ABUJA SCENESETTER FOR AMB. YATES AND VICE ADMIRAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 002428 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2017 TAGS: PGOV PMIL KPKO NI SUBJECT: ABUJA SCENESETTER FOR AMB. YATES AND VICE ADMIRAL MOELLER Classified By: Charge d'affaires Lisa Piascik for reasons 1.4. (b & d). ¶1. (C) U.S. Mission Nigeria warmly welcomes your November 27-29 visit to Abuja. Your visit comes at a pivotal time in West Africa's engagement with Africom. Popular and official misunderstanding of the Africom concept, regional pride, and colonial baggage have made Nigeria and other regional capitals reluctant to give the idea their support. Press coverage is almost uniformly negative; however, most Nigerian resistance to Africom is based on flawed information as to its fundamental purpose and make-up. We believe this can be overcome through a combination of public education, diplomacy, and special attention paid to African sensitivities, though this will not be easy. Nigeria's leadership role within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the continent as a whole make it key to gaining greater region-wide support for the new command. We believe your visit will increase Nigeria's, and thus the region's, understanding of the Africom mission and appreciation of the importance of Africom to Africa's future. NIGERIAN ATTITUDES ON AFRICOM -------------- ¶2. (C) Since taking office May 29, President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua has been largely silent concerning Africom. On November 19, however, his government announced its formal opposition to any element of Africom being based in Nigeria or West Africa. In addition, during her November 12-13 visit to Abuja, GON officials pressured Liberian President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf not to negotiate with the USG concerning a possible Africom presence in Liberia. Press reporting of GON, NGO, and public opinion has been overwhelmingly negative and points to an underlying misunderstanding of Africom's mission and structure. For example, Foreign Minister Ojo Maduekwe has declared publicly that "American troops are not welcome on African soil." Other commonly voiced complaints include fears of recolonization, a U.S. grab of Niger Delta oil facilities, and a Cold War with China, with Africa as the battleground. Privately, those GON officials who understand the concept better have been generally supportive of Africom, and it was hoped that the Airlie House Conference would help persuade them to support Africom publicly as well. However, according to ECOWAS Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace 
and Security Mahamane Toure, the Airlie House information went no further than the invitees, as "information in Africa cannot travel from the bottom up -- you have to appeal directly to political leaders and heads of state." NIGERIA -- A REGIONAL LEADER -------------- ¶3. (C) Nigerians are proud of the nation's leadership role in international and regional peacekeeping operations. Nigerian peacekeepers are currently in Sudan, and the GON expects to have its contribution to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) deployed in the next few months. This deployment, however, comes at a time when Nigerian military leaders are concerned that resources and troops are already stretched thin due to domestic and international requirements. Despite their leadership in peacekeeping on the continent, the Nigerian military remains underfunded and is in critical need of training, equipment and additional personnel to meet its international obligations. ACOTA has been active in training Darfur-bound soldiers, and we are pressing the GON to accept ACOTA training for the AMISOM contingent as well. ¶4. (C) Nigeria is host to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS),and currently plays a strong leadership role in the formation of its policies. ECOWAS is primarily an organization formed to create regional economic cohesion which sees historic West African instability as a major obstacle to economic growth. With strong U.S., Canadian, and European support, the organization is in the process of forming a rapid-reaction military force, the ECOWAS Stand-by Force (ESF). This will be comprised of nearly 2800 troops from ECOWAS' 15 member nations organized into two brigades, of which Nigerian troops and hardware will form the backbone of the Eastern Brigade. The ESF is supposed to be deployment-ready by 2010 and is conducting numerous training, logistics, and command exercises to meet that deadline; most ABUJA 00002428 002 OF 002 observers, however, believe that this is an unrealistic goal. SECURITY ISSUES -------------- ¶5. (C) Violence in the Niger Delta appears to be escalating after several months' lull. Unrest and kidnappings of foreigners subsided substantially in the first months of the Yar'Adua administration, but there have been renewed incidents of violence targeted at western oil facilities in the last month. In addition, militants have escalated their attacks against the hapless Nigerian Navy, killing sailors and stealing equipment and boats. Nigeria is the West's partner in the Gulf of Guinea Energy Security Strategy dialogue process; however, its inability to control the violence within the Delta is a black mark on its leadership. The GON has been generally unresponsive to our offers on illegal arms trafficking and efforts to improve coastal security in the Gulf of Guinea. With more than US$3 billion invested in Nigeria (mostly in the oil industry),the U.S. has an obvious interest in a solution to the security problems in the Delta. The situation was further complicated by the November 12 attack on a Cameroonian military post in the Bakassi peninsula, in which 20 gendarmes died. While the identity of the assailants and their motive for attack are still unknown, some observers believe this could have been an attempt by militants to widen the conflict. GAINING NIGERIAN SUPPORT FOR AFRICOM -------------- ¶6. (C) We believe that much of the Nigerian resistance to Africom can be overcome by reminding the GON of the value that Africom adds to USG humanitarian, counterterrorism, and training efforts in Africa, and reassuring them that Africom will not erode Nigerian sovereignty in any way. Nigerian officials, publicly and privately, have expressed frustration that their political and military leaders were not brought into the discussion during Africom's early planning stages. Always protocol conscious, the mere fact that senior command leadership is visiting Abuja will go a long way toward soothing offended sensibilities. Embassy Abuja's Public Affairs Section is planning a press event, which will be a good opportunity to publicly express USG acknowledgment of and appreciation for Nigeria's leadership role in African affairs, especially peacekeeping. While at this stage it is unlikely that the GON will publicly reverse its stated opposition to any West Africa-based Africom element, we believe that your visit will mitigate the influence of some of the continent's more strident Africom opponents, and may ensure a more helpful behind-the-scenes role by the GON as Africom progresses toward full operational status. PIASCIK