Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ABUDHABI705
2007-04-29 13:44:00
SECRET
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Cable title:  

NEW WAY FORWARD ON IRAQ -- UAE

Tags:  MARR MASS MOPS PREL PTER IZ AE 
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Diana T Fritz 04/30/2007 10:52:18 AM From DB/Inbox: Diana T Fritz

Cable 
Text: 
 
 
S E C R E T ABU DHABI 00705

SIPDIS
CXABU:
 ACTION: POL
 INFO: MEPI P/M ECON USLO DAO RSO AMB DCM

DISSEMINATION: POL
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: AMB:MSISON
DRAFTED: POL:BTHOMSON
CLEARED: DCM:MQUINN, ECON:OJOHN, DAO:TJONES, USLO:EKNOUSE

VZCZCADI161
PP RUEHC RUCNRAQ
DE RUEHAD #0705 1191344
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 291344Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8847
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
S E C R E T ABU DHABI 000705 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR POL-MIL AFFAIRS DAVID GLANCY, AND NEA/ARP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/29/2017
TAGS: MARR MASS MOPS PREL PTER IZ AE
SUBJECT: NEW WAY FORWARD ON IRAQ -- UAE

REF: A. SECSTATE 55436

B. ABU DHABI 0097 (MBZ MEETING WITH P)

C. ABU DHABI 0145 (MBZ MEETING WITH GENERAL ABIZAID)

D. ABU DHABI 0702 (MBZ MEETING WITH ADMIRAL FALLON)

Classified By: AMBASSADOR MICHELE J. SISON, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

S E C R E T ABU DHABI 000705 SIPDIS STATE FOR POL-MIL AFFAIRS DAVID GLANCY, AND NEA/ARP E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/29/2017 TAGS: MARR MASS MOPS PREL PTER IZ AE SUBJECT: NEW WAY FORWARD ON IRAQ -- UAE REF: A. SECSTATE 55436 ¶B. ABU DHABI 0097 (MBZ MEETING WITH P) ¶C. ABU DHABI 0145 (MBZ MEETING WITH GENERAL ABIZAID) ¶D. ABU DHABI 0702 (MBZ MEETING WITH ADMIRAL FALLON) Classified By: AMBASSADOR MICHELE J. SISON, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (S) Although the UAEG expresses concern over the continued violence in Iraq and has been a supporter of efforts to calm sectarian violence and support a moderate secular leadership, Post does not believe the UAE will contribute military resources to the President's new strategy in Iraq. The UAE has neither the capability nor the will to participate militarily in Iraq. ¶2. (S) The UAE has a limited number of troops appropriately trained and equipped for participation in foreign conflicts, and these are already fully committed to ongoing actions in Afghanistan. UAE military leaders have told us that the number of UAE (Special Ops) troops in Afghanistan is set to be increased in the next few months. ¶3. (S) The UAEG has little faith in the al-Maliki government. In January, Abu Dhabi Crown Prince and Deputy Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ) told U/S Burns that the first priority for the region is for Iraq to be "stabilized," but expressed doubt that the al-Maliki government would be able to produce a solution "no matter how many more U.S. troops are added" (ref B). MbZ reiterated this message to General Abizaid three weeks later saying that the UAEG has "little confidence in being able to work with this (al-Maliki's) government" (ref C). Similar sentiments were conveyed by MbZ to Admiral Fallon on April 24 (ref D). ¶4. (S) The UAE withdrew staff from its embassy in Baghdad in June 2006 following the kidnapping of its deputy Charge d'Affaires. The MFA has repeatedly told us that it does not plan to re-staff its embassy in Iraq until the security situation improves. SISON

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