward: Despite the trial, the U.S. and other ADDIS ABAB 00001406 002 OF 006 donors continue to facilitate an ongoing process of political dialogue between the ruling party and opposition leaders of the Coalition for Unity and Democracy Party (CUDP),the United Ethiopian Democratic Forces (UEDF) party, and the Oromo Federal Democratic Movement (OFDM) party, who have taken their seats in Parliament. Party representatives, supported by comparative studies funded by the U.S. and other donors, have already revised Parliamentary rules of procedure to make them better reflect international standards and to accommodate a multi-party political environment. The dialogue also reached agreement on many aspects of the reorganization of the National Electoral Board. The U.S. strategy since last year has been to work closely with the opposition and government alike to strengthen the democratic process. Apart from nurturing talks on institutional reform, another challenge is convincing the EPRDF to reduce harassment of opposition party activists in rural areas and allow opposition offices to reopen. Progress on these issues will be critical to successful local elections, currently scheduled for late-2007. -------------- REGIONAL STABILITY AND SECURITY -------------- ¶6. (U) In the wake of Ethiopia's successful military intervention in Somalia in December 2006, Somalis are in a position to rebuild their nation after 16 years as a "failed state". Ethiopia launched the offensive after the extremist Council of Islamic Courts (CIC) declared jihad against Ethiopia and attacked Somalia's internationally- recognized Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in the central Somali town of Baidoa. The Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) soundly defeated the CIC and forced its members to flee their base in Mogadishu. However, intense fighting against remaining insurgents continues in Mogadishu. ¶7. (U) The USG has pledged USD 40 million in assistance to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and other Somalia reconstruction efforts. The GOE has also been active in urging the TFG to pursue broad-based national reconciliation in Somalia to weaken support for the nascent CIC-led insurgency and to consolidate TFG administration throughout Somalia. A national reconciliation conference is expected to be held in Mogadishu in June 2007, after having been postponed from April. ¶8. (S/NF) The U.S. and Ethiopian Governments cooperated closely in pursuing high-value targets (HVTs) from the East Africa cell of Al-Qaida who fled toward the Kenyan border following the collapse of their CIC protectors. Al-Qaida operatives included some individuals who participated in the 1998 bombings of U.S. Embassies in Tanzania and Kenya. USG public statements acknowledging attacks on HVTs in Somalia by U.S. AC-130 gunships subsequently created some friction with the GOE, however. The GOE told the USG that the news of the attacks jeopardized the participation of other African nations in AMISOM. The U.S. suspended strikes against the HVTs, and, shortly thereafter, several countries announced contributions to the force at the January 2007 African Union Summit in Addis, including two battalions from the Uganda. Nigeria and Burundi are also expected to contribute to the force, and other countries are still evaluating participation. ¶9. (U) Ethiopia-Eritrea: The Ethiopia-Eritrea war of 1998-2000 cost over 100,000 lives and ended in the Algiers Peace Agreement, which established a 25km demilitarized Temporary Security Zone (TSZ) in Eritrea; established a UN peacekeeping operation (UNMEE) to monitor the TSZ, and an independent Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC) to render final and binding delimitation and demarcation decisions laying out the legal border. ¶10. (C) Despite a border delimitation decision rendered in April 2002, the parties have failed to allow demarcation. Ethiopia has accepted the EEBC's border delimitation decision, but insists on dialogue with Eritrea about the consequences of dividing villages and other issues before ADDIS ABAB 00001406 003 OF 006 allowing for demarcation. Eritrea insists on full demarcation before considering dialogue. Intensive U.S. diplomatic efforts in 2006 to break the impasse ultimately failed. As physical demarcation of the border has not been possible, the EEBC recently declared that it has "demarcated" the border by coordinates, and has given both Ethiopia and Eritrea until November 2007 to accept its decision. ¶11. (U) Since October 2005, Eritrea has restricted the movement of UNMEE, including banning all aerial operations, which has precluded UNMEE from adequately monitoring much of the 600-mile border. Eritrea has also expelled UN peacekeepers and military observers from Western countries; USG MILOBs assigned to UNMEE currently serve on the Ethiopian side of the border. In October 2006, Eritrea sent 1,500 troops and 15 tanks into the previously demilitarized TSZ in the southwest. -------------- COUNTER-INSURGENCY -------------- ¶12. (C) Domestic Insurgencies: Insurgent activity in Ethiopia has increased since the civil disturbances following the May 2005 elections. The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and Ogadeni National Liberation Front (ONLF) respectively are Oromo (40 percent of the Ethiopian population) and Somali (6 percent) nationalist movements which have taken up arms against the Ethiopian government in response to perceived ethnic marginalization. Both organizations are receiving assistance from the Eritrean government as another front in Eritrea's proxy war with Ethiopia. Over the past two years, the OLF has dramatically stepped up civil disobedience campaigns among students and has successfully infiltrated the Ethiopian military; several Oromo senior military officers and hundreds of soldiers have defected to the OLF. ¶13. (U) In May 2006, the OLF, ONLF, and the Ethiopian People's Patriotic Front (EPPF) joined together with Diaspora members of the CUD political opposition party to establish a unified Alliance for Freedom and Democracy (AFD) calling for a national conference to bring democracy to Ethiopia. Despite the AFD's professed support for the constitution its pledge of peace, member parties continue their armed struggle against the government. ¶14. (S/NF) The ONLF has claimed responsibility for an April 2007 attack on a Chinese oil exploration installation near Jijiga, in Ethiopia's Somali Region. Approximately 200 insurgents attacked the site, killing 9 Chinese workers and nearly 80 local residents, and killing or injuring 34 Ethiopian troops guarding the facility. Seven Chinese workers were taken hostage but released five days later. -------------- MIL-MIL COOPERATION -------------- ¶15. (C) CJTF-HOA: U.S. Central Command's Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA),based in Djibouti, began humanitarian work in Ethiopia's Somali Region (Ogaden) in 2005, focusing on water projects, clinics, and school construction for Ethiopia's under-served ethnic-Somali population. In mid-2006, however, the GOE asked CJTF-HOA to leave the Ogaden as it launched a large-scale assault on the ONLF. To date, CJTF-HOA has not yet been allowed to resume humanitarian and civil affairs activities in the region, but it is working in the northern Somali Region (near Dire Dawa) as well as the Afar Region (bordering Eritrea),and continues to conduct military-to-military training. ¶16. (S/NF) In a March 2007 meeting with CJTF-HOA Commander Admiral Hart (reftel),CHOD Lieutenant General Samora Yonus identified Ethiopia's military priorities: -- Air mobility is critical as a result of the conflict in Somalia; Ethiopia requires USG assistance to repair two C-130 aircraft and provide additional cargo planes. -- To promote the ENDF's professionalization, USG assistance is needed for the newly established command and staff college ADDIS ABAB 00001406 004 OF 006 in Addis Ababa. -- Samora requested that the USG close CJTF-HOA operating bases in Bilate and Hurso, and possibly relocate to Dire Dawa or Jijiga, so that they would not be co-located on ENDF bases. ¶17. (U) Ethiopia has signed, but has not yet ratified, a bilateral non-surrender ("Article 98") agreement with the United States protecting U.S. personnel from the International Criminal Court (ICC). The USG and GOE signed an agreement in Washington, D.C., in October 2004, but the agreement has not yet been brought before Ethiopia's parliament for consideration. During your visit, you may wish to urge the GOE to ensure ratification of the Article 98 agreement. (NOTE: An appropriate bill must be submitted to the office of the Prime Minister, reviewed by the Council of Ministers, then submitted to Speaker of the House, who reviews it with the Parliamentary Committee to determine whether the bill must go to the House for debate or vote. END NOTE.) ¶18. (U) IMET: Ethiopia receives IMET funds. -- In FY05, Ethiopia received USD 514,000 and used it for Professional Military Education (PME),to include Naval Postgraduate School (NPS),Command and General Staff College (CGSC),and USAF Squadron Officer's School. Ethiopia also used FY05 funds for intelligence training, counter-terrorism training, logistics courses, and English Language Training (ELT) labs. -- In FY06, Ethiopia received USD 589,000 and used it for additional ELTs, CGSC, intelligence training, and military law courses. -- In FY07, ET received USD 650,000 and used it for two students at CGSC, Air Command and Staff College, and additional ELT support. In FY07, Ethiopia also received one slot at the National Defense University funded by counter-terrorism funds separate from IMET. --Ethiopia is projected to receive USD 650,000 in FY08. ¶19. (U) FMF: Since FY03, Ethiopia has received USD 20.735 million in military assistance funds. The majority, roughly two-thirds, has come from FMF, while the remainder came from the East Africa Counter Terrorism Initiative (EACTI). Since FY03, Ethiopia has used this money to buy equipment for its counter-terrorism unit USD 800,000 to support the Ethiopian Defense Command and Staff College (EDCSC) USD 2.1 million), to support CJTF-HOA training at Hurso and Bilate USD 1 million),to 16 HMMWVs USD 1.8 million),to buy 300 tactical VHF radios USD 5.5 million) and C-130 spare parts USD 2.4 million). Based upon the most recent FMF audit, Ethiopia has USD 2.7 million in uncommitted FMF funds. In FY08, Ethiopia is projected to receive USD 800,000 in FMF. It is hoped this will be offset by FY07 and FY08 Section 1206 monies. ¶20. (U) EDCSC: The EDCSC began development in 2005, with the assistance of the USG, using EACTI funds on an FMF case. Classes started in the summer of 2006. The course is modeled on the U.S. Army CGSC, incorporating air and ground operations, and is currently taught by six USG contractors. Support was promised by Addis Ababa DATT Office through 2010, when ENDF would be capable of self-support. However, due to increasing FMF budgets, contractor support will not be feasible in the future. Courses of action are being developed to utilize quality of contract instructors. All contract instructors are retired U.S. Army and USAF officers, with senior PME teaching experience. The ENDF's main concern is that they lack current operational experience to adequately teach the course material. ¶21. (U) C-130s: In 1996, the USG donated four C-130B aircraft to Ethiopia. The first two were refurbished an delivered in 1998. While the second two aircraft were being overhauled, Ethiopia went to war with Eritrea, and, as a result, the second set of planes was diverted to other countries. Ethiopia signed an USD 11 million FMS case for spare parts support, which they paid for with a combination of FMF and national funds. Since 2002, Ethiopia has not received any additional maintenance or technical support from the USG, and, as a result, one of the aircraft fell into disrepair and has not flown since 2002. In January 2007, a ADDIS ABAB 00001406 005 OF 006 technical team evaluated the entire ENDF C-130 program and found excellent maintenance capabilities but a critical lack of spare parts and maintenance equipment. The team estimates that approximately USD 13-17 million is required to provide all necessary parts, equipment, and training, to support the aircraft for the next two years. This includes all necessary work to make the second C-130B airworthy. In 2006, state-run Ethiopian Airlines donated two Lockheed L-100-30s to the ENDF. Both aircraft are in excellent condition, but only one is currently flying. The second aircraft requires an inspection to be performed by Ethiopian Airlines. All proposed USG-assisted maintenance and supply programs will support both types of aircraft. -------------- ECONOMIC OVERVIEW -------------- ¶22. (U) Ethiopia remains one of the poorest countries in the world with a per capita GDP of roughly USD 100 While the private sector is expanding, the state remains heavily involved in most economic sectors, and parastatals and party-affiliated companies continue to dominate trade and industry, hampering full and free competition. In addition, increasingly frequent cycles of drought, high population growth, and inefficient agricultural markets all act as drags on Ethiopia's economic development. Agriculture contributes 42 percent to the GDP and employs 80 percent of Ethiopia's 77 million people. Nearly all agricultural production is rain-fed and small-scale, and thus vulnerable to drought. Economic policies have been improving as the Ethiopian government gradually sheds its Marxist past. The Government recently submitted a long-delayed Memorandum of Foreign Trade Regime (MFTR),an important step forward in the process of WTO accession. According to World Bank data, GDP growth in 2005 was 8.7 percent. Greater economic liberalization, including in key sectors such as telecommunications and finance, and further reduction of population growth will be critical to reducing poverty and increasing food security, however. -------------- DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE -------------- ¶23. (U) In collaboration with donors, the Ethiopian government in January 2007 published its 2006-2010 "Plan for Accelerated and Sustainable Development to End Poverty" (PASDEP). PASDEP will also have a significant governance component. In addition to continuing poverty reduction strategies in areas such as human development, rural development, capacity building, and food security, the new development plan will increase commercialized agriculture, promote greater private sector participation in the economy, scale-up efforts to achieve the Millennium Development Goals, and enhance decentralization of governance. Ethiopia has increased primary education to over 70 percent coverage over the last decade and has also adopted more effective policies to promote family planning and combat HIV/AIDS. ¶24. (SBU) The United States provides both developmental and humanitarian assistance to Ethiopia, though we do not provide any direct budget support to the government. In FY2006, the USG provided USD 150 million in food aid; roughly USD 80 million for health, education, and governance projects; as well as USG120 million through the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). A major objective is to help the Ethiopian government and people increase sources of rural income through a "productive safety net" program so that they will be less vulnerable to drought, disease, and famine. In 2006, USAID developed a new initiative meant to protect the livelihoods of pastoralists in the Southern and Somali regions. As a result of post-election events in Ethiopia, donors providing direct budget support (including the World Bank, European Commission, UK, and Canada) agreed to suspend direct budget support. These funds have been reprogrammed through a new program, the Protection of Basic Services grant, which includes more targeted, tightly monitored aid at the regional and district levels. The re-initiation of donor ADDIS ABAB 00001406 006 OF 006 support, including a USD600 million World Bank program, has been a tremendous relief to the Ethiopian government and has eased some of the financial crunch it was facing. ¶25. (SBU) The United States is coordinating closely with other donors to strengthen democratic institutions such as Parliament, the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia, the media, and civil society, and to create political "space" through dialogue among various actors and groups. Current U.S. resources for this purpose total approximately USD10 million. Restoring public confidence in institutions and dialogue will be essential to deepening democracy and maintaining peace and stability at the heart of the Horn of Africa. YAMAMOTO