AFGHAN DEFMIN WARDAK MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 000956

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DUBAI PLEASE PASS SCA A/S BOUCHER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/10/2017
TAGS: MASS MOPS MCAP PREL AF AE
SUBJECT: AFGHAN DEFMIN WARDAK MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR

ABU DHABI 00000956 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison fore reasons 1.4 (b & d).


1. (S) Summary: On June 8, Afghan Minister of Defense
General Wardak told Ambassador that Abu Dhabi Crown Prince
Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al-Nahyan has informed President
Karzai that the UAE would donate nine Mi-19 helicopters to
Afghanistan. General Wardak has passed the UAE and other
donor countries a list of requirements and is focused on
trying to turn commitments into deliveries to meet the rapid
growth of the Afghan National Army (ANA). The ANA's number
one priority is for increased tactical mobility, followed by
special operations equipment and a way to deal with IEDs.
General Wardak expressed hope that other Arab/Muslim
countries would follow the UAE's lead and deploy troops to
Afghanistan. End summary.


2. (S) On June 8 Ambassador, accompanied by DATT, USLOChief
and Econchief met with Afghan Minister of Defense General
Abdul Rahim Wardak, accompanied by Afghan Ambassador Farid
Zekria, MG Robert Durbin (Combined Forces Commander -
Afghanistan, CFC-A),and ANA Col. Salah Hamadi. General
Wardak was visiting the UAE to try to accelerate delivery of
promised equipment and brief the UAE on the situation in
Afghanistan. He said that he had a meeting scheduled with
Abu Dhabi Crown Prince (and Deputy Supreme Commander of the
UAE Armed Forces) Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al-Nahyan (MBZ)
on June 10. He would also be meeting with UAE Armed Forces
Chief of Staff LtG Hamad Thani Al-Rumaithi, and had requested
a meeting with UAE Vice President/Prime Minister/Ruler of
Dubai Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al-Maktoum, but was waiting
for confirmation. Wardak was not visiting other countries on
this trip.

ANA Growing Quickly
--------------


3. (S) General Wardak explained the only way to stabilize
Afghanistan was for Afghans to take the lead. For that
reason, the Afghan National Army was accelerating its growth,
which results in a pressing need for training and equipment.
In addition, he noted, the ANA had decided to switch from
Russian standard equipment to NATO standard equipment. This
improves interoperability, but puts an additional demand for
equipment on donor countries. The ANA had developed a list
of required equipment that it was passing to donor countries.
General Wardak passed it to the UAE and to other donors
during Abu Dhabi's February 2007 IDEX defense exhibition and
in his visits to NATO. Wardak explained he had received a
number of commitments, but deliveries were falling short,
with $1.3 billion promised and $230 million delivered to date.


4. (S) MG Durbin explained that the ANA's first priority was
for air and ground tactical mobility. The second priority
was for upgraded special operations equipment. General
Wardak interjected that the ANA desperately needed technology
and tactics to defeat IED's. He was pushing donors for
infantry combat vehicles (ICVs) and awaiting U.S. up-armored
HMMVVs (first 256 scheduled for mid-June). MG Durbin
explained the U.S. appropriation for Afghan assistance would
not be able to translate into equipment quickly enough to
meet the rapidly growing ANA. The gap needs to be filled by
NATO and/or by other donors.

NATO falling short
--------------


5. (S) General Wardak complained that -- with the exception
of the U.S., which was shouldering too much of the burden --
NATO forces were not delivering as quickly as needed. The
NATO training teams (OMCTs) had not come up to the level
needed and the "big NATO countries" were not delivering
enough equipment quickly enough. He stated, by way of
example, the German military was decommissioning its Leopard
1 tanks rather than "cascading" them to the ANA. The Germans
had already decommissioned 800 Leopard 1 tanks, but had
another 1200 remaining. If the ANA could get these tanks, it
would use the Leopard 1 as its main battle tank. MG Durbin
said that he believed that the Germans would be more likely
to provide spare parts rather than the Leopard 1s, and that
the Afghans were also pursuing other countries for the
Leopard 1s, including Canada. General Wardak added that he
had already asked the Canadians for excess M-113 Armored
Personnel Carriers (APCs),but so far none had been delivered.

ABU DHABI 00000956 002.2 OF 002



How the UAE can help
--------------


6. (S) Ambassador explained that the UAE was very focused on
Afghanistan. When the ANA Land Forces Commander General
Bismullah Khan met with UAE Armed Forces Chief of Staff LtG
Hamid Thani Al-Rumaithi in January, the UAE side had been
very forward leaning. The UAE had subsequently disbursed
another $30 million in (general) assistance and was
renovating two runways in Afghanistan for military use.
General Wardak explained that the UAE had originally planned
to donate Puma helicopters to the ANA, and then had mentioned
Gazelle helicopters. However, MbZ had said that the
equipment was too old and would raise interoperability
problems. Wardak noted that two days earlier MbZ had called
President Karzai and offered nine Mi-17 helicopters. Karzai
instructed Wardak to follow-up in his meeting with MbZ.
Wardak asked for USG assistance in ensuring timely delivery
of the helicopters. He also noted that the UAE might be
replacing some of its older equipment, which could be
cascaded to the ANA: including possibly 155 mm towed
artillery (M-109s) and armored combat vehicles (ACVs). MG
Durbin suggested that the UAE could upgrade its special
operations equipment in theater and transfer its older "in
place equipment" directly to the ANA as it redeployed. The
parties noted that third party retransfer conditions applied
for U.S. origin equipment.

Bring in the rest of the GCC
--------------


7. (S) Wardak explained the Afghans and the Gulf states
shared a number of the same concerns and that a well trained
and equipped ANA promotes regional stability. He noted that
Afghanistan and the Gulf both shared concerns about Iran and
its nuclear ambitions and that -- for Afghanistan -- "Iran
was close to being an enemy." He argued that if there were a
combined effort by the Arab Gulf states, the ANA could
develop into a strong effective force. Wardak said he had
approached the Saudi Chief of Staff during IDEX, but that he
did not express much interest. Wardak said he had also tried
to contact his friend Saudi National Security Advisor Prince
Bandar in Sultan Al-Saud. He noted that in the past, Gulf
countries such as Saudi Arabia brought in division-sized
units of Pakistani and Bangladeshi troops to serve in their
militaries. Once Afghanistan stabilized, he suggested, the
ANA could fill the same function. Wardak explained that part
of the problem was one of language, but added that the UAE
had offered to train ANA troops in Arabic.


8. (S) In response to Ambassador's question about the UAEG's
idea to have Jordanian and Bahraini special forces deploy to
Afghanistan, Wardak stated having other Arab/Muslim troops
deploy to Afghanistan was an excellent idea. These
deployments would send a clear message to the "extremists"
and would also provide the troops with good field experience.
SISON