SOMALIA: DEPUTY FM TEKEDA DISCUSSES ETHIOPIA'S ROLE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 001017 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF AND AF/E LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS KPKO SO ET SUBJECT: SOMALIA: DEPUTY FM TEKEDA DISCUSSES ETHIOPIA'S ROLE REF: A. FRAZER-AMB TELCON 4/04/07 ¶B. ASMARA 316 (NOTAL) ¶C. NAIROBI 1526 (NOTAL) ¶D. NAIROBI 1464 (NOTAL) ¶E. NAIROBI 1456 (NOTAL) AND PREVIOUS Classified By: AMBASSADOR DONALD YAMAMOTO. REASON: 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY. Ambassador met State Minister of Foreign Affairs Dr. Tekeda Alemu, Ethiopia's point person on Somalia negotiations, on April 4 to review Ethiopia's approach to the Hawiye clan and reconciliation, and later with National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) chief Getachew. Tekeda stated that the Ethiopians were negotiating directly with the Hawiye to contain and neutralize extremist elements, and that Ethiopian troops (ENDF) partially succeeded in "cleaning up" some Hawiye-held areas in north Mogadishu and the airport. ENDF reinforcements came from the Baidoa area. Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was important in the process, but Tekeda cautioned that while PM Ghedi had not played a helpful role, it was not the time to change personalities in the TFG. Waiting until the national reconciliation conference would be a better venue for changing the government. Tekeda and Getachew, in separate meetings, raised the problem of the heavy cost of the Somali conflict, and the need for the ENDF to leave quickly. They realize that an abrupt departure would only allow extremists to return to Mogadishu, and lead to a possible breakdown in clan discussions. Furthermore, African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and TFG troops are not ready to handle stabilization efforts in Mogadishu. But without assistance, the ENDF will need to depart. Tekeda requested U.S. support for allowing Ethiopia to join the International Contact Group, because of Ethiopia's work providing support to AMISOM and the TFG, as well as force protection at the air- and seaports. Finally, Getachew noted that a visit to Somalia by a U.S. official would send a very positive message and reassure the Somali people of U.S. commitment to Somalia,s future. END SUMMARY. -------------- -------------- NORTH MOGADISHU: TENSE BUT SOME SUCCESS AGAINST EXTREMISTS -------------- -------------- ¶2. (S/NF) Minister Tekeda said Ethiopia was in direct contact with Hawiye clan elders and was hopeful that progress was being made in containing extremist elements. The ceasefire was holding, though sporadic fighting continued. Tekeda said the ENDF was hopeful that heavy fighting would not resume. During this ceasefire, it would be important for the Hawiye clan to ensure that the extremists did not rearm and resume fighting. While senior extremist leaders had fled or were in hiding, Tekeda noted that many of the extremists' supporters and field commanders had been neutralized or captured, making another round of fighting difficult for extremist elements and those opposed to the ENDF/TFG. One success was the dramatic reduction and, in some instances, elimination of shelling from the Villa Somalia area, making the airport and Ethiopian/TFG positions more secure. Tekeda went into some detail of the fierce fighting with small ENDF units fighting building-to-building. Surprisingly, there had not been "as much" hand-to-hand combat as anticipated, but extensive shooting and shelling had occurred, resulting in heavy casualties on all sides. He did not specify ENDF casualties, and denied that any ENDF had been captured by extremists. ¶3. (S/NF) Asked about the need for the TFG to be a part of the negotiations, Tekeda said this was important. But for the TFG specifically, President Abdullahi Yusuf and Prime Minister Ali Mohammed Ghedi needed to address a comprehensive list of problems, including land and property ownership disputes, reaching out to clan elders, and handling extremist elements in Mogadishu. Tekeda added that the talks with the Hawiye were productive. -------------- -------------- FUTURE OF TFG/EXTREMISTS OPERATING IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES -------------- -------------- ¶4. (S/NF) Tekeda cautioned that while Prime Minister Ghedi ADDIS ABAB 00001017 002 OF 002 was unhelpful in the reconciliation process, it was not the time to change personalities. The focus should not be on "correcting" TFG leadership roles, but on maintaining a clear eye on neutralizing extremists; this was the main mission. Changing Ghedi would only make the work of the TFG more difficult. It was better to wait until the reconciliation conference in May, and let the Somalis make their decision. Tekeda added that whether Ghedi had their full support or not, Ghedi was an Abgaal; replacing him now could undercut the TFG and alienate the Abgaal. Tekeda echoed the statements of Prime Minister Meles to us in earlier meetings that any action, no matter the good intention, could have unintended consequences. Reaching out to one clan may alienate another, changing a person could offend a clan. In this state of tension, when focus should be on making the reconciliation conference a success, Tekeda underscored the need to reach out to and remain in communication with all clans. -------------- --- SOMALIA: COST WILL ULTIMATELY FORCE THE ENDF OUT -------------- --- ¶5. (S/NF) Tekeda and Getachew in separate meetings raised the cost of the conflict for Ethiopia. Foreign exchange reserves had been depleted as a result of the conflict. The ENDF had withdrawn two-thirds of its force, and had reinforced its Mogadishu operations from troops in Baidoa. While the ENDF would not depart suddenly, Tekeda said the ENDF would need to depart soon, because of the cost. They fully realize that a precipitous departure would only invite the extremists back to Mogadishu, or create a breakdown in talks with the clans. AMISOM troops and the TFG were yet not strong enough to stabilize Mogadishu and bring order, they said. -------------- INVITE ETHIOPIA TO THE CONTACT GROUP MEETING -------------- ¶6. (S/NF) Tekeda asked for U.S. assistance to join the U.S.-led International Contact Group. The Arab League were members, and Egypt and Yemen would join. He said Ethiopia did not oppose Egypt or Yemen, but strongly felt that Ethiopia should also be a part of the discussions. Ethiopia's heavy involvement in Somalia--supporting AMISOM troops and the TFG, providing force protection at the air- and seaports, as well as providing assistance to the reconciliation conference--earned it a seat at the table. Ethiopia had paid a heavy burden, in terms of ENDF lives and financial drain on its budget. Tekeda said Foreign Minister Seyoum was sending a letter of request to the USG. -------------- USG OFFICIAL SHOULD VISIT SOMALIA -------------- ¶7. (S/NF) In a separate meeting, Getachew noted that a visit by a U.S. official to Somalia would send a positive message to the people of Somalia, reassuring them of U.S. support. He left the issue of timing to the U.S. and other senior Ethiopian officials. The ENDF would provide intelligence and support. ¶8. (S/NF) COMMENT. Ambassador will meet Foreign Minister Seyoum next week, and has also been called in by Prime Minister Meles for a meeting next week to clarify U.S. policy towards Eritrea. We will continue to coordinate with Embassy Nairobi on the Ethiopian role in Somalia. The cost of the war has become a major challenge for Ethiopia. If their continued presence in support of AMISOM and the TFG is helpful, the ENDF will expect support and some financial assistance. But a perception that their role is unproductive will force the ENDF to leave quickly. We will need to assess the consequences of their departure, or whether we should encourage their continued presence, albeit more low-key, in Somalia. END COMMENT. YAMAMOTO