OIL COMPANY REPRESENTATIVE TALKS HOSTAGES, DELTA,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 001368 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DOE FOR CAROLYN GAY E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/26/2017 TAGS: PGOV PINR ENRG NI SUBJECT: OIL COMPANY REPRESENTATIVE TALKS HOSTAGES, DELTA, AND SAO TOME REF: A. LAGOS 00415 AND PREVIOUS ¶B. LAGOS 00422 ¶C. ABUJA 01172 ABUJA 00001368 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Political Counselor Russell J. Hanks for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Emboffs on June 8 met with a representative of Chevron Nigeria Ltd. (CNL) to discuss the events leading up to the June 2 release of six CNL employees kidnapped on May 1 in Bayelsa State. The representative indicated Bayelsa State officials leaned heavily on CNL for supplies and logistical support and suggested that ransom payments by State officials had become a routine practice. He personally believed a military solution would be necessary to resolve the Delta conflict and envisioned a role for the State to pay or find opportunities for unemployed youths as a way to keep future militants at bay. The representative privately reiterated CNL's "wait-and-see" position on the Nigeria-Sao Tome Joint Development Zone (JDZ). END SUMMARY. -------------- -------------- State Government, Kidnappers Have Outstretched Hands -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) Emboffs on June 8 met with Chevron Nigeria Ltd. (CNL) Representative Mansur Aliyu (Protect) to discuss the events leading up to the June 2 release of six CNL employees kidnapped on May 1 in Bayelsa State (reftel A). Aliyu offered details relating to the hostage negotiations between the Bayelsa State government and kidnappers noting that Bayelsa State officials leaned heavily on CNL for supplies and logistical support throughout the negotiations. Bayelsa State officials asked CNL to supply medication and food to pass on to the hostages, which CNL refused citing this was the State's responsibility. Officials also requested the use of CNL's helicopter to deliver these supplies, which CNL also refused on grounds that the kidnappers would be likely to assault the helicopter and take its crew hostage. ¶3. (C) Aliyu told Emboffs that on June 2, Bayelsa State Governor Timipreye Silva personally secured the release of the CNL hostages, including Amcit John Stapleton (reftel A), and collected them with the use of CNL's helicopter. Aliyu also alleged that the Bayelsa State government had paid the kidnappers the "usual amount" (NFI) for the hostages' �A;release, suggesting that this had become a routine practice in Bayelsa State hostage negotiations. He was very clear that the Bayelsa State government paid this ransom from State funds and that CNL was not involved in the ransom payment. ¶4. (C) Aliyu was critical of the supposedly widespread practice in which State Governments and companies paid ransoms to kidnappers. As an example, he cited the June 1 kidnapping of ten Indian nationals from the Indorama Eleme Petrochemical housing compound in Rivers State (reftel B). Aliyu indicated the company had paid the kidnappers N40 million (about USD 31,000),but that the kidnappers would not release the hostages until the company paid the balance of their N150 million (about USD 118,000) ransom demand. (Note: The ten Indian hostages were released on June 17.) -------------- A Peace Tax and A Military Solution -------------- ¶5. (C) Aliyu thought insecurity in the Niger Delta was compounded when militants and/or criminal gangs imposed an implicit tax on construction companies operating in the region. This "tax" made necessary infrastructure projects unprofitable. He posited the States could encourage these projects by either shouldering this "tax" by paying-off youths or providing them employment opportunities. Even though this probably would open the door for ghost workers and other types of corruption, he described this potential practice as "padding contracts for peace." ¶6. (C) Aliyu believed the only credible way to address ABUJA 00001368 002.2 OF 002 Delta insecurity would be to use force. However, he thought President Yar'adua's decision to give key executive and security posts, such as the Vice President and the Chief of Defense Staff to Ijaws was a "blunder" and would complicate their ability to address insecurity in their home region, the Niger Delta. ¶7. (C) COMMENT: While Aliyu advocated the use of force and payoffs to assuage Niger Delta militancy and criminality, these opinions reflected his personal views. Oil companies could see a backlash from militants and local communities in the face of widespread military action in the Niger Delta and would discourage these moves to avoid being seen as complicit with any military excesses. ¶8. (C) COMMENT (Continued): Aliyu's comment that having Ijaw's in high level government posts would hamstring their ability to objectively address Niger Delta insecurity and development downplays the potential benefit of high level representation from the South-South in garnering local support and advocating the region's issues at the federal level. However, as Aliyu alludes, their acceptability among many Niger Delta communities is likely to depend on their ability to engage the region's minority ethnic groups and mobilize the political will to address the Delta's myriad security and development challenges. -------------- Joint Development Zone -------------- ¶9. (SBU) Aliyu also discussed CNL's operations in the Nigeria-Sao Tome Joint Development Zone (JDZ),indicating it had suspended operations in the JDZ after announcing its Obo-1 exploration well did not contain commercial quantities of hydrocarbons (reftel C). Aliyu reiterated CNL's position that CNL had not written-off the JDZ and was waiting to see what companies find in other JDZ concession blocks before resuming exploration drilling. He was skeptical that companies would find significant commercial quantities in other blocks and said CNL assessed Block 1, where the Obo-1 well is located, had the best prospects of the JDZ concession blocks. CAMPBELL