ETHIOPIA: GOE ADDRESSES RELIGIOUS CONFLICT IN JIMA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ADDIS ABABA 001381 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF/E AND DRL: SJOSEPH LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/07/2017 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PTER KISL KIRF ET SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA: GOE ADDRESSES RELIGIOUS CONFLICT IN JIMA ZONE, LOCALS STILL SCARED REF: A. ADDIS ABABA 02911 (NOTAL) ¶B. ADDIS ABABA 00956 (NOTAL) ¶C. ADDIS ABABA 01166 ADDIS ABAB 00001381 001.2 OF 004 Classified By: Pol-Econ Counselor Kevin Sullivan Reason: 1.4 (d) ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: In a three-day visit to the Jima area in Ethiopia's Oromiya Region, Poloff and FSN met with local government and religious leaders to better understand the causes of recurrent religious conflicts, including an October 2006 machete attack by Muslims that killed or injured 36 Christians. There was little evidence to support previous GoE suggestions that the outlawed Oromo Liberation Front had a hand in stirring up religious hatred. Most agree that a new, extremist brand of Islam has seeped into the Oromiya Region, likely from the Middle East or Sudan, and that the aggravating issue around Jima seemed to be complicit local government administrators. Following the violence, the GoE made large-scale changes to local leadership and maintains a heightened security presence to help quell potential future outbreaks. Locals remained concerned about not only existing tensions between Muslims and Christians, but also strong GoE pressure on opposition groups. END SUMMARY -------------- LOCAL DEMOGRAPHICS SHOW POSSIBLE DIVIDE LINES -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Religious-based conflict in western Oromiya erupted in September and October of 2006. Clashes during an Ethiopian Orthodox Church (EOC) holiday celebration resulted in armed conflict between Muslim and Christian groups, killing four Muslims and six Christians, injuring many, and resulting in numerous churches burned (ref A). Later, on October 15, in the town of Beshesha (approximately 30 miles from Jima city),during another EOC celebration, dozens of machete- and pistol-wielding aggressors stormed an EOC church, setting it ablaze. As churchgoers fled, many were captured by the armed Muslims who forced them to either immediately renounce Christianity and accept Islam, or be killed. Six Christians died from brutal machete attacks, while more than 30 others were wounded. Several attackers were subsequently arrested and sentenced to the death penalty or stiff jail terms by a local court. Regional and federal police have moved into the area in large numbers to boost security and prevent additional attacks. ¶3. (SBU) No further clashes were reported until late March 2007, when one Evangelical preacher was killed in the city of Jima. Details were unclear, and at the time of Poloff and FSN's visit, no contacts in Addis Ababa had a clear answer for what had happened or whether arrests had been made. ¶4. (SBU) On the surface it appeared that these conflicts were simply religious. However, Ethiopia, and particularly the Jima zone, has a long history of these two religions coexisting peacefully. Jima zone is primarily Muslim (estimated up to 85%),but Jima city and several other urban centers have significant Christian populations, both EOC and Evangelical. Religion tends to follow ethnic lines, with indigenous Oromos largely Muslim, while settlers from the "highlands" (i.e. Amhara and Tigray Regions) support the EOC. Evangelicals are a mix of local former animists, as well as some Muslim and Christian converts both from Oromiya and the highlands. Traditionally the area did not have a great deal of political unrest. Despite the likely presence of the outlawed Oromo Liberation Front (OLF),Jima is not reported to be an OLF stronghold, unlike other parts of Oromiya. In the 2005 elections, legal opposition parties did gain some foothold, with the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD) (which draws much of its support from Amhara voters) securing two federal parliamentary seats from Jima. The complicated mix of religions, ethnicities, and political parties in this area led some to theorize that the recent conflicts were not simply religious in nature (ref A). -------------- GOE POINTS TO FOREIGN INFLUENCE, OLF -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Newly-installed Jima zonal administrator ADDIS ABAB 00001381 002.2 OF 004 Mohammed-nur Abachebsa said that the clash in Beshesha was both religious and political. Over the last several years, Ethiopians returning from Sudan, Saudi Arabia and other parts of the Middle East have spread a more extremist version of Islam, he said. They created a new sect in Ethiopia related to Wahhabism, called "Kewariat." This has split the local Muslim community, as this new group differs strongly from the more moderate Muslims that were traditionally the majority in the area. Mohammed-nur claimed that the OLF, to foster unrest and mobilize support, are utilizing this split by supporting the extremists. Funding from abroad, as well as from the OLF, has helped to develop a strong following for the new extremist Muslims, he said. ¶6. (SBU) Though he did not have details regarding the March 2007 Evangelist killing, Mohammed-nur said that the attackers follow the Kewariat sect that was responsible for the October 2006 event in Beshesha. For those involved in the church attack in Beshesha, justice has been swift, Mohammed noted, with a large number of arrests made and many found guilty. Four received the death penalty, four received life in prison, while others received sentences from two to 20 years. Additionally, he said a "Peace and Security Committee" (PSC) had been formed to repair the damage to the community. At the zonal level, representatives from the government, Muslim and Christian faiths, Elders, and women's and youth groups, formed a six-person panel with the goal of organizing events and programs aimed at bridging the religious divide. This structure is to be replicated at every woreda (county) and kebele (district),so that all communities would be involved. Mohammed-nur said a number of local woreda and kebele administrators had been changed due to their inability to prevent such conflicts. The work of the PSC, together with the newly appointed administrators, helped to "stabilize the situation," in the zone, he said. -------------- -- MUSLIM AND ORTHODOX LEADERS STICK TO PARTY LINE -------------- -- ¶7. (SBU) Local EOC and the Ethiopian Islamic Affairs Supreme Council (EIASC) leaders echoed the zonal administrator's claims. (NOTE: Both organizations, at least at higher levels, are widely believed to be under the influence of the GoE. END NOTE.) Both groups stated that those responsible for the Beshesha attack, as well as the more recent Jima killing, were "a few rotten apples" from the new Kewariat sect. Hajji Abuyazid Hajji Kiar of the EIASC described some of the sect's unique tenets: the establishment a Muslim government; refusal to pay taxes; ban on eating any food made by the labor of an animal. Regarding the recent killing in Jima, Hajji Abuyazid claimed that an evangelist walked into a local mosque with his shoes on and proclaimed that "Jesus is savior." As a result, Muslims in the mosque attacked him and beat him to death. To date, no arrests have been made. Hajji Abuyazid agreed that the OLF has a direct interest fomenting the increasing Islamic fundamentalism to destabilize the government. Both leaders said that their work as PSC members has helped calm the situation and that they were pleased with the arrests and sentences of those involved with the Beshesha attack. ¶8. (SBU) Abuna Estifanos of the EOC noted that the number of mosques is growing very quickly (2,700 mosques versus 261 EOC churches in SW Ethiopia),and that they are often funded from abroad. Many of these new mosques are deliberately being built near or on EOC land, leading to conflicts like the one near Jima in September, he claimed. Despite the influx of radical Islam over the last six years, he said, local government leaders (nearly all Muslims) were reluctant to restrain these groups as their political power grew. In many cases, including Beshesha, kebele leaders were involved with the groups, he claimed. Following the Beshesha incident, over 100 kebele leaders, numerous woreda administrators, and the Jima zonal administrator, were all fired or rotated to other districts, at the order of the regional administration, he said. -------------- LACK OF PREVENTION, STRONG RESPONSE BY GOE -------------- ADDIS ABAB 00001381 003.2 OF 004 ¶9. (SBU) Essey Miressa, local head of the Evangelical Mekane Yesus Church, agreed that much of the problem stems from Ethiopians, as well as some foreigners, bringing extremist Islam from Saudi Arabia. He also repeated claims that local administrators had been co-opted by these groups and were left powerless to control their expansion. The EIASC is equally powerless, he noted, since very few Muslims follow their leadership. A member of the PSC, he said that it was inactive and "more about security than peace." The committee comprises mostly GoE representatives instead of religious leaders, and simply monitors local populations rather than developing community-building programs, he complained. Essey Miressa criticized judgments given to the perpetrators of the Beshesha attack: those from other regions were given the harshest sentences, while locals were given much lighter punishment, or none at all. This was done to give the impression of justice, but also to avoid upsetting the local Muslim population. He dismissed claims of OLF involvement with extremists or the events in Beshesha. There was little evidence of OLF presence in the area, he said, and "People in the Jima zone associate with Islam, and to a much lesser extent being Oromo." While most political opposition in the area are CUD supporters and many began to associate CUD with highlanders after the election, he does not believe ethnicity played a role in the conflicts. It was "100 percent a religious issue," Essey Miressa concluded, as shown by the incident in Jima. He said the Evangelist killed was an acquaintance of his, and was simply speaking to a fellow evangelist outside a mosque when a mob of Muslim youth attacked him, dragged him in the mosque, and beat him to death. ¶10. (SBU) The local representative of the Ethiopian Human Rights Council, Addisu Desta, was the only contact that believed ethnicity played a role in these conflicts. (NOTE: EHRCO, while a reliable human rights watchdog, is considered close to the Amhara-based CUD opposition party. END NOTE.) EHRCO agreed that rising extremism has roots from abroad, but said that the local government did not discourage messages that "highlanders should return to where they came from" being preached in local mosques. Addisu said that this therefore effectively targeted the base CUD support in the area. "Muslims knew that the government was anti-CUD and therefore would look the other way when these events were planned," he claimed. "The government does not want the region totally out of control, but their strong response (to the Beshesha event) gives them the opportunity to show they are in control," he concluded. He also disagreed that the OLF had any involvement, as they have little presence around Jima. -------------- LOCALS STILL AFRAID OF NEIGHBORS -------------- ¶11. (SBU) Poloff and FSN also met with local religious and community leaders in the village of Beshesha and the local woreda capital Agaro. Local EIASC representatives repeated many of the same claims made by the EIASC in Jima (and in Addis Ababa),and said radical Islam in the area drew support from former moderates, as well as from the OLF. However, local EOC leader Kesis Berhanu Mahtebe broke ranks with the previous claims by zonal and national EOC leaders, saying that the OLF has nothing to do with the event and that is "strictly about religion." He said that the first noticeable influx of extremism began in 2001. Though Muslims have long been in control of local administrations, many also had Christian deputies, as well as kebele militias of mixed religion. As more money began to arrive to fund mosques and religious activities, local administrators began marginalizing Christians. Mosques were being built on EOC land, and local imams began preaching increasingly hateful messages. Administrators turned a blind eye to these groups, and some, particularly those in Beshesha, were complicit in anti-Christian messaging, Kesis Berhanu said. He said that local government knew that the attack would take place, and did nothing to stop it. Even though many kebele and woreda administrators have been replaced, such teaching continues, he reported. The only thing preventing another attack, he claimed, is the presence of regional and federal police. ¶12. (SBU) In Beshesha, where the massacre took place, local ADDIS ABAB 00001381 004.2 OF 004 EOC members have built a memorial where the church once stood. Burned cars from the attack have yet to be moved. Local community leaders, as well as one older man and one young boy who were present during the attack, gave Poloff their account of events. They recalled the horror of the night of October 15 when hundreds of Muslims, many of whom they recognized as neighbors, rose over the hillside and stormed their church wielding weapons and torches. The boy, who bears a deep scar on his face from being hacked with a machete, told of being made to kneel and renounce Christianity. Though several people were arrested for planning the attack, the older victim (who also had machete scars on his face) said that many involved still live in the village. Local leaders reported having found a stash of machetes and kerosene in one of the local mosques after the attack. Tensions remain very high, and EOC members are constantly afraid of another attack. When large-scale church services take place, the army is called out to protect gatherings. -------------- --- REPORTS FROM OPPOSITION RECALL REST OF W OROMIYA -------------- --- ¶13. (C) To gauge political space for opposition parties in the area, particularly in light of upcoming local elections, Poloff and FSN met with local UEDF leader Amente Lebeta. As reported in other western Oromiya cities (ref B),Amente said that following the 2005 elections and subsequent demonstrations, local officials cracked down on opposition parties. Indeed, no opposition parties have offices in Jima. Amente said that UEDF members are constantly harassed by security forces and are forced to meet in secret. (NOTE: As with other local opposition leaders in other areas, Amente was very nervous during the meeting and seemed highly conscious of being seen meeting with Poloff. END NOTE.) Though several UEDF members have been arrested, he said that many opposition)oriented voters remain silent for fear of losing the right to 25 kilograms of wheat promised by the GoE (ref C) to alleviate high prices. He dismissed the notion of recent religious conflict having any connection with the OLF, but reported that since the event, government security forces have increased pressure on opposition groups. Though Jima city voted largely CUD in the elections, Amente said that the UEDF and fellow opposition party Oromo Federal Democratic SIPDIS Movement (OFDM) enjoy some support. He was very confident, that if permitted to open offices and allowed to speak to constituents, his party would perform well throughout the zone in local elections. However, he doubted that the GoE would allow opposition to compete freely, and anticipates boycotting the election. Separately, zonal administrator Mohammed-nur told Poloff that, although Jima had largely supported the CUD, "voters regret that now," and this would be evident in the upcoming local elections. He said that opposition parties are free to open offices and will be able to compete openly, regardless. -------------- --- COMMENT: RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM STILL A THREAT -------------- --- ¶14. (C) While the above accounts of religious clashes around Jima vary somewhat, it seems clear that the violence was largely religious in nature. The GoE's assertions that the OLF played a role appear to be unfounded. Given Muslims' greater propensity to support the ruling party, it is not surprising that local Muslim officials were reluctant to rein in Muslims who began to preach extremist views. National-level EPRDF officials understand the danger of fundamentalism, however, and seem to have taken at least some measures to discourage another outbreak of religious violence. YAMAMOTO