UAE MOVING FORWARD ON GSD; DEFINING THE AGENDA

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 000458 SIPDIS NOFORN STATE FOR NEA/ARP, NEA/FO-DAS GRAY; PM ACTING A/S MULL DOD FOR OSD PDAS MARY BETH LONG CENTCOM FOR MAJ GEN FINDLEY NSC FOR N. RAMCHAND, M. DORAN E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/18/2017 TAGS: PREL PTER PARM MOPS MASS KNNP IR AE SUBJECT: UAE MOVING FORWARD ON GSD; DEFINING THE AGENDA REFS: A) 06 ABU DHABI 3835 (GSD SCENE-SETTER) B) 06 ABU DHABI 4077, 4078, 4079 (OCT. GSD REPORTING) C) 06 ABU DHABI 4302 (GSD AT JMC FOLLOW-UP) D) ABU DHABI 145 (MbZ W/GEN. ABIZAID) E) ABU DHABI 304 (MbZ MEETS SOCOM GEN. BROWN) F) ABU DHABI 187 (MbZ TALKS IRAN W/ CSAF GEN. MOSELY) G) USDAO ABU DHABI IIR 6 931 0021 07 Classified by Ambassador Michele J. Sison, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). ¶1. (C) Summary: Following the October 19, 2006 Gulf Security Dialogue session held in Abu Dhabi, Embassy has identified and clarified key areas of potential cooperation with the UAEG, particularly vis-a-vis the "existential threat" the UAE perceives from Iran. Future GSD discussions with the UAE will be closely tied to ongoing talks on the UAE-US Bilateral Air Defense Initiative (BADI),which proposes a combination of passive defense (Shared Early Warning),active defense (Patriot, HAWK, Short Range Air Defense (SHORAD) and future upper tier systems like Theater High Altitude Air Defense (THAAAD)) and establishing a "Common Air Picture", LINK 11/16, along with CENTRIXS interoperability. There have been ongoing technical discussions on Shared Early Warning and Air and Missile defense--most recently March 6-7. Abu Dhabi Crown Prince and Deputy Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ) was briefed by defense contractors in February on THAAD/PAC-3/Shared Early Warning systems and stated that he wants a complete missile defense system by summer 2009. MbZ has also repeatedly inquired about progress on Predator B. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Background: The U.S. enjoys a strong defense cooperation relationship with the UAE, and the Gulf Security Dialogue (GSD) provides an opportunity to further deepen that relationship. With GSD discussions taking place against a background of rising international concern over Iranian nuclear ambitions, the critical need for enhanced UAE-US cooperation has become more clear and urgent to UAE officials. The upcoming GSD discussions in Washington will build on prior exchanges including the June 2006 Joint Military Commission (JMC) in Washington, the November 2006 JMC (working group meetings) in Abu Dhabi, and the October 2006 GSD also held in Abu Dhabi. ¶3. (S) Future GSD discussions should highlight to the UAE the importance of "interoperability" with the U.S. and GCC allies in designing, procuring and implementing a credible air and missile defense system -- which naturally raises the questions of integrated Shared Early Warning (SEW) systems, layered defense capabilities, and possible acquisitions such as the PAC-3 Patriot missile (lower tier) and THAAD (future upper tier). The Emiratis have historically expressed skepticism about GCC coordination on an integrated GCC missile defense. ¶4. (S/NF) While the Emiratis understand our arguments about interoperability in discussing key air defense systems, they have not been convinced enough to pursue a purchase. At USCENTCOM's direction, and with Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) permission, U.S. Army missile defense experts traveled to the UAE in early 2006 to conduct an air defense assessment. Previously, potential Patriot emplacement locations in the UAE were focused against the Iraqi threat. The surveys, completed April 19, 2006, identified six new Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) emplacement locations to deter the Iranian missile threat. They would protect much of the metropolitan areas of Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Fujairah from an Iranian threat axis, including key nodes such as Al Dhafra Air Base, Al Bateen Air Base, Minhad Air Base, Fujairah Airport, Jebel Ali Port, and Fujairah Port. End Background. Defense Cooperation -------------- ¶5. (S) During the 14 November, 2006 JMC working group meetings, USCENTCOM presented a BADI overview to senior UAE military officials. The presentation highlighted BADI's combination of passive defense (Shared Early Warning),active defense (Patriot, HAWK, and SHORAD) and the establishing of a shared/common air picture (LINK 11/16). Staff Major General Mohammed Sowaidan expressed interest in obtaining more information on Surface Launched ) Advanced Medium Range Air to Air Missile (SL-AMRAAM) in addition to BADI. During the same working group meetings, DMI noted UAE,s support for GSD and its shared concerns over Iran to highlight its desire for a closer intelligence relationship with the US, including expanded access to US intelligence products and training (ref G). ¶6. (S) At the UAE-US Air Defense Working Group meeting on January 14, the UAEG requested USLO assistance in arranging classified technical briefings from USG/Contractors on EAD, PAC-3, MEADS and THAAD. A Shared Early Warning (SEW) system via CENTRIXS dissemination was outlined by USLO. Subsequently the UAEG submitted a letter of request (LOR) to USLO in Feb 2007 for the purchase/installation of CENTRIXS throughout the UAE Armed forces and have also expressed their intent to submit a Letter of Intent (LOI) for a SEW site survey and follow on Letter of Request (LOR) for SEW once the requirements have been determined by the site survey. The UAEG requested a classified Patriot PAC-3 configuration and THADD briefing during a follow-on meeting tentatively scheduled for April along w/a potential visit to Ft. Bliss in El Paso TX at some date TBD to receive familiarization w/lower tier BADI assets. Patriots and Shared Early Warning -------------- ¶7. (S) On February 1, CSAF Gen. Moseley met with MbZ immediately following a Raytheon/Lockheed Martin briefing to MbZ on the ongoing development of THAAD/PAC-3 and shared early warning systems (Ref F). Speaking of a time frame for the first time, MbZ stated that he wants a complete missile defense system by summer 2009. MbZ expressed particular interest in the possibility of mounting PAC-3 on Littoral Combat Ships (LCS). After learning that PAC-3 cannot yet be mounted on a seagoing platform, MbZ was pleased to note that SL-AMRAAM has already tested successfully on a wide variety of platforms and could be ship-based. Sheikh (Staff Colonel) Ahmed bin Tahnoon A-Nahyan, advisor to MbZ on critical infrastructure protection, took particular note of this fact and asked about upgrading/extending their existing Hawk/AMRAAM assets. When Raytheon/Lockheed briefers noted the 32km limit of unelevated radar, MbZ stated that the UAE had identified a location at an elevation of 6,000 feet on the UAE's northern border that he would like the contractors to come back and look at as a possible location for an early warning radar system. (Ref. F) 8.(S) During technical discussions on Shared Early Warning and Air and Missile Defense March 6-7, the UAE provided a critical asset list to assist CENTCOM in preparing the classified Patriot PAC-3 and THAAD briefings. The UAE was provided a SEW demonstration and expressed intent to request SEW. Additionally, tactical level talks were conducted with members of the UAE HAWK Air Defense Brigade and USCENTCOM missile defense representatives. (Comment: The Embassy's US Liaison Office (USLO) feels the release and presentation of the classified Patriot PAC-3 and THAAD briefings ASAP is crucial to maintaining momentum for the UAE considering an U.S. interoperable Air and Missile Defense system. End Comment.) UAE worries over Iranian "backlash" -------------- ¶9. (S) Comment: MbZ has expressed concern about Iranian nuclear aspirations but also about the growing Iranian influence not only in Iraq but throughout the region. Although MbZ's rhetoric is replete with calls to be tough on Iran, i.e., stop Iran "by all means possible" and "deal with Iran sooner rather than later" (refs D and F),the UAEG is clearly nervous about any US actions that could upset their much larger and militarily superior neighbor, and has often expressed trepidation over the prospect of being caught in the middle between the US and Iran. Posturing aside, Emirati leadership obviously fears consequences for the UAE, in terms of a potential "backlash" from Iran, as a possible result of any US-Iran or Israel-Iran military dust-up in which the UAE could be even tangentially associated or implicated. 10 (S) Comment cont.: MbZ's recurrent requests for Predator B should be placed in the context of the UAE's current defense capabilities. The UAEG already has an advanced platform for delivering a significant bomb payload in the F-16 Block 60s and a Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) is in the final stages of completion for the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS). The capabilities of Predator B, although significantly less than the Block 60 F-16s, does represent a capability for border patrol and tactical engagement and MbZ's repeated call for it indicates that Predator B is not only an issue of intelligence and tactical engagement, but is also becoming an issue of trust in our defense cooperation relationship. End Comment. SISON