NIGERIAN JTF EXACERBATES CHEVRON'S OIL BUNKERING

C O N F I D E N T I A L ABUJA 001534 SIPDIS SIPDIS DOE FOR CAROLYN GAY E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/18/2017 TAGS: PGOV ASEC EPET KJUS ENRG NI SUBJECT: NIGERIAN JTF EXACERBATES CHEVRON'S OIL BUNKERING WOES Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN CAMPBELL FOR REASONS 1.4 (B AND D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Ambassador Campbell on June 18 met with Chevron's Chief Nigeria Security manager Peter Williams (strictly protect) to discuss Chevron's operations in the Niger Delta region and security challenges facing oil production. Williams remarked many Nigerian security operators were not "on the side of the angels" and were permissive of and/or complicit in illegal oil bunkering activities. A sensitive source provided Chevron details of a JTF conspiracy to aid and abet bunkering and Williams requested the possibility of Post bringing this information to the attention of the Nigerian Authorities. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) Williams began by remarking that while local youths had invaded a Chevron facility on the night of June 17 he expected the facility would be back online within ten days. He observed that in contrast to an uptick in kidnappings in May, attacks on oil infrastructure had quieted down in recent weeks. ¶3. (C) Regarding Chevron's recent experience with Nigerian Joint Task Force (JTF) operations to protect oil facilities and target illegal oil bunkering in the Niger Delta, Williams stressed many JTF operators were not "on the side of the angels" and the JTF was generally as much of a problem as a solution in addressing Delta security. Many operators were complicit in illegal oil bunkering activities or tipping off bunkerers to JTF operations and corruption within the JTF could be found even as high as the Naval High Command-level. He said the Warri region was rife with bunkering activity run by local kingpins that was causing significant environmental degradation. He posited that the Nigerian government could bring order to the region if only the Electoral and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) could bring some key kingpins to justice. ¶4. (C) In one instance, a sensitive source told Chevron that JTF command had made a subtle change to the Battalion boundaries around the Escravos and Forcados rivers area, giving 146th Battalion territory in the creeks that was previously controlled by the 93rd Battalion and is rich in oil production activity. Williams suggested that JTF headquarters made the change to give bunkerers unfettered access to more lucrative flow lines in the Ebite region since the 146th Battalion was generally seen as more permissive of bunkering activities compared to the 93rd Battalion. ¶5. (C) Williams told the Ambassador that Chevron wanted to bring this information to the attention of Nigerian authorities, but judged the EFCC too blunt an instrument to address this particular problem directly. Chevron was also concerned that involving the EFCC through official channels would allow the perpetrators to trace the information back to Chevron and its source and would be likely to bring adverse repercussions to each. Accordingly, he asked whether the post could "remove the middlemen" and bring this case to the attention of EFCC Chairman Nuhu Ribadu. ¶6. (C) COMMENT: The Ambassador implied the US Government's reticence in serving as a diplomatic backchannel for international oil companies, posing the question whether attacking illegal oil bunkering at other than a tactical level would become a political issue for the Nigerian government. While the Nigerian government is under pressure to address Niger Delta security and development, responding to illegal oil bunkering must be an important element. CAMPBELL