PROSPECTS FOR NIGERIA'S FORTHCOMING ELECTIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 000618 SIPDIS SIPDIS DOE FOR CAROLYN GAY E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/2017 TAGS: PGOV NI SUBJECT: PROSPECTS FOR NIGERIA'S FORTHCOMING ELECTIONS REF: ABUJA 564 ABUJA 00000618 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Ambassador John Campbell for reasons 1.4. (b & d). ¶1. (C) Nigeria is only two-and-a-half weeks away from State Governor and Assembly elections, and three-and-a-half from Presidential and National Assembly elections. Despite the short timeframe, there is considerable disagreement among Nigerians about whether the elections will happen, what they will look like, and their short- and long-term implications. The following is our assessment, which was cleared broadly within the Mission (including by Consulate General Lagos). If Elections Go Ahead -------------- ¶2. (C) While the possibility the elections will be postponed is real (see paras 7-10, below),we think they will probably go ahead as scheduled. As we have reported (see reftel on the Ambassador's meeting with Senate President Nnamani, in particular),there is a clear sense among key elites that they want Obasanjo out soonest, even if it has to happen via a flawed election. ¶3. (C) The chances that elections will be reasonably free and fair are small, given the poor preparations by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) and its Chairman, Maurice Iwu, and the apparent lack of political will to fix them. In our internal discussion, Country Team participants characterized the forthcoming polls as a "quasi-election," or an "election-like event." A significant minority raised questions about whether INEC,s failures are so extensive as to make it impossible to conduct even flawed elections, though most thought some sort of vote was still probable. ¶4. (C) Presuming the polls on the 14th and 21st go ahead as scheduled, the question of how Nigerians will respond to them depends on several factors: INEC's declared outcome, the perception by elites of the degree of rigging/chaos, and the short-term actions of the winners, losers and President Obasanjo. ¶5. (C) Were the outcome not to be a win for PDP candidate Yar'adua on the first ballot, requiring a runoff between the top two finishers (an outside, but real, possibility),many would perceive the results as at least an improvement on ¶2003. If, however, the conduct and results of the polls suggest a blatant steal by the PDP (which is how a Yar'adua landslide would be perceived),it is not clear how Nigerians would respond. Both Buhari and Atiku have hinted at "extralegal" responses if they are rigged out. Buhari has flatly said he would not go quietly to the courts as he did in 2003 if he felt the election was again stolen, and Atiku has threatened to "disrupt the process" if he is not on the ballot. Whether either of them would actually go to the streets is another question, though we have noted an increased visibility of machetes and clubs in demonstrations among all major parties. (Comment: In our public statements and private conversations with key leaders, we have, of course, stated that violence is unacceptable. The Ambassador has personally made the same point to Vice President Atiku and Gen. Buhari. End comment.) ¶6. (C) If Yar'adua wins, the question of how Nigerians will respond to him will depend on several factors. Key unknowns about Yar'adua include whether his health will allow him to fulfill his duties as President and, if so, the degree to which he will act as a puppet of Obasanjo. If his health problems turn out to be as bad as reported, or he turns out to be as much a tool of Obasanjo as the latter clearly hopes, this will likely lead to a rapid decline in whatever legitimacy he brings to office. If, by contrast, he proves to be more physically able, and politically willing and able, to use his office to chart a different course than President Obasanjo (e.g., by going after some of the more blatantly corrupt officials of the current regime, or by launching new populist initiatives to attack poverty, for example),his popularity could increase over time, even if many Nigerians question the validity of his initial election. If Elections are Unavoidably Postponed ABUJA 00000618 002.2 OF 003 -------------- ¶7. (C) Again, our judgment is that any postponement is a less likely scenario, though still a possibility, particularly because of some outstanding legal issues. An Appeals Court ruling on Vice President Atiku's case against his exclusion from the Presidential ballot is expected Monday. Whatever the outcome, the case will be appealed to the Supreme Court. Were it to rule in Atiku's favor at a late stage in the campaign, it is conceivable the Court could order a delay in order to add him to the ballot. While President Obasanjo has now signed a bill retroactively extending the dates for voter registration, his failure to do so within the 30 days prescribe in the Constitution could also lead to future legal challenges which could force a postponement. (Comment: Our sense is that, while the Supreme Court,s ruling particularly on Atiku,s case is unpredictable, it is unlikely to take a step which would delay the elections, if only because, to do so would potentially create a constitutional vacuum after May 29, when the current government,s mandate expires. End comment.) ¶8. (C) We doubt that ordinary Nigerians would react strongly against such a delay, particularly given the apathy with which many have already reacted to these elections. Key elites, on the other hand, would likely want to assure that any postponement did not translate into even a limited extension of President Obasanjo,s administration. Were such a delay scenario to play out, there would almost certainly be moves in the National Assembly to impeach both Obasanjo and Atiku on corruption charges, and install some sort of interim government to make a new attempt to organize a transition. If Elections are Postponed by an Executive Ploy -------------- -- ¶9. (C) We judge a scenario in which elections would be postponed because of what most would perceive as executive trickery to be unlikely, not least because Obasanjo has been persuaded that such an "outcome" is one Nigerians would be least likely to accept. In such an event, the National Assembly would probably try to intervene quickly to remove the President from office. ¶10. (C) What we do not know is how Nigerians would respond if the Presidential elections have to be postponed because the April 14th State elections demonstrate that INEC,s preparations have been a disaster. The executive would certainly try to blame this on Iwu's incompetence, but it is not clear if most elites would buy this. Conclusions -------------- ¶11. (C) Overall, it is likely that an "election-like event" will take place on the 21st. As in the past, Nigerians are likely to acquiesce to the result, particularly in the short run. Factors which would promote acceptance include: the extent to which the result is not perceived as a blatant PDP steal (e.g., if the State elections on the 14th do not result in the PDP winning an implausibly large number of Governorships, or if the result of the Presidential poll is a runoff or at least plausibly close, or if the conduct of the polls is less a shambles than most informed observers expect); and, in the event of a Yar'adua win, his early, independent behavior in office. ¶12. (C) Only a transparent ploy by President Obasanjo to postpone elections significantly would produce the kind of scenarios which could lead to a breakdown of civic order across the country. Again, this is an unlikely scenario. (There has, of course, already been a breakdown of civic order in the Delta and elsewhere, but this has at least for the present been limited to those regions.) ¶13. (C) The most likely scenario is a quasi-election leading to the grudging acquiescence of a Yar'adua win. While bilateral relations will continue to be good, the problems of the last four years point to the potential pitfalls in governance. All of the leading presidential contenders say they are committed to continued reforms, but we question their domestic political support. Areas of the country will continue to be ungovernable; electoral fallout will determine the improvement or deterioration of the problem. An election ABUJA 00000618 003.2 OF 003 which is less democratic than 2003, which was in turn clearly less democratic than 1999, would not be a step forward. A step backward from democracy would clearly suggest Nigeria is moving in the wrong direction. ¶14. (C) Nonetheless, politics in Nigeria has thus far been an elite sport which has had little impact on the lives of ordinary Nigerians. While these elites may be more divided than we have previously seen as to the desired outcome, many ordinary Nigerians seem to view the elections with remarkable indifference, not bothered by the lack of preparations since they presume the outcome has already been fixed, and that INEC will muddle through somehow on the day. This seeming irrelevance of politics and, indeed, governance gives the body politic a resilience not found elsewhere. ¶15. (C) That said, the Presidential candidates with any chance of winning are all avowedly pro-American, and none advocates policies hostile to our interests. If the election "event" at least leads to a civilian-to-civilian transfer of power, we would publicly have to define this as progress. We would then need to engage the new administration quickly on the broad range of our mutual interests, while also reminding it of our continuing concern over Nigeria,s democracy and governance problems. CAMPBELL