Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ABUDHABI705
2007-04-29 13:44:00
SECRET
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Cable title:
NEW WAY FORWARD ON IRAQ -- UAE
how-tonull Diana T Fritz 04/30/2007 10:52:18 AM From DB/Inbox: Diana T Fritz Cable Text: S E C R E T ABU DHABI 00705 SIPDIS CXABU: ACTION: POL INFO: MEPI P/M ECON USLO DAO RSO AMB DCM DISSEMINATION: POL CHARGE: PROG APPROVED: AMB:MSISON DRAFTED: POL:BTHOMSON CLEARED: DCM:MQUINN, ECON:OJOHN, DAO:TJONES, USLO:EKNOUSE VZCZCADI161 PP RUEHC RUCNRAQ DE RUEHAD #0705 1191344 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 291344Z APR 07 FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8847 INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
S E C R E T ABU DHABI 000705
SIPDIS
STATE FOR POL-MIL AFFAIRS DAVID GLANCY, AND NEA/ARP
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/29/2017
TAGS: MARR MASS MOPS PREL PTER IZ AE
SUBJECT: NEW WAY FORWARD ON IRAQ -- UAE
REF: A. SECSTATE 55436
B. ABU DHABI 0097 (MBZ MEETING WITH P)
C. ABU DHABI 0145 (MBZ MEETING WITH GENERAL ABIZAID)
D. ABU DHABI 0702 (MBZ MEETING WITH ADMIRAL FALLON)
Classified By: AMBASSADOR MICHELE J. SISON, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).
S E C R E T ABU DHABI 000705
SIPDIS
STATE FOR POL-MIL AFFAIRS DAVID GLANCY, AND NEA/ARP
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/29/2017
TAGS: MARR MASS MOPS PREL PTER IZ AE
SUBJECT: NEW WAY FORWARD ON IRAQ -- UAE
REF: A. SECSTATE 55436
B. ABU DHABI 0097 (MBZ MEETING WITH P)
C. ABU DHABI 0145 (MBZ MEETING WITH GENERAL ABIZAID)
D. ABU DHABI 0702 (MBZ MEETING WITH ADMIRAL FALLON)
Classified By: AMBASSADOR MICHELE J. SISON, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).
1. (S) Although the UAEG expresses concern over the continued
violence in Iraq and has been a supporter of efforts to calm
sectarian violence and support a moderate secular leadership,
Post does not believe the UAE will contribute military
resources to the President's new strategy in Iraq. The UAE
has neither the capability nor the will to participate
militarily in Iraq.
2. (S) The UAE has a limited number of troops appropriately
trained and equipped for participation in foreign conflicts,
and these are already fully committed to ongoing actions in
Afghanistan. UAE military leaders have told us that the
number of UAE (Special Ops) troops in Afghanistan is set to
be increased in the next few months.
3. (S) The UAEG has little faith in the al-Maliki government.
In January, Abu Dhabi Crown Prince and Deputy Supreme
Commander of the Armed Forces Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ)
told U/S Burns that the first priority for the region is for
Iraq to be "stabilized," but expressed doubt that the
al-Maliki government would be able to produce a solution "no
matter how many more U.S. troops are added" (ref B). MbZ
reiterated this message to General Abizaid three weeks later
saying that the UAEG has "little confidence in being able to
work with this (al-Maliki's) government" (ref C). Similar
sentiments were conveyed by MbZ to Admiral Fallon on April 24
(ref D).
4. (S) The UAE withdrew staff from its embassy in Baghdad in
June 2006 following the kidnapping of its deputy Charge
d'Affaires. The MFA has repeatedly told us that it does not
plan to re-staff its embassy in Iraq until the security
situation improves.
SISON
SIPDIS
STATE FOR POL-MIL AFFAIRS DAVID GLANCY, AND NEA/ARP
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/29/2017
TAGS: MARR MASS MOPS PREL PTER IZ AE
SUBJECT: NEW WAY FORWARD ON IRAQ -- UAE
REF: A. SECSTATE 55436
B. ABU DHABI 0097 (MBZ MEETING WITH P)
C. ABU DHABI 0145 (MBZ MEETING WITH GENERAL ABIZAID)
D. ABU DHABI 0702 (MBZ MEETING WITH ADMIRAL FALLON)
Classified By: AMBASSADOR MICHELE J. SISON, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).
1. (S) Although the UAEG expresses concern over the continued
violence in Iraq and has been a supporter of efforts to calm
sectarian violence and support a moderate secular leadership,
Post does not believe the UAE will contribute military
resources to the President's new strategy in Iraq. The UAE
has neither the capability nor the will to participate
militarily in Iraq.
2. (S) The UAE has a limited number of troops appropriately
trained and equipped for participation in foreign conflicts,
and these are already fully committed to ongoing actions in
Afghanistan. UAE military leaders have told us that the
number of UAE (Special Ops) troops in Afghanistan is set to
be increased in the next few months.
3. (S) The UAEG has little faith in the al-Maliki government.
In January, Abu Dhabi Crown Prince and Deputy Supreme
Commander of the Armed Forces Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ)
told U/S Burns that the first priority for the region is for
Iraq to be "stabilized," but expressed doubt that the
al-Maliki government would be able to produce a solution "no
matter how many more U.S. troops are added" (ref B). MbZ
reiterated this message to General Abizaid three weeks later
saying that the UAEG has "little confidence in being able to
work with this (al-Maliki's) government" (ref C). Similar
sentiments were conveyed by MbZ to Admiral Fallon on April 24
(ref D).
4. (S) The UAE withdrew staff from its embassy in Baghdad in
June 2006 following the kidnapping of its deputy Charge
d'Affaires. The MFA has repeatedly told us that it does not
plan to re-staff its embassy in Iraq until the security
situation improves.
SISON