NIGERIA STRUGGLES TO MEET AMISOM COMMITMENTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 001320 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS DOE FOR CAROLYN GAY E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/21/2017 TAGS: PREL MOPS KPKO NI SUBJECT: NIGERIA STRUGGLES TO MEET AMISOM COMMITMENTS REF: ABUJA 01265 ABUJA 00001320 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Ambassador John Campbell for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C//NF) SUMMARY: The Nigerian military battalion designated to serve in the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) is under-manned, under-equipped, and under-trained. The military leadership does not say, and probably does not know, when its troops will be AMISOM-ready. While the USG has several programs in place to help build Nigeria's capacity to field peacekeeping forces, including the battalion designated for Somalia, Nigerian participation in and/or acceptance of these programs has been erratic. As of mid-June, Nigeria's ministerial-level government is virtually non-existent, with caretaker officials reluctant to make decisions on a host of operational issues. END SUMMARY. -------------- - Nigerian Commitment to AMISOM on Shaky Footing -------------- - ¶2. (C//NF) While the Nigerian military has become better funded, more professional, and clearly more subordinate to civilian rule since 1999, it remains under-manned, under-equipped, and under-trained for its myriad international peacekeeping and internal security engagements. Specifically regarding Nigeria's commitment to provide peacekeeping troops to serve in the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM),Nigerian Chief of Defense Staff (CDS) General Azazi in early June told DATT that the battalion designated for Somalia had serious deficiencies in equipment and training. Furthermore, it is not clear whether the Nigerian military has sufficient troop strength to meet its commitments; former President Obasanjo promised troops for Somalia without consulting military commanders. Senior military leadership has also expressed reservations about the African Union's requirement that units be self-sustainable for a period of six months. In the face of these operational and logistical obstacles, the Nigerian military leadership does not say, and probably does not know, when the promised troops will be AMISOM-ready. ¶3. (C//NF) CDS Azazi is supportive in principle of Nigeria's participation in African Union peacekeeping operations, and ensures troops that so wish serve on AU missions and have the opportunity to reap the considerable financial rewards of AU service. However Azazi's "spread-the-wealth" policy, adopted while he was Chief of Army Staff, imposes a two-year lag before troops can serve on another peacekeeping operation and is straining the Nigerian military's ability to field full-strength, cohesive, and battle-ready battalions for upcoming foreign deployments. Some battalions draw about half their strength from augmentees, and their junior officer ranks are anemic, impairing unit cohesion and leadership. In addition, these battalions are under-trained, often foregoing pre-deployment home unit training. ¶4. (C//NF) Nigerian peacekeeping units are grossly undersupplied. For example, Nigerian units serving in the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) are unable to issue sufficient arms to all troops prior to deployment, leaving some to rely on uncalibrated weapons left in place by troops departing the theater. Nigerian units also suffer from insufficient air support as the military lacks the budget to refurbish neglected transport and attack aircraft. -------------- -------------- Nigerian Military Halfheartedly Accepts USG Support -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C//NF) The USG has several programs in place to help build Nigeria's capacity to field peacekeeping forces throughout Africa, but Nigerian participation in and/or acceptance of these programs has been erratic. ¶6. (C//NF) The Nigerian military participates in USG-sponsored training under the Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program, but Nigerian battalions participating are often ill-prepared, ABUJA 00001320 002.2 OF 002 with troops arriving for ACOTA training several days late without having completed the prerequisites and lacking necessary equipment, including sufficient ammunition for live-fire exercises. ¶7. (C//NF) The Nigerian military is often slow to identify specific materiel deficiencies that the USG may be able to meet. With respect to Somalia, relevant officials have not yet presented a specific list to which we could respond. However, DATT anticipates receiving specific requests at his June 25 scheduled meeting with senior Nigerian Army operational planners. -------------- Ministerial Leadership Vacuum -------------- ¶8. (C) As of mid-June, Nigeria's ministerial-level government is not in place. While the executive and legislature and their most senior advisers are holding meetings and formulating policy, there is a void in ministerial leadership across the Nigerian government. In mid-June, President Yar'adua reportedly submitted a list of ministerial nominations to the Nigerian Senate. The legislature is expected to resume its session on June 24 and may take up confirmation hearings at that time. -------------- Strategy/Recommendation -------------- ¶9. (C//NF) All elements of the mission will continue to engage on Somalia CDS Azazi, other high level military officials, and the new Ministers of Defense and Foreign Affairs once they are appointed. A/S Frazer has already raised Nigeria's commitment to AU peacekeeping missions including AMISOM with President Yar'adua during their May 29 meeting, and Yar'adua pledged to review the issue (reftel). Post assesses that further high-level USG interventions or formal demarches to pressure the Nigerian military to honor its AMISOM commitments would be counterproductive until relevant ministers are in place. ¶10. (C//NF) DATT will also work to codify Nigerian military deficiencies and discuss further possible USG support options. Key Nigerian military officials have been unavailable or out of the country during the last several weeks, limiting DATT's access to top military leaders. DATT has meetings scheduled for June 25 and 26 with senior Nigerian Army operational planners and CDS Azazi respectively to discuss bilateral training opportunities, including peacekeeping training, as well as possible solutions to AMISOM battalion equipment and training deficiencies. Based on Post's current understanding of the Nigerian AMISOM battalion's deficiencies, we recommend we make a formal US offer of financial assistance for equipment up to USD 1 million and that we provide additional ACOTA funding to fully train AMISOM-designated units. We also suggest that the USG offer transport and logistical support for Nigerian AMISOM units for a minimum of six-months upon their deployment. CAMPBELL