ONE YEAR LATER: NARCOTICS COMMITTEE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ACCRA 002533

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2017
TAGS: SNAR KCRM PGOV PREL GH
SUBJECT: ONE YEAR LATER: NARCOTICS COMMITTEE
RECOMMENDATIONS NOT IMPLEMENTED

REF: A) 2006 ACCRA 2386 B) ACCRA 2477 C) ACCRA 2402
D) ACCRA 2426 E) ACCRA 2140 F) ACCRA 2244
G) ACCRA 2273 H) ACCRA 2096 I) ACCRA 2392

Classified By: AMBASSADOR PAMELA E. BRIDGEWATER FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND
(D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Just over a year ago, the GOG released the
Georgina Wood Committee report in response to a public outcry
after several embarrassing cocaine scandals in 2005. The GOG
endorsed the report and pledged to quickly implement its
proposals, but it has largely failed to do so. Most key
recommendations have not been implemented and one was
implemented only after assistance from the UK. GOG efforts
to combat narcotics remain poorly resourced and the GOG lacks
an overarching strategy to combat the problem. Perhaps most
seriously, the GOG does not appear to have the political will
to go after the barons despite the fact that high-level GOG
officials have told us they know their identities.
Corruption and a lackadaisical attitude toward narcotics also
thwart progress. While the GOG has taken a few positive
steps recently, including cooperating with the U.S. to arrest
and expel two Afghan traffickers, it must redouble its
efforts and treat the problem more seriously if it wishes to
avoid the attendant problems that come with becoming a major
transit point for narcotics. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) On September 29, 2006, with much fanfare, the GOG
publicly released the Georgina Wood Committee report, which
listed numerous recommendations for the GOG to implement
after the fall out from the 2005 missing cocaine scandal
involving the MV Benjamin and other cases(ref A). These
scandals revealed high level complicity in cocaine
trafficking and raised awareness on the level of narcotics
flowing through Ghana. The blue ribbon Committee interviewed
40 individuals over a 12-week period and investigated the MV
Benjamin and East Legon cocaine cases which received
considerable local media coverage. As reported in ref B and
septel, two Ghanaians were convicted and sentenced to 15
years hard labor for their role in the MV Benjamin case and
two Venezuelans were convicted for possession of cocaine in
the East Legon case. Two other trials related to the MV
Benjamin case are ongoing.


3. (C) Despite the clamor for reform after the Wood report
was issued, and despite the GOG's public committment to
implement all the Committee's recommendations, it has largely
failed to do so. The following key recommendations remain
outstanding:

-- The Committee recommends that as a matter of urgency, the
status of the Narcotics Control Board (NACOB) be critically
examined and enhanced to enable it to meet the growing
challenges of the drug trade.

-- The Committee recommends that a high powered national task
force be set up to examine the problem thoroughly.

-- The Committee recommends that a reasonably well resourced
Navy and equally well-resourced Air Force is necessary, if
the war against the drug trade is to succeed.

-- The Committee recommends the setting up of a
well-resourced Special Court to expeditiously dispose of all
drug related cases.

-- The Committee strongly recommends the public recognition
of patriotic acts of its citizens. To this end, the Committee
recommends the setting up of a fund for adequately rewarding
informants.

-- The Committee recommends that assets be seized from those
convicted of narcotics offenses and be plowed back into
communities who contributed to the arrests.


4. (C) The only recommendations that appear to have been
applied relate to the arrests of individuals in the MV
Benjamin and East Legon case and a recommendation concerning
public awareness campaigns. However, even these
recommendations have only been half-heartedly implemented.
For example, prosecutors did not charge Assistant
Commissioner of Police (ACP) Kofi Boakye, who implicated
himself in cocaine trafficking during a taped conversation
played in court, despite the Committee's urging. The judge
in this case, while announcing guilty verdicts for two of the
defendants, said Boakye is guilty and expressed his distaste
for Attorney General Joe Ghartey's refusal to charge him (ref
C). The public outreach recommendation was only implemented
after Ghana requested assistance from the UK as reported in
ref B.


ACCRA 00002533 002 OF 003



5. (C) Ghana's inability or unwillingness to implement the
Wood Committee's recommendations has meant it missed an
opportunity to seize momentum in the war on narcotics. The
citizenry was shocked at the 2005 scandals and the GOG had
public support to go after major barons. As we see it, the
GOG faces three main challenges in its efforts to combat
narcotics: lack of resources, lack of a coherent national
strategy, and the inability, or unwillingness, to go after
major traffickers. The Wood Committee report generally
addressed the first two challenges, but it carefully avoided
the third.


6. (C) On the resource front, the lead agency on narcotics,
NACOB, is under-funded and its officers are poorly paid and
often poorly trained. Low pay opens the door to corruption,
and inadequately trained officers are unable to perform
effectively. For example, UK officials with Operation
Westbridge, a UK program that attempts to interdict narcotics
shipments at Ghana,s airport, have repeatedly bemoaned the
fact that NACOB officers are often rotated out of the airport
once they have gained competency in their tasks. NACOB has
also been unable to repair the two USG donated "itemisers" at
the airport when they have broken. The UK repaired them once
and EUCOM has agreed to repair them most recently. They are
presently working, but were out of service for over one year.
NACOB officials say they do not have the funding to repair
them and demur when someone suggests they ask for additional
funding to maintain equipment.


7. (C) The lack of a coherent national strategy dovetails
with the GOG's inability or unwillingness to go after the
drug barons. Investigations seem to focus on small time
couriers and long-term investigations are rarely carried out.
One Ghana Police contact confided that the GOG lacks the
will to go after the barons. This was made more evident when
working level contacts and the Secretary to the President
D.K. Osei told us that the GOG knows the identities of the
major drug barons (ref D). While Osei did tell us recently
after the arrest of a Ghanaian in a combined DEA/Ghana Police
Operation that he hopes to go after more drug barons, working
level contacts have told us that there is no political will
to go after the big fish. One NACOB official told us to
expect very little from narcotics investigations until after
the 2008 elections (ref E). According to this view, if
narcotics arrests occur and are published in the paper, it
hurts the ruling NPP,s image since other parties would use
the articles to allege that the NPP has allowed narcotics
trafficking to flourish under its reign. Regardless of the
reason, it seems that the GOG has made a calculated decision
not to go after the barons.


8. (C) In this regard, it is worth noting that opposition
politicians, including National Democratic Congress candidate
John Atta Mills, have been highly critical of the ruling
NPP's efforts on combating narcotics. In a September
meeting, Mills suggested to the Ambassador that the
significant funds being expended by NPP candidates may be
linked to narcotics trafficking (ref H). An NPP Presidential
candidate also told us Kufuor is financing favorite Alan
Kyerematen's campaign through corruptly obtained funds (ref
I).


9. (C) Corruption and the GOG attitude toward narcotics also
factor into the GOG outlook toward anti narcotics efforts.
While it is difficult to determine the scale of corruption on
narcotics in Ghana, it appears to be endemic. For example,
in the MV Benjamin cases, an Assistant Commissioner of
Police, Kofi Boakye, is on tape discussing why he was not
informed of this large shipment of cocaine entering Ghana.
Some contacts have suggested that he was never charged
because he may be able to implicate high-level individuals in
narcotics dealing. Continuing on this theme, President
Kufuor has asked us to share sensitive narcotics information
only with his office, because he does not know whom to trust
when it comes to narcotics. Attitude is another concern and
many GOG officials do not seem to grasp the scope of the
problem and its potential side effects. The President,s
office and a few other contacts seem to grasp the seriousness
of the issue at times, but even D.K. Osei, the Secretary to
the President, told us during the recent arrests of the two
Afghan traffickers (refs C and D) that after this case, "we
can all take a rest."


10. (C) All things considered, the GOG has taken some
positive steps in the past several months. For example, the
Ghana Police have relieved hundreds of officers for suspected
participation in narcotics offenses (ref B). The GOG,
through the President,s office, also handled the arrest and
subsequent expulsion of the two Afghans smoothly as well as
the arrest of another Ghanaian involved with the Afghans,
although it remains to be seen how these extraditions will be

ACCRA 00002533 003 OF 003


carried out. The convictions in the East Legon and MV
Benjamin cases are also noteworthy, despite their
shortcomings. However, the GOG still has a long way to go in
its battle against narcotics, and must find the political
will to tackle the problem if it is to address this problem
with the seriousness it merits.
BRIDGEWATER