USAU AMB COURVILLE MEETING W/UGANDAN AMB SSEMPALA

C O N F I D E N T I A L ADDIS ABABA 001061 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/FO, AF/RSA E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/10/2012 TAGS: PREL MOPS AU SUBJECT: USAU AMB COURVILLE MEETING W/UGANDAN AMB SSEMPALA AND GENERAL ARONDA Classified By: AMBASSADOR CINDY L. COURVILLE FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D ) ¶1. (C)SUMMARY: On 2 April 2007, USAU met with General Aronda, Chief of Defense of the Ugandan Peoples Defense Force and Ambassador Ssempala to discuss issues and concerns regarding the deployment of Ugandan troops in Somalia at the Ugandan Embassy in Addis Ababa. END SUMMARY ¶2. (U) Participants: a. AMB Courville ) USAU Ambassador b. AMB Ssempala ) Ugandan Ambassador to Ethiopia and the African Union c. General Aronda, Chief of Defense of the Ugandan Peoples Defense Force d. COL Rainey ) USAU Military Liaison Officer e. CAPT Couch ) USAU Military Liaison Officer f. COL Bole ) Ugandan Defense Attache to Ethiopian and AU Embassies. ¶3. (C) Summary of major points discussed: AMB Ssempala expressed that the Ugandan mission with AMISOM was &moving in the right direction8. General Aronda communicated that some areas of improvement were needed, specifically: a. More &level8 meetings were necessary between the Ethiopians and the Ugandans. b. The African Union (AU) needs to communicate and publicly condemn the violence in Somalia against AU peace keepers. Overall a better job in communicating the positives of the AU AMISOM mission must occur in order to simply counter the ICU/ UIC messages. c. Again requested US help in investigating the two IL-76 aircraft incidences. d. Expressed disappointment that the US was not meeting the spirit of their own messages of support and partnership with their partners, the UPDF. Specifically noting requested help in maritime security support. This is a particularly sensitive issue as it applies to the recent escort requirements for the Ugandan &RO/RO8 evolution 2 weeks ago and most recently a reported &commandeering8 of a vessel in the Mogadishu harbor in the last 24 hours. e. Noted the &spoiler8 impact of the UIC and its communications with Yemen, and the ongoing hindrance of Eritrea in any situation involving Ethiopia. f. Reiterated an earlier request on shared intelligence with the US. g. Highlighted the ongoing and pressing need for international humanitarian assistance for the Somalian people. That assistance will go along way to countering the UIC messages and propaganda. h. Recommended that the AU and the UN identify the UIC &most wanted8 list and promulgate that list to the International audience. i. Requested lessons learned from the UNISOM deployment be distributed and that their own pre-deployment lessons learned be distributed to future troop contributing countries. j. Finally ) the AMISOM mission is a political challenge, the diplomats need to take action, and most importantly take it out of the hands of the military where it has been erroneously thrust. ¶4. (C) Next Steps: - US provide intelligence support to the AMISOM Mission, - USAU discuss with DIA on how to move forward on Commissioner Djinnit, request to establish intelligence sharing program with the AU - Request that NSTB review photos of two IL-76 incidences and provide assessments for the AU - DOS / DOD provide Maritime security support off Somalia coast. - ESF funding for AU Communications upgrade to allow for more -- Fund USAU ESF request support to implement a more robust communications strategy -- to include public communications, website communications and email communications. - USAU to pass on UNISOM lessons learned to UPDF and UPDF to pass onto the AU it,s own lessons learned from pre-deployment preparations, to include equipment and training requirements. - AU must bring greater support to bear to leverage support at the individual country foreign minister level. COURVILLE YAMAMOTO