ETHIOPIA: SEN. BROWNBACK CONFERS WITH PM MELES ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 000104 SIPDIS SIPDIS AF FOR A/S FRAZER AND DAS SWAN E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/16/2017 TAGS: OVIP PREL MOPS ET SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA: SEN. BROWNBACK CONFERS WITH PM MELES ON SOMALIA, IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN Classified By: Pol/Econ Counselor Kevin Sullivan for reasons 1.4 (b) an d (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: PM Meles briefed Sen. Brownback and his staff on Ethiopia's military operation in Somalia during a Jan. 12 meeting. Meles said that the GOE had learned from U.S. interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan that it was essential to place the burden for establishing security and political peace on local leaders as quickly as possible. With this in mind, the ENDF would begin withdrawal from Somalia the week of Jan. 15 but leave some units behind to support the political efforts of the TFG and local clan leaders. The ENDF would also continue to pursue fleeing CIC extremists, largely to prevent them from regrouping for a counter-offensive. Meles praised current U.S. policy in Somalia urged USG and other international officials to resist the temptation to be too prescriptive about governance in Somalia in the coming period. The PM also cautioned the USG against withdrawing from Iraq in defeat, and instead urged the U.S. to seek new allies and redefine victory. Sen. Brownback thanked the Prime Minister for his contribution to fighting extremism in Somalia. The Senator also suggested some new ways the USG and private Americans could partner with Ethiopia on development. End Summary. ¶2. (U) Sen. Sam Brownback and staffers Josh Carter and Maj. Michael Sherkey called on Prime Minister Meles Zenawi Jan. 12, accompanied by Amb. Yamamoto and Pol/Econ Counselor (note-taker). Meles was joined by his personal assistant Gebretensai. -------------- BROWNBACK: YOU'VE RESET THE TABLE IN SOMALIA -------------- ¶3. (C) Sen. Brownback congratulated PM Meles on "resetting the table" in Somalia through aggressive military action against CIC extremists. He noted that many in the U.S. had simply given up on Somalia and didn't even want to discuss it, but Ethiopia had spilled its own blood to break up extremist networks there. Meles replied that he was very pleased by what had been achieved in Somalia. "We have a real opportunity now; if we play it well, we can have relative stability in Somalia and dramatically undermine negative influences coming from the Gulf." -------------- -------------- WARLORD INTO MINISTERS, MILITIAS INTO NATIONAL ARMY -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) Meles indicated that the first priority now in Somalia was to neutralize the threat of a return to "warlordlism" by incorporating warlord militia into the national army, and the warlords themselves in the government at different levels. This approach could remove one potential source of instability while at the same time rapidly creating a larger force to combat other sources of instability (such as Islamic extremism). Meles claimed that 5-6 brigades of such militia could be assembled within a week or two, as well as police forces in all major towns. At the same time, the GOE would begin to pull its own forces out the week of Jan. 15. Leaving ENDF special forces units behind, as well as some ENDF personnel embedded in TFG institutions, would be enough to fulfill Ethiopia's security role for the next phase of the operation, which Meles described as "maintaining big guns in reserve, not patrolling the streets in Mogadishu." He said that the TFG and Somali clan leaders would take charge of providing day-to-day security immediately. "Those who can control the situation on the ground without firing a shot must be in the government," he argued. The ENDF would only intervene militarily in the situation if requested to do so by clan leaders. The Prime Minister did not expect the TFG to face organized resistance to its efforts to establish security, but rather isolated incidents of terrorism. -------------- - LESSONS FROM IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN: NO CODDLING -------------- - ¶5. (C) Meles told Brownback that the GOE had studied carefully lessons from the U.S. interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan when planning its operation in Somalia. "Your best move in Afghanistan was your political operation," the ADDIS ABAB 00000104 002 OF 003 PM observed. "You took the remnants of a positive force you could work with (the Northern Alliance) and built relationships with clan leaders in the South." In the case of Somalia, Ethiopia realized it must act before potential local partners -- especially the TFG -- had been eliminated. This allowed the GOE to combine its own resources with those of indigenous allies, which reduced the cost of the operation for Ethiopia and expedited victory. ¶6. (C) The GOE was now "trying not to stop too early, which some argue the USG did in Afghanistan. Now you have a problem along the Pakistan border." The ENDF was, for its part, pursuing fleeing CIC leaders everywhere, breaking the movement into small pieces that will find it difficult to reassemble. "We must keep them running. Even if we don't kill many more terrorists, they won't be able to plan anything except their own survival." ¶7. (C) Meles concluded that "your political arrangement in Afghanistan started well, but ended poorly because you took too much responsibility for the security and development of the country upon yourselves. When the father works hard for them, the sons relax." The PM said that if Ethiopian forces were on the ground indefinitely, then local actors would not do what was necessary to establish peace and stability. -------------- -------------- MELES: LEAVING IRAQ IN DEFEAT WORSE THAN POST-VIETNAM -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) Sen. Brownback told Meles that after U.S. actions in Iraq and Afghanistan, the post 9/11 doctrine of preemption had played itself out. He asked for Meles' advice about current U.S. policy choices in Iraq. PM commented that now that the USG had weakened the indigenous will to fend for themselves, U.S. forces would have to stay on the ground longer. Governments in both Kabul and Baghdad would collapse if abruptly abandoned by U.S. forces. It was essential get the security situation under control. He argued that to succeed, first the USG would have to get the politics right, both internally and with Iraq's neighbors. Debate and discussion should focus on this task first, not on the number of U.S. troops on the ground. Meles suggested that gaining more active, public support from U.S. allies in the region would be helpful. He pointed out that Iran, who was currently a major U.S. adversary in Iraq, had weaknesses in the regional context. Sunnis and Arabs had previously been willing to cooperate against what they perceived historically as a Shiite and Persian competitor in Tehran. Such an alliance might still be possible. ¶9. (C) Meles argued passionately that if the U.S left Iraq in defeat, the consequences for the region and the world would be more dire than they were in the post-Vietnam era. "Many dominos are ready to fall, the most serious of which would be Saudi Arabia," a country whose private citizens were already the most important supporters of extremism in the region. He said that it might be necessary for the USG to change the definition of victory in Iraq. He noted that the successful action against the CIC in Somalia could be helpful in the global fight against terrorism, showing that those who insisted on negotiated with terrorists that victory against extremism is possible. Meles argued that peaceful means of fighting terrorism are important, but sometimes military action is an essential first step. "After that, it's about intelligence and police work," he said. -------------- -------------- MELES: SEND MONEY, NOT INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL EXPERTS -------------- -------------- ¶10. (C) Meles commented that U.S. policy concerning the Somalia situation had been good so far; following up the commitments already made would be critical. He noted that he had not distanced himself from any U.S. actions, including the air strike against Al Qaeda targets, despite criticism from some quarters. "We have done the right thing together, and have nothing to hide," the PM said. He had especially high praise for intelligence and other cooperation with CJTF-HOA, which he called "the most responsive and effective relationship the GOE had with the (Bush) Administration." (Note: the PM implied that State and USAID's responses to his requests were not as prompt). Sen. Brownback indicated that ADDIS ABAB 00000104 003 OF 003 he would be pushing for a package of assistance on water and health projects as well as food for the Somali people. The PM said that what the GOE most wanted from the USG at this point were 1) resources to pay the new national army in Somalia; 2) quick deliveries of humanitarian assistance to Somalis, both to address immediate needs and to change the image of the USG among Somalis; and 3) encouragement for the TFG to continue its inclusive dialogue with various actors and constituencies in Somali society. ¶11. (C) Meles noted that there would be a temptation for the USG to be precise about prescriptions for elections, the judiciary and other aspects of reconstruction in Somalia, but it would be best if the USG could "restrain yourselves." Somalis would have to find their own way forward by means that were most appropriate for the Somali context. The PM noted that the peace process in Somaliland had been completed designed and conducted by clan elders, and the country had as a result been stable for ten years. In southern Somalia, on the other hand, there had been 15 international attempts at restoring peace and security aided by dozens of international "experts." All of these had so far failed. Helping to finance the efforts of Somalis would be far more effective than micro-managing their negotiations, Meles concluded. -------------- -------------- STRENGTHENING BILATERAL PARTNERSHIP, PHILANTHROPY -------------- -------------- ¶12. (U) Sen. Brownback saluted the GOE's open, welcoming policies on adoptions, which he said were good for the children involved and helped build bridges between the U.S. and Ethiopia. The Senator expressed his interest in engaging more U.S. citizens and NGOs in helping AIDS orphans. He offered to organize a group of American CEOs and other philanthropists to visit Ethiopia and learn about the needs of Ethiopia. The Prime Minister heartily welcomed the offer and suggested that he work on planning for the visit with Amb. Yamamoto. ¶13. (U) Sen. Brownback did not have the opportunity to clear on this message. YAMAMOTO