UAE CENTRAL BANK GOVERNOR ON IRANIAN BANK SEPAH,

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 001293 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/IR, NEA/ARP, EB/ESC/TFS, S/CT, ISN/CPI - MCGEEHEN TREASURY FOR U/S LEVEY, ACURTIS, KHECHT DHS FOR DHS/ICE, FINANCIAL AND TRADE INVESTIGATIONS, KDELLACOLI, JGALLION NSC FOR JZARATE, NRAMCHAND, EABRAMS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/01/2017 TAGS: PTER KTFN PREL IR AE SUBJECT: UAE CENTRAL BANK GOVERNOR ON IRANIAN BANK SEPAH, CASH COURIERS, AND FBI REQUEST REF: A. ABU DHABI 1123 ¶B. ABU DHABI 832 ABU DHABI 00001293 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b),(d). ¶1. (U) This contains business proprietary information. ¶2. (C) Summary: On August 1, Ambassador, accompanied by OFAC Attach and Econchief, met with UAE Central Bank Governor Sultan Nasser Al-Suwaidi. Al-Suwaidi confirmed that Iranian Bank Sepah's trade finance accounts with UAE banks remained frozen, but reiterated the UAE's intention to unfreeze the trade finance debit accounts, as "the only parties being harmed by the freezing were UAE banks." Ambassador pressed on our continued interest in a cash courier interdiction operation with the UAEG and passed a revised plan to the Governor, who heads the UAE Joint Counter Terror Finance Coordinating Committee (JTFCC) team. Al-Suwaidi committed to having the JTFCC members, including Dubai Customs and Federal Customs, study the revised proposal. Al-Suwaidi welcomed a proposed visit by the FBI to examine records relating to the September 11, 2001 attacks and said that he saw no problems with AIG obtaining a license to establish a private banking representative office in the UAE. End Summary. 1737 and Bank Sepah -------------- ¶3. (C) Ambassador raised the UAEG's June 25 notification to the 1737 Sanctions Committee of its intention to unfreeze certain trade finance debit accounts under the name of bank Sepah and our request for the UAEG to delay or withdraw its request and to provide more information (ref a). Al-Suwaidi confirmed that the accounts were still frozen, but reported that he intended to order their unfreezing shortly. He stressed that the accounts represented money owed to UAE companies and represented contractual obligations entered into prior to the UNSC designation of Bank Sepah. This is permitted under UNSCRs 1737 and 1747, he commented. He noted that these funds were for letters of credit and that currently they represented a negative for UAE banks. Unfreezing the accounts, he stated, would bring the accounts to "a square position" then they would be closed. He said that the UAE agreed with the need to isolate Iran financially, but did not agree with harming UAE banks. The funds, he stressed, would not benefit Bank Sepah or any UNSC designated entity. In fact, Sepah would have to pay out to these accounts. Cash Courier Operation Plan Passed -------------- ¶4. (C) Ambassador raised once again our request to have the UAE participate in a cash courier operation with DHS/ICE, a proposal to which the Governor had previously been unreceptive. She stressed that DHS/ICE had revised the plan to ensure that U.S. Customs officers would not be visible during any Dubai Customs inspection of arriving passengers. DHS/ICE attach had developed an alternative proposal for a joint operation focusing on a customs "red line/green line" model with targeted searched based on high-risk profiling and identification of suspicious travel itineraries or behavior in the customs area. She explained this disclosure approach is similar to how UK and UAE customs operate, while U.S. Customs uses a declaration approach. Al-Suwaidi took the revised plan on board and said that the UAE's JTFCC team would review it. (Note: On July 25, Ambassador had consulted with Dubai State Security Chief BG Mohammed Al-Qamzi about how to push the cash courier operation through. Al-Qamzi told Ambassador that he thought the problem related to the possibility or non-UAE nationals playing a public role in the operation. Al-Qamzi recently joined the UAE's JTFCC team. End note.) FBI Request for Assistance -------------- ABU DHABI 00001293 002.2 OF 002 ¶5. (S) Ambassador turned the discussion to an FBI request for assistance. She noted the close cooperation between the Central Bank and the FBI in identifying possible co-conspirators in the September 11 attacks and explained that the FBI was identifying and collecting evidence with regard to five individuals: Khalid Shaykh Mohammed, Ramzi Mohammad Abdullah Binalshibh, Ali Abd Al-Aziz Ali, Mustafa Ahmed Al-Hawsawi, and Muhammad Mani Ahmed Al-Qahtani. The FBI, she explained, would like to bring in a team. She explained that she had passed the same message to UAE National Security Advisor and Director of State Security Directorate (SSD) Sheikh Hazza bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, who had welcomed the visit. Al-Suwaidi said that the Central Bank would also welcome the visit. AIG Private Bank License -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Turning to other matters, Ambassador explained that she had been approached by American International Group's regional representative about a request to open a representative office of the AIG Private Bank in the UAE. The application is pending Central Bank Board approval. Without prejudging any regulatory decision, Ambassador asked for the board to consider it in a timely fashion. Al-Suwaidi replied that there were normally no regulatory problems with obtaining a representative office banking license, and he did not think AIG would have a problem. It had not been considered during the May board meeting as the board was working through a heavy agenda prior to the summer. SISON