A STRATEGY FOR GETTING NIGERIAN TROOPS TO SOMALIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L ABUJA 001826 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12598: DECL: 08/20/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL NI SUBJECT: A STRATEGY FOR GETTING NIGERIAN TROOPS TO SOMALIA Ref: Abuja 1787 Classified by Charge d'Affaires a.i. Robert E. Gribbin for reasons ¶14. b. and d. ¶1. (C) As indicated by our reporting on this subject (Reftel), including Congressman Payne's meetings with FM Maduekwe and President Yar'Adua on August 20, Nigeria is not moving forward at any speed to designate, train or deploy a battalion for AMISOM. Part of the issue is, we believe, the lack of information about the situation in Mogadishu. Nigeria has no representation there and no means of finding out much about what is going on. Leaders are in the dark and unwilling to admit it. Presuming that we want to keep pushing Nigeria to participate, we propose a strategy of information sharing designed to bring them into the Somalia loop. Consequently, the Embassy would pass messages to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Defense and the General responsible for Peacekeeping. ¶2. (C) An initial report should describe in detail the Ugandan deployment, their quarters, and daily activities. It should discuss their reception by the transitional government and local community as well as relations with Ethiopian forces. Obviously, the report should focus on the security situation for the peacekeeping troops. There is a growing sentiment here, as recently stated by the Foreign Minister, that Nigeria has to be much more pro-active in guaranteeing the safety of its citizens abroad. While he was commenting on run-ins by private citizens with authorities in Europe, the Minister of Defense echoed a parallel theme in addressing peacekeeping operations. ¶3. (C) Subsequent reports to be shared should continue to provide updates regarding peacekeeping activities in Somalia. Others should focus on the politics of the country and the region. We believe that sharing information will help Nigerians to come to informed decisions about AMISOM and Somalia. While there is the risk that the reality of the situation may scare Nigeria away, we hold out little hope of moving from the current limbo in the absence of better information. ¶4. (C) An additional thought would be to offer to send several Nigerian officers to Mogadishu to assess the situation and, or seek to have Nigeria assign several observers to the current AU mission. Maybe one way to broach this would be for Uganda to extend the invitation. Either possibility would provide for an independent source of information that the government here would find credible. ¶5. (C) DATT suggests that a Government of Nigeria site survey focus on both strategic and operational issues. A suggested itinerary would include Addis Ababa for political guidance; then to Mogadishu to see the operational terrain. After this site visit, a quick visit to Uganda to see the on-going training and finally to either Djibouti or Kenya if one or the other is going to be the logistical support base. Site survey personnel should include a representative from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for discussions in Addis and at least two MoD/military representatives for logistics and operations. It would not be a bad idea to have the Nigerian delegation accompanied by a USG representative; especially if coordination is required with CJTF HoA in Djibouti. ¶6. (U) Please advise. GRIBBIN