SCENE SETTER FOR GENERAL PETRAEUS' OCTOBER VISIT TO UAE

S E C R E T ABU DHABI 001699 SIPDIS SIPDIS BAGHDAD FOR GENERAL PETRAEUS STATE FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ARP, PM/FO DOD/OSD FOR A/S LONG, DAS KIMMITT, KELSO, QUINN, ANDERSON CENTCOM ALSO FOR MAJ GEN FINDLEY, REYES, RODRIGUEZ NSC FOR NRAMCHAND, EABRAMS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/10/2017 TAGS: PREL PTER PARM MOPS MARR IR IZ AF LE AE SUBJECT: SCENE SETTER FOR GENERAL PETRAEUS' OCTOBER VISIT TO UAE REF: A) STATE 140269 (COALITION CONFERENCE) B) ABU DHABI 1595 (ADMIRAL FALLON WITH MBZ) C) SECDEF 31828 (AUGUST 2 VISIT) Classified by Ambassador Michele Sison, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S) General Petraeus: Embassy Abu Dhabi and Consulate General Dubai welcome your visit to the UAE, where we look forward to supporting your media appearances and meetings with senior Emirati officials. Our most valuable senior interlocutor on defense issues and regional security is Abu Dhabi Crown Prince and Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed Forces Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ) al-Nahyan, with whom a meeting has been requested for October 20 in Abu Dhabi. I should have some time to brief you on prior conversations with MbZ before we enter that meeting. MbZ has a personal background in the UAE Air Force (a Sandhurst graduate, he is a qualified helicopter pilot) and has frequently engaged senior U.S. officials on issues related to Iraq -- a key topic when he met with officials at the White House and the Pentagon in May. He appreciated Admiral Fallon's appraisal of the situation in Iraq when they met in Abu Dhabi September 17 and will welcome your views on the current status and anticipated security progress in the foreseeable future. You might remind him of your invitation to have a senior Emirati official join the MNF-I Coalition Conference in Bahrain October 29-31 (ref A). Iran is also very much on MbZ's mind; we offer below our perspectives on Iraq and Iran as seen through the prism of our relationship with the UAE, in addition to UAE views of other regional hotspots. ¶2. (C) We have also requested, but are less confident we will be offered, a meeting with Mohammed bin Rashid (MbR) al-Maktoum, Prime Minister and Vice President of the UAE and Ruler of Dubai. MbR (also a Sandhurst graduate) is the nominal Minister of Defense but is not involved in the practical management of UAE defense issues and has not generally engaged visitors on UAE regional policies. (Note: LTG ¶R. Steven Whitcomb, ARCENT Commander, will have visited the UAE Land Forces Commander and possibly the UAE Chief of Staff the day prior to your visit, but will not have met MbZ or MbR. End note.) Iraq -------------- ¶3. (S) The UAE has offered some political and economic support for Iraq and identifies Iraqi stability as a regional priority; nonetheless, the UAE's (all-Sunni) leadership has over the past several months exhibited a hardened attitude toward Prime Minister al-Maliki, perceiving him as incapable of moving beyond sectarian bias to lead a unified Iraq. The UAE has in the past favored former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi (who visits Abu Dhabi often) and has stalled on its commitment to relieve Iraqi debt (of $3.5 billion) in order to avoid al-Maliki claiming credit. The UAE has expressed concern over the continued failure of the al-Maliki government to significantly improve overall security in the country. While clearly skeptical of al-Maliki's leadership, MbZ also told SecDef on August 2 that Iraq had not followed up on signals that the UAE would receive an al-Maliki visit -- albeit with a rather cautious welcome mat (ref C). ¶4. (S) As part of the UAE's cautious engagement on Iraq-related issues, Abu Dhabi recently offered assistance to Iraqi refugees in Syria ($10 million),hosted (after some hesitation) the first large Iraq Compact conference in September 2006, continues to support broad coalition goals in Iraq, and continues to look at options for re-opening its diplomatic mission in Baghdad (closed since the May 2006 kidnapping of a UAE diplomat). The UAE sent a team to Baghdad in August to explore options for re-opening its Embassy; you may wish to inquire with MbZ about the current status of UAEG thinking. ¶5. (S) Note: Concern has been expressed by the Coalition about the use by terrorists of the UAE's abandoned Embassy compound; Coalition Forces captured the "security chief" of the compound, Abu Shinan, and continue to hold him due to his connections with Sunni insurgent groups. The UAE has expressed concern over his potential release to Iraqi forces, fearing his execution. The Iraqi Government (National Security Advisor Muwaffaq al-Rubaie) reportedly discussed a possible raid on the compound with UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed (AbZ, MbZ's younger brother) in late June. The UAE tells us that it agreed with al-Rubaie that only the UAE should lead a raid on its diplomatic compound -- with Iraqi and/or Coalition Forces coming in behind. MbZ's staff told us in September that the UAE had tried to arrange the timing of such an operation but gained no traction with the Iraqis. The UAE has not tried to coordinate such an operation directly with us. End note. ¶6. (S) Meanwhile, the UAE has been engaged in regional efforts to facilitate reconciliation between Sunni and Shi'a forces, including by hosting various factions in Abu Dhabi. The UAEG has frequently expressed alarm regarding Iranian influence in Iraq, and has made attempts to reach out to moderate Shi'a to encourage their engagement in the Iraqi political process independently of Iran. The UAE values and seeks reassurance of continued close consultation on U.S. plans and strategy involving Iraq (and Iran). Your visit will be a helpful reminder to MbZ that we value regional coordination. MbZ will certainly be interested in your thoughts subsequent to your reports to Congress in September. ¶7. (S) The UAE's direct consultations with Baghdad are not always positive. During Iraqi National Security Advisor al-Rubaie's late June visit the UAE leadership apparently sensed that al-Rubaie took the attitude that current UAE outreach actions in Iraq were hostile and indirectly justified Iranian counter-influence. Al-Rubaie reportedly focused his efforts on urging the Emiratis not to support the Iraqi Sunnis. VP Adel abd al-Mahdi visited Dubai for an investment conference in early September, but it was unclear whether he held substantive meetings with Emirati officials. Other Iraqi politicians travel through the Emirates periodically and Dubai plays host to various conferences on economic issues which senior Iraqi delegations attend. Nonetheless, senior level GoI engagement is limited. Ayad Allawi is likely the most frequent high profile Iraqi visitor, and clearly the most welcome among the UAE leadership. Iran -------------- ¶8. (S) MbZ reiterated to SecDef in August and Admiral Fallon in September that Iran is the UAE's most serious and long-term threat, a theme we hear repeated often in UAE defense circles (but not a theme we hear from the more business-oriented leadership of Dubai). MbZ will likely be skeptical of attempts at dialogue by Iran, and he is eager to establish a defensive architecture against Iranian missiles (we are processing a number of missile-defense related FMS cases). Nonetheless, the leadership has also told us that they are not in a position to sacrifice $16 billion in annual trade with Iran, while realizing that this same neighbor and major trading partner is also a potential menace to the UAE. It is worth recalling that the May 10-12 visit of Vice President Cheney to the UAE was immediately followed by a one-night stopover by Iranian President Ahmadinejad, who was given a red carpet welcome and delivered a defiant anti-U.S. speech at a Dubai sports arena during his stay. ¶9. (S) Iran is the large neighbor that will not go away, so the UAE feels a need to engage (particularly on the economic side and especially in Dubai) with a potential foe in this rough and unforgiving neighborhood. While assisting our regional military mission (see paragraphs 13-14 below),the UAE leadership has consistently pursued a cautious, non-confrontational public posture towards Iran. In the past the UAE has been hesitant to participate in certain military exercises designed to show a strong defensive front against Iran. The UAE did, however, send observers to Leading Edge 07 in October 2006 in the Gulf, which had a Proliferation Security Initiative theme. The decision to host Eagle Resolve 2008, with a Theater Air and Missile Defense theme, is another forward-leaning step. The UAE sees Iran as an adversary to prepare defenses against, yet it considers economic engagement one of those defenses. ¶10. (S) Your recent comment to reporters that Iran, through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Qods Force, is providing Iraqi insurgents with advanced weaponry to kill U.S. soldiers in Iraq generated prominent attention in UAE media as well as discussion among local interlocutors. Anything you wish to share on this and related matters concerning Iran -- especially Iran's role in Iraq -- with the UAE leadership will be received with great interest. Elsewhere in the region -------------- ¶11. (S) AFGHANISTAN: While the UAE has contributed up to 250 Special Operations troops to the Coalition effort in Afghanistan for four years, it has not yet publicly acknowledged this participation. One of MbZ's oft-stated interests in sending Emirati Special Ops troops to Afghanistan is to get his military forces "bloodied" and battle-hardened so they may effectively confront imported or domestic extremism when called upon to do so back home. The UAE pursues Afghanistan reconstruction aid with an emphasis on road networks, mosques, medical facilities and schools and has made efforts at political mediation between Pakistan and Afghanistan. It has helpfully offered the Afghan Army training, Mi-17 helicopters, and runway renovations. ¶12. (S) LEBANON: The UAE provides significant humanitarian and security assistance to Lebanon; the UAE has been at the forefront of reconstruction efforts, continuing a longstanding de-mining operation, and contributing resources for school construction and hospitals. UAE Air Force C-130s and helicopters have been used in relief efforts. The UAE has also provided UAE-manufactured small arms to the LAF. The UAE seeks to strengthen the Siniora government, having delivered over $300 million in assistance to Lebanon this year, while also seeking limited engagement with Syria (to include a mid-July visit by UAE President Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan and a donation of $10 million towards the support of Iraqi refugees and $100 million to build a hospital in Syria). ¶13. (S) PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY: The UAE would like to see tangible progress on the Middle East Roadmap, rejects the Hamas agenda, and continues to support the Palestinian people through more than $400 million in housing and humanitarian assistance since 2000. MbZ and his brothers, Foreign Minister Abdullah and National Security Advisor/State Security Director Hazza, are in close contact with President Mahmoud Abbas and Prime Minister Salam Fayyad. As the result of the May 2007 visit of USSC General Dayton, the UAE transferred $80 million to the Palestinian president. UAE Cooperation -------------- ¶14. (S) The U.S. enjoys strong defense cooperation with the UAE, working together in key aspects of the war on terror. In addition to supplying Special Operations troops on the ground in Afghanistan, the UAE has been a source of security assistance for Lebanon and the Palestinian Authority, and has assisted virtually every trouble spot in the region in need of reconstruction support. The Emirates provide critical basing and over-flight for U.S. reconnaissance and refueling assets, extensive naval logistics support, and the Navy's liberty port of choice in the region (425 ships annually). We suggest you thank MbZ for his strong support for the U.S. Air Force and Navy in the UAE and encourage continued partnership. A few quantitative measures of bilateral cooperation include: --- 1,600 USAF personnel (380th Air Expeditionary Wing) at Al Dhafra Air Base; --- a vigorous training schedule at the Gulf Air Warfare Center at Al Dhafra; --- the F-16 Block 60 program; --- approximately 425 port visits last year; --- over 24,000 US military overflights/landings in 2006; --- more than 150,000 U.S. servicemen and women enjoying liberty annually in the UAE; and --- 180 UAE Special Operations forces currently serving with the Coalition in Afghanistan; --- 150 conventional ground forces with South African built armored personnel carriers are planned to deploy in support of OEF, to work directly with Canadian forces. ¶15. (S) These contributions are significant in scope but also enduring in their continuity over a number of years. The ports of Jebel Ali and Fujairah are vital to U.S. Navy interdiction operations, re-supply and sustainment, and combat support efforts across the region. Jebel Ali in Dubai has hosted more port visits for each of the past three years than any other port outside the United States. In expressing appreciation for this outstanding partnership, we also like to remind the UAE that the evolving nature of military requirements mandates an ongoing focus on joint planning, coordination, and strategic interoperability. SISON