UAE CENTRAL BANK GOVERNOR ON IRANIAN BANK SEPAH,

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 001293

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/IR, NEA/ARP, EB/ESC/TFS, S/CT, ISN/CPI -
MCGEEHEN
TREASURY FOR U/S LEVEY, ACURTIS, KHECHT
DHS FOR DHS/ICE, FINANCIAL AND TRADE INVESTIGATIONS,
KDELLACOLI, JGALLION
NSC FOR JZARATE, NRAMCHAND, EABRAMS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/01/2017
TAGS: PTER KTFN PREL IR AE
SUBJECT: UAE CENTRAL BANK GOVERNOR ON IRANIAN BANK SEPAH,
CASH COURIERS, AND FBI REQUEST

REF: A. ABU DHABI 1123

B. ABU DHABI 832

ABU DHABI 00001293 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b),(d).


1. (U) This contains business proprietary information.


2. (C) Summary: On August 1, Ambassador, accompanied by OFAC
Attach and Econchief, met with UAE Central Bank Governor
Sultan Nasser Al-Suwaidi. Al-Suwaidi confirmed that Iranian
Bank Sepah's trade finance accounts with UAE banks remained
frozen, but reiterated the UAE's intention to unfreeze the
trade finance debit accounts, as "the only parties being
harmed by the freezing were UAE banks." Ambassador pressed
on our continued interest in a cash courier interdiction
operation with the UAEG and passed a revised plan to the
Governor, who heads the UAE Joint Counter Terror Finance
Coordinating Committee (JTFCC) team. Al-Suwaidi committed to
having the JTFCC members, including Dubai Customs and Federal
Customs, study the revised proposal. Al-Suwaidi welcomed a
proposed visit by the FBI to examine records relating to the
September 11, 2001 attacks and said that he saw no problems
with AIG obtaining a license to establish a private banking
representative office in the UAE. End Summary.

1737 and Bank Sepah
--------------


3. (C) Ambassador raised the UAEG's June 25 notification to
the 1737 Sanctions Committee of its intention to unfreeze
certain trade finance debit accounts under the name of bank
Sepah and our request for the UAEG to delay or withdraw its
request and to provide more information (ref a). Al-Suwaidi
confirmed that the accounts were still frozen, but reported
that he intended to order their unfreezing shortly. He
stressed that the accounts represented money owed to UAE
companies and represented contractual obligations entered
into prior to the UNSC designation of Bank Sepah. This is
permitted under UNSCRs 1737 and 1747, he commented. He noted
that these funds were for letters of credit and that
currently they represented a negative for UAE banks.
Unfreezing the accounts, he stated, would bring the accounts
to "a square position" then they would be closed. He said
that the UAE agreed with the need to isolate Iran
financially, but did not agree with harming UAE banks. The
funds, he stressed, would not benefit Bank Sepah or any UNSC
designated entity. In fact, Sepah would have to pay out to
these accounts.

Cash Courier Operation Plan Passed
--------------


4. (C) Ambassador raised once again our request to have the
UAE participate in a cash courier operation with DHS/ICE, a
proposal to which the Governor had previously been
unreceptive. She stressed that DHS/ICE had revised the plan
to ensure that U.S. Customs officers would not be visible
during any Dubai Customs inspection of arriving passengers.
DHS/ICE attach had developed an alternative proposal for a
joint operation focusing on a customs "red line/green line"
model with targeted searched based on high-risk profiling and
identification of suspicious travel itineraries or behavior
in the customs area. She explained this disclosure approach
is similar to how UK and UAE customs operate, while U.S.
Customs uses a declaration approach. Al-Suwaidi took the
revised plan on board and said that the UAE's JTFCC team
would review it. (Note: On July 25, Ambassador had
consulted with Dubai State Security Chief BG Mohammed
Al-Qamzi about how to push the cash courier operation
through. Al-Qamzi told Ambassador that he thought the
problem related to the possibility or non-UAE nationals
playing a public role in the operation. Al-Qamzi recently
joined the UAE's JTFCC team. End note.)


FBI Request for Assistance
--------------

ABU DHABI 00001293 002.2 OF 002




5. (S) Ambassador turned the discussion to an FBI request for
assistance. She noted the close cooperation between the
Central Bank and the FBI in identifying possible
co-conspirators in the September 11 attacks and explained
that the FBI was identifying and collecting evidence with
regard to five individuals: Khalid Shaykh Mohammed, Ramzi
Mohammad Abdullah Binalshibh, Ali Abd Al-Aziz Ali, Mustafa
Ahmed Al-Hawsawi, and Muhammad Mani Ahmed Al-Qahtani. The
FBI, she explained, would like to bring in a team. She
explained that she had passed the same message to UAE
National Security Advisor and Director of State Security
Directorate (SSD) Sheikh Hazza bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, who had
welcomed the visit. Al-Suwaidi said that the Central Bank
would also welcome the visit.

AIG Private Bank License
--------------


6. (SBU) Turning to other matters, Ambassador explained that
she had been approached by American International Group's
regional representative about a request to open a
representative office of the AIG Private Bank in the UAE.
The application is pending Central Bank Board approval.
Without prejudging any regulatory decision, Ambassador asked
for the board to consider it in a timely fashion. Al-Suwaidi
replied that there were normally no regulatory problems with
obtaining a representative office banking license, and he did
not think AIG would have a problem. It had not been
considered during the May board meeting as the board was
working through a heavy agenda prior to the summer.
SISON