TERRORIST FINANCE: HUMAN APPEAL INTERNATIONAL

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ABU DHABI 000245 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR EB/ESC/TFS, LCANNON, KLEAHY, STATE FOR S/CT PHILL STATE FOR NEA/IR, NEA/ARP TREUTER, DBAGWELL TREASURY FOR U/S LEVEY, A/S POBRIEN, DAS DGLASER, ACURTIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2017 TAGS: EFIN PTER KTFN ETTC PREL ECON AE SUBJECT: TERRORIST FINANCE: HUMAN APPEAL INTERNATIONAL (HAI) POST-VETTING AND CHARITABLE REPLACEMENT SERVICES REF: A. ABU DHABI 2598 JUN 03 ¶B. ABU DHABI 409 JAN 06 ¶C. ABU DHABI 2081 MAY 06 ¶D. DUBAI 2853 MAY 06 ¶E. ABU DHABI 2169 MAY 05 ¶F. ABU DHABI 1301 APR 06 Classified By: Ambassador Michelle J. Sison, for reasons 1.4 b and d. ¶1. (S) Summary. The USG has approached the UAEG since 2003 about concerns with Human Appeal International (HAI) with little progress. Despite assurances U/S Levey received in May 2006, HAI,s Dubai branch office still appears to be operational. Post has no objections to a designation but suggests that U/S Levey, prior to any designation, consult with the UAEG to follow up on concerns raised in May 2006. These concerns could be conveyed during his projected early March visit. Post recommends that U/S Levey bring additional information, updated since January 2006, to pass to the UAEG to in order to strengthen the impact of the visit. Post notes that there will likely be negative public/official reactions in the UAE from a designation of HAI, but that the UAEG is more likely to support or implement a designation if HAI is added to the UN 1267 list. Closing HAI in the UAE will likely cause a disruption for most of its overseas field offices since funds reportedly are sent through the Ajman headquarters. End summary. ¶2. (S) Since 2003 the USG has approached the UAEG at very senior levels to address serious concerns with HAI but with little progress (Ref A, B, C, and D). Senior UAE interlocutors have expressed concern about HAI,s ties with the Muslim Brotherhood as well as a willingness to act to curb HAI,s activities, but in fact it appears that little has been done since the HAI paper was passed both in January and in April of 2006 (Ref B and C). -------------- The Dubai Office ) Still Open -------------- ¶3. (S) Despite assurances from Mohammed al-Qemzi, Chief of the General Department of State Security in Dubai, in May 2006 (Ref C),HAI,s Dubai branch office is apparently still open and operational. A caller to the Ajman headquarters in February 2007 was told that the Dubai Office of HAI, near the Dubai Hospital, was open and that the organization could be reached at 971-4-262-6444. The caller was told that they would be &open till 1:30.8 In January OFAC Attache took photographs of the office in Dubai where the &Human Appeal International8 logo and its phone number &262-64448 are prominently displayed. (Note. Al Qemzi said in reftel that the license wouldn,t be renewed. Post does not know what the license cycle is, but it has been nine months since the request. End note.) ABU DHABI 00000245 002 OF 004 -------------- -------------- How could HAI,s designation be successfully implemented? -------------- -------------- ¶4. (S) Post has no objections to a designation of HAI but suggests that a designation will be most successfully implemented in the UAE if it is added to the UN 1267 list. Post also recommends that since the UAEG requests that it be consulted on designations that a visit from U/S Stuart Levey prior to any designation would be necessary and advisable (Ref C). The UAEG consistently asks to be part of the consultative process on designations, particularly if the UAE is going to be affected. A unilateral designation of HAI, without very specific and directed discussion, would be interpreted as an act of bad faith. A visit by U/S Levey should focus on what actions have been taken by the UAE since May 2006. A visit would reinforce the seriousness of USG concerns about HAI. U/S Levey could push for immediate steps to resolve concerns such as the multiple bank accounts, the international branches, the status of the Dubai branch office and seek UAEG input on how it plans to address these and other concerns in a timely manner. Since this issue has been a longstanding item of discussion with the UAE since 2003, Post has no objection to proceeding with a designation -- if there is no progress during the Levey visit. ¶5. (C) Post also recommends that any additional updated information be made available to pass to the UAE )- particularly if it strengthens the case against the Ajman office and HAI's reported Al Qaida ties. Such specific information would be helpful to demonstrate to the UAEG that HAI remains a current concern. -------------- --- What is the likely reaction of the UAEG to HAI,s designation? -------------- --- ¶6. (S) A designation of HAI would likely result in public and private backlash in the UAE. HAI is the third largest charitable organization in the UAE headquartered in the emirate of Ajman and operating under the patronage of the ruling Al Nuaimi family in Ajman (Ref E). A designation of HAI would be the first designation of a domestic UAE entity as a supporter of terrorism and would likely receive a great deal of negative attention in the Arabic press/media. ¶7. (S) Reactions within the government to a designation are likely to be mixed. In April 2006 Al Qemzi said that he saw HAI as a Muslim Brotherhood front organization and noted his willingness to close the Dubai branch office by not renewing its license in Dubai (Ref C). On the other hand, also in April 2006, Abdulrahim Al Awadi, Head of the Central Banks Anti Money Laundering and Suspicious cases unit (AMLSCU), spoke very highly of the board members of HAI during the meeting of the Joint Terrorism Financing Coordinating ABU DHABI 00000245 003 OF 004 Committee. ¶8. (C) UAEG will probably seek updated information in addition to the paper provided to the UAE in January 2006. The UAEG may note that the ties to Al Qaida were primarily identified in the overseas branch offices and therefore question why the UAE headquarters is being designated. Another factor is that it will be politically difficult for the UAEG to support the designation of a charity that appears to benefit the Palestinian people )- especially in light of the UAE President,s public welcoming of the Fatah-Hamas accord brokered by the Saudis in Mecca. -------------- -------------- Will the UAEG implement UNSCR 1267 and subsequent resolutions against HAI? -------------- -------------- ¶9. (C) If HAI is designated under UN 1267 it is likely that the UAEG will undertake to freeze their assets. Post expects little/no action will be taken against HAI if there is only a US designation. -------------- -------------- Will the UAEG request that a UNSC member place a hold on a listing by the UNSCR 1267 Sanctions Committee? -------------- -------------- ¶10. (C) It is possible that the UAE may seek to put a hold on HAI,s designation. -------------- Additional Information on HAI -------------- ¶11. (C) DHS/ICE in Dubai reported that it interviewed and denied the visa applications of two HAI employees who were seeking to go to the US in 2006. Information about these individuals will be reported septel. ¶12. (U) Post also notes that the local UAE Yellow Pages list the phone number for the Ajman Headquarters as 971-6-7422115, the Dubai office as 971-4-2666697. The HAI office in Dubai lists 262-6444 on the building (Note. The complete number would be 971-4-262-6444. End note.) HAI,s UAE website lists 971-6-747-1777 as the phone and 971-6-742-7444 as the fax for the Headquarters. Finally the website for the Australian Branch of the HAI lists a second office in Melbourne which was not in the paper presented to the UAE in 2006. -------------- --- Likelihood of Charitable Services being replaced -------------- --- ¶13. (U) HAI provides assistance both domestically and internationally in areas such as health care, social ABU DHABI 00000245 004 OF 004 development, orphan and child care, education, and urgent relief, but its efforts seem to be primarily directed to international services (Ref E). Since HAI Ajman claims to receive and redistribute most of the organization,s funds, if HAI in the UAE is shut down the greatest impact will likely not be in the UAE but at the overseas branches and field offices worldwide that receive funding from headquarters. Post has no estimates on the exact amount of local charitable contributions HAI receives since information is not publicly available. There are three other major charitable organizations in the UAE, the Red Crescent Association, the Mohammed bin Rashid Foundation in Dubai and the Sheikh Zayed Charitable and Humanitarian Foundation in Abu Dhabi, that may be able to pick up activities currently undertaken by HAI in the UAE (Ref F). SISON