KEEPING THE FOCUS ON FREEDOM -- UAE DEMOCRATIC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ABU DHABI 001869 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR NEA/FO/ NEA/ ARP, NEA/PI, NEA/PPD ALSO FOR R, S/P, DRL, AND ECA TUNIS FOR MEPI E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2017 TAGS: PREL KDEM KMPI PGOV ELAB PHUM KPAO AE SUBJECT: KEEPING THE FOCUS ON FREEDOM -- UAE DEMOCRATIC REFORM UPDATE REFS: A) ABU DHABI 949 B) ABU DHABI 1016 C) ABU DHABI 1018 D) ABU DHABI 1096 E) ABU DHABI 1127 F) ABU DHABI 1154 G) ABU DHABI 1458 H) ABU DHABI 1567 I) ABU DHABI 1688 J) 05 ABU DHABI 2173 K) STATE 130991 Classified by Ambassador Michele J. Sison, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: This message reflects priorities in the U.S. Mission to the UAE's Democracy Strategy, originally designed in 2005 (ref J) and substantially updated in July, 2007 (ref F). It is designed to guide the practical application of resources, both programmatic and diplomatic, in pursuing overall goals related to freedom and political openness in the UAE. Without repeating the "benchmark" format already established (with ref F as our most recent articulation of benchmarks),this message will follow a more open "brainstorming" format in listing the types of programmatic and diplomatic angles the USG might pursue in pressing a traditional society toward our stated goal of an increasingly participatory system. The most effective reform is obviously home-grown, yet encouragement from the USG can influence the focus and pace of UAE reform efforts. This cable addresses the four-fold agenda set forth previously: 1) Political Participation, 2) Development of an Active and Independent Press, 3) Government Transparency, and 4) Judicial Independence. End summary. Political Participation -------------- ¶2. (C) Our ongoing benchmarks of encouraging municipality elections, additional elected student councils, and UAE legislation granting greater autonomy to professional organizations remain important, but have seen little progress to date. On the electoral front, the UAE chose to begin with partial Federal National Council (FNC) elections held in December, 2006 (ref I),and we were able to assist with training for female parliamentarians involved in that election. We also continue to press for greater space for civil society by engaging with individuals and organizations potentially influential in Emirati society (ref H) but who need greater expressive latitude in which to share their ideas. The cumulative effect of our efforts can help open up the political landscape over time. ¶3. (C) Our efforts on the horizon should focus on: --- encouraging the UAEG to consider a more robust role for the FNC; --- encouraging FNC members to push the envelope somewhat in asserting their consultative and oversight functions; --- building capacity in municipality and FNC-related institutions and individuals through training in communications skills and organizational effectiveness (including by expressing USG support for proposed NDI efforts in this arena); --- engaging with FNC topical committees to encourage deeper investigation of societal issues and impress upon them their role as gatekeepers of public policy interests in their fields of expertise; --- continuing to encourage municipality elections; --- continuing to encourage more elected student councils; --- continuing to press the UAEG to offer greater political space for professional associations, NGO's, academics, and civil society in general; --- offering training and capacity-building support for those few NGO's that do exist; --- pressing the UAEG to reconsider its habit of blacklisting (as "Muslim brothers") activists who counter official views; --- expanding the NGO world by convincing more (potentially vocal) citizens of the utility of an active civil society; --- continuing to note the merits of labor unions to a skeptical UAEG which does not want to empower foreign nationals politically (it speaks of "functional rights" as opposed to "political rights" for workers and views labor as a national security issue); --- supporting UAE efforts to instill an ethic of civic ABU DHABI 00001869 002 OF 004 participation through the school curriculum; --- and, encouraging the UAE to learn from the lessons of the limited FNC elections to ensure technically sound preparations for future elections. Development of an Active and Independent Press -------------- - ¶4. (SBU) Limited action has been taken by the UAEG toward promulgating revisions to the Press and Publications Law currently under review (and prepared with assistance from U.S. specialists). However, UAE Vice President and Prime Minister (and Ruler of Dubai) Mohammed bin Rashid announced September 25 that journalists should not be imprisoned because of what they write, adding that passage of the revisions should be accelerated. Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed (former Information Minister) made similar comments. Media contacts viewed the announcement as a significant step forward that may boost prospects for passage of the revisions, but not as an invitation to unfettered press freedom. Other penalties would remain in force (e.g., monetary damages) and the press will continue to exercise caution. The announcement came in the midst of an ongoing court case involving two journalists who raised questions about the legal and financial ethics of a socially-prominent individual. The Court of First Instance ruled that they had committed defamation and sentenced them to two months imprisonment. That decision was under appeal when the September 25 announcement was made. ¶5. (C) Although the UAEG does not actively censor the press, other than forbidding direct criticism of the ruling families, insulting Islam, and other limited categories of expression, there is heavy self-censorship among journalists. Like much of the UAE work force most journalists (though not all columnists and editors) are expatriate foreign nationals on term contracts and effectively subject to deportation if their contracts are not renewed. Programming that targets the creation of a more professional press corps such as training in English language, direct interviewing techniques, and investigative reporting, has and will continue to foster confidence in reporters' abilities and should result in a press that is more prepared to pursue independent stories instead of relying heavily on wire services and official statements. The value of such training is high, as reporters can thereby exploit the opportunity to test the boundaries of free expression with greater professionalism (Prime Minister Mohammed bin Rashid's statements that "the press is free" should be seen as an invitation by qualified reporters). Training value will further expand as reporters are eventually permitted to use these skills to report more objectively -- hopefully with fewer red lines in the future. The U.S. should support activities that strengthen the independence, competence, and civil society profile of the already recognized UAE Journalists Association. We should also continue to work with the recently-established $10 billion Mohammed bin Rashid Foundation, headquartered in Dubai, which seeks to improve education, including journalism training, throughout the Muslim world. Additionally, we can encourage strategic alliances with prominent U.S. non-profit organizations such as Teach for America, the Aspen Institute, and the Gates Foundation. ¶6. (C) Our efforts on the horizon should focus on: --- pressing for passage of revisions to the press law recommended by the UAEJA; --- engaging the press in training programs that enhance analytic and investigative skills in particular; --- highlighting the importance of source credibility and careful fact-checking; --- training for better English skills which can be a particularly vital research and investigative skill; --- raising the value of freedom of expression with senior UAEG officials regularly (particularly with Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed, who is also head of the National Media Committee); --- reminding UAEG officials of the helpful role of Dubai Media City; --- programming USG visitors for press events in Dubai Media City and throughout the UAE; --- pressing for media outlets in Dubai Media City to be given more latitude in reporting on UAE issues; --- engaging academics about the role of the press; --- encouraging the development of spokespersons within the UAEG who have credible media skills and welcome interaction ABU DHABI 00001869 003 OF 004 with the press; --- encouraging the press to branch beyond the "safe" wire stories distributed by the official news agency WAM; --- and, highlighting openness as a source of long-term stability to a leadership class more disposed to top-down control. Government Transparency -------------- ¶7. (C) There is significant overlap between the need for transparency and public participation. In addition to encouraging popularly elected national, municipal, and student councils, the U.S. should encourage open -- including online -- discourse within those bodies and between those bodies and the public. The same can be said for governmental bodies not popularly elected. Abu Dhabi Emirate's Consultative Council posts its agenda and allows the public to submit comments online, and may be open to training and technical assistance from the Embassy. Similar practices should be encouraged in all emirates, the Federal National Council, and among ministries that generate legislation or administer public services. As a critical first step, the UAE should be encouraged to publish (in Arabic and English due to its large expatriate population) laws and regulations online as soon as they are promulgated. As a necessary second step, we should encourage efforts by federal ministries to solicit public comments on draft legislation, as the Ministry of Labor recently did with its draft labor law. Currently, decision makers communicate with select stakeholders on draft legislation, but usually on a confidential basis. SIPDIS ¶8. (C) The issuance of sovereign bond ratings for Abu Dhabi Emirate is likely to produce greater transparency on economic information-sharing than has traditionally been the case. Making statistics available to the public is not the only goal -- ensuring the accuracy of data is required to make transparency meaningful. The U.S. should highlight the need for technical training and expertise in the maintenance of modernized record keeping systems and more accurate statistical analysis within federal ministries, municipal bodies, and emirate administrations. ¶9. (C) Our efforts on the horizon should focus on: --- encouraging higher quality record keeping in UAE ministries, including through issue-specific training opportunities; --- drawing attention to the need for more credible statistics (on population, for example) rather than relying on broad estimates; --- encouraging the UAE public, even through small programs that reach a limited audience, to seek out public information and hold the government accountable; --- pressing for publication of all new laws (eventually including all existing laws) on easily-accessible formats in Arabic and English, preferably on the Internet; --- encouraging participants in USG-funded programs to seek greater access to government information; --- encouraging public interest in deliberations of the Federal National Council and other administrative bodies; --- reminding senior UAEG leaders of their obligation to offer transparent information to the public; --- commending the UAEG for the open method of soliciting comments on the labor law, and encourage thoughtful review of comments submitted; --- seeking expansion of the concept of Internet comment solicitation on draft legislation; --- and, encouraging development of a Freedom of Information regime to aid the public and press in accessing official data. Judicial Independence -------------- ¶10. (C) Each of the seven UAE emirates is semi-autonomous and governed by a hereditary ruler. The laws and courts of each emirate are established by those rulers and are loosely coordinated with federal practices. Some emirates maintain their own police forces and immigration services; Abu Dhabi, Dubai, and Ras al-Khaimah have separate court systems, while the other four emirates adhere to a unified federal court structure. The UAE judiciary is largely comprised of foreign nationals (Egyptians and Sudanese foremost among them),who are working on fixed-term contracts and are less likely to make rulings that might antagonize their hosts -- ABU DHABI 00001869 004 OF 004 particularly the ruling sheikhs. The U.S. should continue to press for enhanced training for UAE national judges, a system of tenure for judges, and perhaps stronger bar associations to give judges a greater sense of professional independence in making their judgments. ¶11. (C) Our efforts on the horizon should focus on: --- matching legislative openness (new laws on the Internet) with judicial accountability by putting the essence of rulings in the public domain in a similarly user-friendly format; --- encouraging consultants working with the UAEG or its constituent emirates to highlight for their employers the benefits of judicial independence and even-handedness, particularly in attracting more foreign investments; --- offering ongoing training courses in the U.S. for UAE judges; --- building trust in judges by noting their key role in society; --- pursuing a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) with the UAE to enhance bilateral cooperation and instill a greater sense of judicial accountability on an international level; --- encouraging the expanson of opportunities for female participation in he judicial system to (among other reasons why this is inherently important) improve the ratio of Emirati nationals available for service as judges; --- promoting exchanges that enhance law school programs in the UAE and the region; --- promoting linkages between UAE training programs and U.S. law schools; --- and, reminding the UAE leadership through word and deed that the USG values the rule of law as a foundation of modern civilization. ¶12. (C) Comment: As the UAE moves rapidly forward in an era of high prosperity, it is ecoming somewhat more open, tolerant, and willin to address issues that define its international reputation. The UAE leadership is clearly not interested in competition for authority to rule, and domestic pressure for political change is weak. Nonetheless, the leadership seeks to balance societal pressures (domestic and foreign) to ensure stability and some anticipate eventual demands for greater public participation, enhanced government transparency, a freer press, and a more independent judiciary. Post seeks to focus programming and engagement to encourage irreversible steps in the general directions noted in this message. End comment. SISON