SCENESETTER FOR A/S ROOD: THE US-UAE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 000276 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR ISN A/S ROOD, TFOLEY, PMCNERNEY, RPAN, CRUSSELL TREASURY FOR BHAMMERLE COMMERCE FOR WWYSONG E.O.12958: DECL: 1/28/2017 TAGS: PRELPGOVETTCIRAE SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR A/S ROOD: THE US-UAE COUNTERPROLIFERATION TASK FORCE REF: A) 06 ABU DHABI 1887 B) 06 ABU DHABI 2688 C) 06 STATE 102501 D) 06 ABU DHABI 2780 E) 07 ABU DHABI 0185 F) 07 ABU DHABI 0097 G) 06 BEIJING 024449 H) 07 DUBAI 0059 I) 06 ABU DHABI 4473 J) 07 ABU DHABI 0146 K) 07 ABU DHABI 0168 Classified by Ambassador Michele J. Sison, for reasons 1.4 (b and d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Assistant Secretary Rood, Embassy Abu Dhabi looks forward to welcoming you to the UAE for the third meeting of the US-UAE Counterproliferation Task Force (CTF) on March 1. The UAE CTF Chair, Brigadier General Mohammad Al Qemzi -- Dubai's General Department of State Security Director -- is likely anticipating a summary of the US export control policy plans alluded to by USDOC A/S Padilla in his December speech. In addition, we have requested meetings with Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdallah bin Zayed al Nahyan (AbZ) and Sheikha Lubna al Qasimi, Minister of Economy. We will want to use these opportunities to restate to the UAE leadership our concerns about the UAE's lack of an export control law, to discuss USG export control plans, and to push for full and effective implementation of UNSCR 1737 on Iran. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Since ISN/CPI Director Foley's April 2006 meeting of the CTF Working Groups (REF A),we have had several interactions with the UAE on proliferation, export controls, and proliferation finance issues. Improving the UAE's Counterproliferation Record -------------- --- ¶3. (C) Earlier this week, Embassy was informed that the Abu Dhabi Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Zayed, had instructed that a new "Executive Committee on Commodity Control Procedures" be formed. Although the new committee adds greater participation by Abu Dhabi (Crown Prince's Office and Federal State Security Directorate) - - a welcome move -- we are concerned that the existence of competing committees may cause confusion. We have suggested that Executive Committee on Commodity Control Procedures members not already on the CTF join the March 1 meeting (septel) in order to unify UAE's efforts. (NOTE: Dubai State Security Director Mohammed al Qemzi chairs both committees. END NOTE.) ¶4. (S/NF) Although this letter is signed by the International Affairs Director of the Abu Dhabi Corwn Prince's Court, we have been told that it was actually drafted by al Qemzi. In June, the Ambassador provided AbZ and Al Qemzi information about USDOC export control officer duties and responsibilities, as well as those of the USDOC Sentinel Team (REF B). A non-paper explaining USG positions -- the urgency of passing an export control law by mid-July, effective enforcement and continued cooperation on interdiction efforts -- and possible repercussions of UAE inaction (REF C) prompted a terse written response from Al Qemzi (REFS C and D). Status of the UAE Export Control Law -------------- ¶5. (C/NF) In spite of longstanding US urging, the UAE still has no export control law. We have continued to push the UAE to move promptly in passing this law. The issue came up recently during the January 22 calls of Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns and NEA PDAS James Jeffrey on Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al-Nahyan (MbZ),AbZ, and UAE Prime Minister/Ruler of Dubai Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al-Maktoum (MbR). Following the meetings, AbZ told us that MbR, in his role as Prime Minister, had requested that the law be moved forward expeditiously. On February 5, Ministry of Economy Under Secretary Abdulla Al-Saleh (Sheikha Lubna's number two) told Econchief that the draft export control law had been passed from the Ministry of Economy to the Ministry of ABU DHABI 00000276 002 OF 003 Justice. The Ministry of Justice reviews all legislation before it goes to the cabinet and the Federal Supreme Council (comprised of the rulers of each of the seven emirates) for approval to ensure that the legislation is compatible with existing legislation (REF E). USG Public Comments Spark Negative Reaction -------------- ¶6. (C/NF) USDOC A/S for Export Administration Padilla's December 14 remarks to the Washington International Trade Association received wide attention in the UAEG and in local media. The UAEG is likely to ask for clarification of the USG message in meetings. On December 18, Economy Minister Sheikha Lubna directed a letter critical of the remarks to Commerce Secretary Gutierrez, suggesting these issues are best discussed in private and requesting further information. The letter said that PadillaQs comments "are at odds with the ongoing cooperation between our two great countries, surprising and detrimental." Secretary Gutierrez's response to Sheikha Lubna addressed USG concerns and invited further discussion. MbZ told U/S Burns that such public comments by the USG make it difficult to answer the Arab street when the UAEG takes unpopular stances in support of American policy goals in the region(REF F). ¶7. (U) A statement from the Dubai Customs Authority -- carried by WAM, the UAE official news organization -- expressed "deep concern over [these] unacceptable statements" and claimed the accusations about Mayrow General Trading Co were baseless. An editorial in the English-language daily Gulf News termed the "wild and unfounded accusation" an "hysterical outburst." The local media also focused on what was perceived as an implied threat from the comment that "time for action is running short." Recent Interdiction Actions -------------- ¶8. (S/NF) In October 2006, the UAEG halted a shipment of steel strips bound for Iran aboard the M/V Victory I. The shipment was held temporarily by the UAEG while an investigation of the goods was conducted in China. In December, Beijing agreed to repatriate the goods, while maintaining the goods were not controlled and Chinese export control laws had not been violated (REF G). Seven previous requests for cargo inspection or detention in 2006 were not successful for various reasons; including lack of detailed information, ship re-routing or apparent UAE inaction. ¶9. (C/NF) In the most recent development, the UAE was cooperative from the beginning in responding to our February 2007 request to stop two containers of U.S.- origin test equipment (environmental humidity chambers and mechanical vibration test systems useful in testing ballistic missile systems) being shipped from Canada through Dubai to Syria. In this instance we had full technical information, plenty of advance notice, and the support of the Canadians. Following the shipQs arrival on February 13, Dubai Customs removed, opened and re- sealed the two containers, which are being prepared for return to Norfolk, Virginia (REF K,L). Cooperation in this case, in which the shipment destination was Syria rather than Iran, was clearly less problematic for the UAEG, which nevertheless should be thanked for its positive response to our request. ¶10. (S/NF) Finally, multiple UAEG entities have asked for further information on Mayrow General Trading Co. Although we believe these requests have been met, a REL- UAE fact sheet on Mayrow to leave with the UAE CTF team would likely be well-received. CP Finance -------------- ¶11. (S) At the April 2006 CTF Finance working group, the UAEG -- represented solely by the Central Bank -- was presented with EO 13382 and encouraged to adopt similar authorities for the UAE to counter proliferation financing. The UAEG representatives expressed their confusion as to why AQ Khan and other entities, whose ABU DHABI 00000276 003 OF 003 assets the UAEG had frozen, at USG request, were not listed on the Executive Order. The UAE has frozen a series of accounts related to WMD proliferation at the request of the USG. The UAEG, on numerous occasions requested additional information on those accounts to sustain the freeze and no additional information has been forthcoming. Abdulrahim Al Awadi, head of the Anti-Money Laundering and Suspicious Cases Unit, emphatically noted that any requests to freeze assets must go through Qproper channelsQ -- through the Ministries of Justice and Foreign Affairs. ¶12. (S) However, since September 2006, Al Awadi has appeared more Qforward leaningQ on the issue of asset freezing. In a recent meeting between OFAC Attache, Econchief and Al-Awadi, he mentioned that Dina Khan had come to the UAE with her lawyer to complain about the UAEG asset freeze of her account. (Note: He did not say when this meeting took place, but it was likely in the Summer of 2006. End note.) Al Awadi noted that he had rebuffed her requests to release her assets and demanded that she provide additional information on the legitimacy of the money in the account. His attitude represents a major shift from his earlier position, where he expressed concern about freezing accounts without sufficient evidence usable in a court of law. ¶13. (S) We have intensified our efforts to encourage the UAE to cut off financial ties with Iran and to increase scrutiny of Iranian financial institutions and awareness of Iranian deceptive practices. U/S Burns (Ref H),U/S Stuart Levey (Ref I),and A/S Patrick OQBrien (Ref J) visited the UAE in January 2007, December 6 and 20, 2006 respectively, warning UAE officials of the risks of dealing with Iran. The UAE Central Bank has taken some steps to increase its monitoring of Iranian institutions and the UAEG has, in the past, quietly closed some Iranian front companies. However, the UAEG is unwilling to take any public or confrontational actions against Iranian institutions. Iran -------------- ¶14. (S) We have encouraged the UAE to fully implement UNSCR 1737 sanctions against Iran in a number of recent meetings, including the January visit of U/S for Political Affairs Burns and U/S (Treasury) for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Levey. In U/S Burns' meeting with MbR, the Dubai Ruler expressed concern about the potential negative impact on Dubai of any future UN sanctions but also a willingness to cooperate quietly. Our view is that the CTF is an appropriate place to discuss the non-proliferation aspects of UNSCR 1737. We assess that the direct impact of UNSCR 1737 on the UAE is likely to be relatively small given the targeted nature of the sanctions. However, the impact will be disproportionately felt by Dubai and the northern emirates. Outstanding Issues from the CTF Working Groups -------------- -- ¶15. (C) During the April 2006 CTF Working Groups, apart from the main issues of passing/enforcing export control legislation (or sharing a draft of the law with the US for comment),the UAE side committed to present information on their authorities to stop and inspect shipments of concern at the upcoming CTF meeting. It was also agreed that broader UAE participation is needed in order for the Counterproliferation Finance Working Group to operate effectively. The same point would be worth repeating at this CTF meeting (REF A),and in fact underscores the request to include certain/all members of the new "Executive Committee on Commodity Control Procedures." SISON