SENATOR SAYS INDICTMENT A NOT SO VEILED THREAT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 000580 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/2017 TAGS: PGOV KDEM PHUM NI SUBJECT: SENATOR SAYS INDICTMENT A NOT SO VEILED THREAT REF: A. ABUJA 564 ¶B. 565 ABUJA 00000580 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Political Counselor Russell Hanks for reason 1.4 (B and D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The Deputy Senate President Jonathan Zwingina called the tabled indictment delivered against the President on March 7, an explicit message to President Obasanjo --- deliver an election as planned in April, or the Senate will reconvene on April 24 and begin legal proceedings against him for corruption. Zwingina said the threat is necessary because their is increasing pessimism at the National Assembly that INEC will be able to deliver an election in three weeks. This sense of foreboding, Zwingina said, was given fresh impetus this week when the Senate leadership found out that a key foreign printing sub-contractor had not started printing ballots and may be unable to meet the April 14 deadline. Zwingina believes that the courts will "definitely" rule that Atiku can be a candidate and that if that occurs, Nigeria's political equation will again shift dramatically. End Summary DRAMA AT THE SENATE -------------- ¶1. (C) Senator President Nnamani suffered a significant blow to his credibility in his handling of the PTDF report in the Senate, Zwingina said. By not debating the indictment against the President and Vice-President before going into recess on March 7, it appeared that he was trying to "soft-pedal" the offenses which could be the grounds for impeachment. Zwingina said the Senate leadership was convinced by Senator Nnamani that no action or debate on the issue should be taken in order to reduce the chances of delaying the election (ref A). Nnamani, Zwingina said, was under great pressure including threats directly from the President that if he did not cooperate his archenemy, the governor of Enugu state, "would take care of him." ¶2. (C) Zwingina described a tense week in which Senate President Nnamani was squeezed by both the presidency and his colleagues in the Senate. The President wanted him to quash the report and the specially appointed ad-hoc committee wanted to submit and debate the report (ref B). While the President threatened him directly, Zwingina said, his colleagues threatened to embarrass him, by resigning and implying that he had been bought. When details of the report began to filter out both sides demanded favorable action. ¶3. (C) Nnamani first went to his colleagues in leadership positions and convinced them that debate and action on the report would inexorably lead to a crisis and possibly a delay in the elections. He persuaded his colleagues, including Zwingina, to work out a compromise with the members of the ad-hoc committee. The compromised reached was that they would table the report, with no debate and adjourn the Senate one day early. He also agreed to allow debate on the report on the first day the Senate resumes it work, although this may be after the elections. ¶4. (C) Zwingina, said his colleagues reluctantly bought Nnamani's argument and he moved the motion to reject the resignation of the Senators. Senate leaders argued that by accepting its compromise, they could deliver a not so veiled threat that if the elections did not happen on time they would come back into session to initiate "serious actions" against President Obasanjo. If elections are held and come off well, Zwingina said, the Senators have agreed not to debate the report when the session resumes. ¶5. (C) Zwingina admitted that the whole episode had dulled the shine on Nnamani's star but that he had made a conscious decision to "protect the system." Nnamani might have underestimated the hope many Nigerians had in a resurgent National Assembly and his actions may have "dashed their hopes," he said. But Zwingina said that members of the leadership in the Senate felt particularly powerless in the face of "an executive who does not abide by the constitution or obey the laws." CONCERN OVER INEC'S LACK OF PREPARATION -------------- ABUJA 00000580 002.2 OF 002 ¶6. (C) Zwingina said there was increasing pessimism about INEC's preparations for elections. With only three weeks to go, work had not yet started on printing of the ballots. The Nigerian Mint, originally designated to print all of the ballots was incapable of printing security features in the ballot. As a result, some of the ballots and the security features are to be sub-contracted out to a UK-based company, Zwingina said. In a briefing for Senate Nnamani on March 8, the Senate President was told that the UK company had not been paid its advance to begin the work and, therefore, had not begun printing ballots. More disturbing, Zwingina said, was that the company had estimated that if it started work immediately it would not be able finish printing the ballots until May. ¶7. (C) Zwingina said that timing of printing is also likely to be affected by INEC's insistence that it include pictures on ballots. If INEC, however, decided to leave out pictures and security features, there would be an outside chance that they would meet the deadline. He said that given this crisis, he could not imagine why Iwu was traveling to the United States to convince Americans that preparations were going on well, when the reality was quite the opposite. "We will not know until April 13, whether there will be an election on April 14," Zwingina said. ¶8. (C) Zwingina also expressed concern over Iwu's Panglossian outlook in which everything was under control and would work out. This contradicted what other commissioners were saying, Zwingina said. In addition, Iwu's statement that it would comply with court orders that met certain conditions was also troubling, he noted. This suggested to many Nigerians, Zwingina contended, that INEC was playing a partisan role in the elections. ATIKU CHANCES AND WORRIES ABOUT THE MILITARY -------------- ¶9. (C) Zwingina said that he was sure that courts will reinstate Atiku into the presidential race. If that occurred the whole political equation would shift. The President, he said, was fixated on excluding Atiku, and a favorable court decision would put the President on the defensive. He said that Atiku would find that the majority of the members of the NASS would then shift their support his way, but only after the first round of elections. ¶10. (C) The National Assembly is deeply concerned about the "politicization" of the military". The military leadership had paid a courtesy visit on the Senate in the last two weeks, Zwingina recounted and they had publicly reaffirmed their loyalty to the constitution and noninterference in the political process. But privately, Zwingina said, one key military leader had said that" we also listen to what people say when they visit us." Zwingina believes that military intervention would be a disaster, but something that he remains worried about. The current environment would provide a pretext consistent with Nigeria's history in which the military would take over and make vague promises about cleaning up politics. One of the first acts, he noted would be to dissolve the National Assembly and rule by decree. CAMPBELL