INEC: PREPARATIONS FOR 2003 VS. 2007 ELECTIONS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 000631

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DOE FOR CAROLYN GAY

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV KDEM NI
SUBJECT: INEC: PREPARATIONS FOR 2003 VS. 2007 ELECTIONS

ABUJA 00000631 001.2 OF 003


--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (SBU) Begin Summary: The current posture of the
Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) and
preparations for the 2007 elections raise worrisome echoes of
the failures of 2003, when preparations were inadequate and
polling itself was embroiled in disarray, misconduct and
confrontation. The inadequacies observed in 2003 appear
accentuated in 2007. Preparations for the 2003 and 2007
elections share some common features: inconclusive voter
registration, inability of the electorate to view the voter
roll, lack of voter education, late recruitment of ad-hoc
staff, lack of information about polling units and many other
issues. Unlike during the 2003 elections, there have been
numerous pre-election legal challenges in the run-up to the
2007, owing largely to what analysts have described as the
dubious role of INEC: principally its relationship with the
incumbent government and a general inability to provide a
level playing field for political parties and candidates. END
SUMMARY.

--------------
TECHNICAL SUPPORT TO INEC FOR 2007 ELECTIONS
--------------


2. (U) In a communiqu issued at the end of a post election
workshop attended by various stakeholders in Kaduna after the
2003 elections, it was resolved that INEC required technical
support in various aspects of election administration to
ensure the 2007 elections were better managed and more
credible. Organizations like USAID, DFID, the European Union,
and the UNDP, working through agencies like IFES, IRI and
NDI, provided training in specialized areas to various
stakeholders of the electoral process including INEC. This
support was to address technical and other identifiable
hurdles that would threaten credible elections in 2007.
Analysts insist that INEC has the technical competence
required for a credible election but lacks the political will
to be an unbiased umpire in the process. This lack of
political will could be attributable to the status of INEC as
an extension of the Presidency.

--------------
HOW INEC'S LEADERSHIP EMERGED
--------------


3. (U) The emergence of INEC's leadership is a fundamental
challenge to the independence of the Commission. There is a
striking resemblance in the way INEC leadership emerged in
2003 and 2007. The Dr Abel Guobadia-led- INEC had direct
links with the incumbent administration in 2003. Guobadia was
appointed by President Obasanjo on the recommendation of
Chief Tony Anenih, a member of the ruling PDP top brass and a
chief strategist for the re-election of Obasanjo. All the
federal INEC Commissioners were believed to be card-carrying
members of the PDP and were openly partisan in the discharge
of their duties. Directors of the Commission, meant to be
career civil servants, were also appointed based on their
affiliations either with the then-leadership of INEC or the
incumbent administration. Guobadia worked for the Presidency
and would not yield to advice or pressure from other
quarters. His catch phrase then in reaction to public
criticism was "nobody should tell me how to do my job."


4. (SBU) It is also common knowledge within political
circles that Professor Maurice Iwu, the current INEC
Chairman, has strong links to the Obasanjo administration.
Iwu was introduced to President Obasanjo by one of his
closest aides - Special Adviser on Domestic Affairs, Dr. Andy
Uba, who is also the governorship candidate for the PDP in
Anambra state. Though Iwu's Commissioners were also appointed
in a similar manner to those in 2003, there are indications
that some of them hold different views about their
expectations of what INEC's role should be. There have been
media reports of major disagreements between Iwu and some of
the Commissioners on disqualification of candidates,
particularly of Vice President Atiku Abubakar. Iwu has been
accused of shutting out candidates that might pose a

ABUJA 00000631 002.2 OF 003


challenge to his godfather in Anambra state, Andy Uba. Iwu
reportedly walked out of an internal INEC meeting and
allegedly told the Commissioners that he would do what
President Obasanjo told him to do and asked them to resign if
they were not "loyal to the President." Although some
analysts believe Iwu should be fired as "he has left the
impression of being servile to the president, partial to the
ruling party and willing to make baffling choices," they
caution that a change in INEC at this point could lead to a
breach of the Constitution and a delay in the elections.

--------------
LOGISTICS FOR 2003 ELECTIONS
--------------


5. (U) Less than three weeks to the elections in 2003, there
were still unresolved logistical problems with the election
preparations. The National Democratic Institute and the
Carter Center issued a pre-election statement on March 28,
2003 expressing worries about the state of preparations for
that election. The statement read in part "NDI and The Carter
Center are deeply concerned that deficiencies and other flaws
related to the organization and conduct of the upcoming
elections, if not addressed and corrected, could irreparably
harm public faith in the country's democratic process." The
crucial logistical challenges of that election were voter
registration and the status of the voter roll, security,
observer accreditation and general confidence in the
electoral process. Voter registration was greatly manipulated
and the voter roll not adequately displayed as required by
the Electoral Act. There was widespread political violence
across the country; INEC provisions for accrediting domestic
observers were extremely cumbersome and electoral
irregularities were anticipated. On the other hand, details
about locations of polling stations and copies of sample
ballot papers were made available to Diplomatic missions well
ahead of the start of elections. This same information has
not yet been shared with the public or diplomatic mission at
just over 2 weeks prior to the 2007 polls.

--------------
LOGISTICS FOR 2007 ELECTIONS
--------------


6. (U) The preparedness of INEC for the 2007 elections has
been a source of concern for most stakeholders in the
Nigerian democratic process. Political parties, civil society
organizations and regional groupings across the country have
at various times doubted the preparedness and even the
capacity of INEC to conduct credible elections in 2007. The
Transition Monitoring Group (TMG),which is a coalition of
civil society organizations with a focus on electoral
process, and the Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF),the major
regional group for northern Nigeria, have publicly expressed
doubts about INEC's preparedness for the April elections.


7. (U) Preparations started on a very shaky note with the
introduction of electronic voter registration and all the
attendant problems of a new technology in a country with
little functioning infrastructure. The exercise started late
with an inadequate number of (generally) malfunctioning
machines, a lack of information and outright fraud. There
were allegations of diversions of the Direct Data Capture
(DDC) machines mostly by members of the ruling political
party. The voter roll has still not been properly displayed
for challenges and amendments as required by law. Though INEC
declared it had registered about 61.5 million voters, it is
not clear how many of those registered voters will be able to
cast their votes as INEC "reserves the right to determine how
many of those registered voters are valid." It is also not
clear how INEC intends to merge the registrations from the
direct data capture (DDC) machines and registrations from the
locally configured laptop computers. Analysts fear there
might not be a credible voter roll for the elections as
virtually no one outside of INEC has seen a copy. The INEC
Chair on March 13, 2007 said permanent voter cards to replace
the paper receipts some voters received when they registered
were being printed but did not disclose distribution
mechanism. (NOTE: Some voters received no proof of
registration and we now hear that INEC may not distribute the

ABUJA 00000631 003.2 OF 003


permanent cards at all. END NOTE.)


8. (U) Less than a month before the 2007 elections, it is
not clear to the Nigerian public where polling units will be
located, what the ballot papers look like, which domestic
observer groups will be accredited, or what is INEC's policy
on election observation. These major outstanding questions
have continued to create anxiety and suspicion amongst both
stakeholders and the general public, with some fearing that
the incumbent administration does not intend to relinquish
power. Though the House of Representatives on March 13, 2007
grudgingly endorsed INEC's preparations for the April
elections, Nigerians, taking into account the widespread
litigations, disqualification of opposition candidates and
electoral violence that has been on the increase, are far
from being convinced INEC was serious about conducting
elections.


9. (SBU) While President Obasanjo was reported to have said
he had no misgivings about foreign observers monitoring and
commenting on the conduct of the next elections, Professor
Iwu seems more predisposed to shutting out observer groups.
He had allegedly sought to put in caveats designed to
restrict the freedom of election observers. Civil society
organizations are however resolute on closely monitoring the
process. Mr. Emma Ezeazu of the Alliance for Credible
Elections (ACE) had reportedly insisted "with or without
accreditation, Nigerians were going to monitor the elections
for which communities, unions and associations had already
been mobilized."


10. (U) On March 14, 2007, INEC placed the first
advertisements in national dailies calling for applications
for recruitment of the estimated 500,000 ad-hoc staff needed
for the elections. INEC had disclosed it was encountering
problems recruiting ad-hoc staff as people anticipate
widespread violence during the elections. It is also common
knowledge that INEC has been loathe to pay the emoluments due
its ad hoc staff in the past. It is not clear what the
timeline is for the hiring and training of the ad-hoc staff
within the coming weeks. As of March 29, "recruitment is
underway," according to Iwu.


11. (SBU) As of March 14, 2007, INEC had just reportedly
commissioned the Security Printing and Minting Company to
print 400 million (rather than an earlier disclosed number of
240 million) ballot papers for the elections. The exclusion
of disqualified candidates on the ballot papers and the
capacity of the Minting Company to deliver the papers on time
are outstanding concerns, even though Iwu has announced this
week that the ballots had "already been printed." The ballot
papers for presidential elections according to INEC would
bear photographs of candidates. Analysts are concerned that
this could lead to a delayed election, as INEC would have to
reprint ballot papers if candidates currently challenging
their disqualifications in court eventually won their cases.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


12. (SBU) Preparations for the 2007 elections compare
negatively even to the relatively low standard set by those
of 2003. Further, supposed gains from the lessons learned in
2003 have not been realized. With less than three weeks to
the general elections, Nigerians still have a heightened
anxiety, uncertainty, suspicion and widespread fear that the
nation might be drifting to anarchy. The current assertive
posture of the judiciary and the National Assembly provide a
counterbalance to INEC's lack of transparency, but this has
yet to calm the worst fears of the Nigerian public. END
COMMENT.
CAMPBELL