DUBAI RULER/UAE PM MOHAMMED BIN RASHID ON IRAQ,

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 001180 SIPDIS SIPDIS NOFORN STATE FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ARP, T, ISN/FO, S/P, PM/FO DOD/OSD FOR JESS KELSO, JOHN QUINN, JAMES ANDERSON CENTCOM FOR CCJ5-FRANK RODRIGUEZ NSC FOR RAMCHAND, ABRAMS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/16/2017 TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS PARM EAID IR IZ LE AF PK SY AE SUBJECT: DUBAI RULER/UAE PM MOHAMMED BIN RASHID ON IRAQ, SYRIA, COUNTERPROLIFERATION REF: A. ABU DHABI 1119 ¶B. ABU DHABI 949 ¶C. DUBAI 425 Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). ¶1. (S) Summary: On July 15, Ambassador met with UAE Vice President, Prime Minister, Minister of Defense and Dubai Ruler Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al-Maktoum (MbR). MbR complained about the Iranian influence in Iraq and voiced his belief that the current situation in Iraq is a civil war which will continue if the U.S. pulled out. Eventually, he opined, the Iraqis "would learn to live with each other." He told Ambassador that UAE President Khalifa's message to President Bashar Al-Asad during Khalifa's July 15-16 visit to Damascus would be that it was in Syria's interest to help Iraq stabilize. He expressed concern about the situation in Pakistan and the need to support President Musharraf's efforts against Islamic extremists. MbR also explained that the new MbR Foundation would be looking at education and other long-term counter radicalization efforts. Ambassador thanked MbR for the UAE's support to the U.S. military and for counterproliferation efforts. She also stressed the USG's interest in expeditious ratification of the UAE's export control law. End Summary. ¶2. (S) On July 15 Ambassador, DATT, and Econchief met with MbR and his sons Sheikh Hamdan bin Mohammed and Sheikh Maktoum bin Mohammed. UAE Commander Air Force and Air Defense Major General Mohammed bin Suwaidan al Qamzi, and Chief of Dubai State Security BG Mohammed Al-Qamzi also attended the meeting. (Note: MG Suwaidan is the senior-most officer in the UAE's military from the Emirate of Dubai. End Note.) Iraq -------------- ¶3. (S/NF) Ambassador asked MbR for his assessment of the results of Iraqi National Security Advisor Mowaffak Al-Rubaie's recent visit to the UAE were (ref a). BG Al-Qamzi stated that the visit "had not led to any progress." Al-Rubaie, he asserted, focused his efforts on trying to convince the UAE "not to support the Sunnis in Iraq." He said Al-Rubaie took the attitude that UAE actions were hostile, and had "indirectly" justified the Iranian influence in Iraq as a matter of religion. MbR (reiterating a commonly-heard complaint from UAE leaders) stated Iraqi PM Al-Maliki and Al-Rubaie were both influenced by Iran. Al-Qamzi noted that recent Iranian statements about the failure of U.S. policy in Iraq demonstrated their influence in Iraq. ¶4. (S) Ambassador presented MbR with a copy of the Initial Benchmark Assessment Report to Congress on Iraq, noting this is an interim report and the final report is due to Congress in September. Quoting the President, Ambassador stressed that beginning to withdraw before "our commanders tell us we are ready would be dangerous for Iraq, the region, and for the United States." Nations throughout the Middle East have a stake in a stable Iraq, she added. MbR, who appears to anticipate a U.S. withdrawal, explained he thought the civil war in Iraq would continue and the U.S. presence was "delaying it." However, eventually the Iraqis would learn to live together, he said. MbR also suggested Iraqi "tribes," both Sunni and Shia, would if strengthened be able to drive foreign fighters and Al-Qaeda out of Iraq. President Khalifa's Visit to Syria -------------- ¶5. (S) MbR told Ambassador that he had just met with UAE President Khalifa that morning. MbR added they developed Khalifa's message to Syrian President Bashar Al-Asad, which would be two-fold. The first point, MbR stressed, would be that "Syria is still an Arab country." As such, it should ABU DHABI 00001180 002 OF 003 not tie itself so closely to Iran. The second point would be that Syria has a strong influence on Iraq and on controlling the border between the two countries. It should "try to help." MbR stated an Iraqi collapse would be bad for both the Gulf States and the Syrians. MbR went on to complain that U.S. statements identifying Iran, Iraq, and Syria as the regional "bad guys" provided Iran and Syria an incentive to work together to "save face" with their own publics. (Note: President Khalifa departed for Damascus July 15 on an official two-day visit. End Note.) MBR Foundation and Counter Radicalization -------------- ¶6. (C) Ambassador told MbR that news of the new foundation's USD 10 billion endowment was well received in Washington, where it is hoped that, in the long term, the foundation's program could help counter extremism. MbR said that over time the budget would grow. The goal was to take young people to the best universities in the U.S. and Europe and give them skills and hope for the future. MbR stated that the foundation would concentrate its initial efforts on Iraq and Afghanistan. Pakistan and Extremism -------------- ¶7. (C) MbR turned the conversation to Pakistani President Musharraf's actions against extremists at Lal Mosque in Islamabad. Al-Qamzi stated that Musharraf needed to be careful to prevent the Islamists from coming to power. MbR opined that Musharraf "needs help" and stressed the need to control Islamic extremists, citing the UAE's efforts to reach out to its own citizens who might have such tendencies. He said that "we know who they are and we talk to them" to explain that terrorist acts would hurt not only themselves, but also their country and their families. MbR further commented the UAE had helped Musharraf avert one assassination plot and would continue to work with the Pakistani authorities to avoid others. MbR stated it was not a matter of if, but when, Musharraf is killed by terrorists or radicals. Lebanon -------------- ¶8. (C) Ambassador thanked MbR for the support the UAE provides to the Lebanese Armed Forces and for the UAE's coordination with the U.S. on this matter. MbR stressed the UAE would continue to support the Lebanese government, which needed a chance to deliver security to its people. MbR also said he saw TV pictures of UAE helicopters operating in Lebanon, commenting wryly that neither the Lebanese nor the Emiratis had had the opportunity to paint over the UAE tail markings. Counter-Proliferation, Export Controls -------------- ¶9. (S) Ambassador stressed USG appreciation for the UAE's cooperation on counterproliferation issues, including stopping two transshipments from China to Iran. Al-Qamzi noted that the UAEG continued to hold two Chinese origin containers that were shipped in clear violation of UNSCRs 1737 and 1747. He added the Chinese authorities had complained but the UAEG's Ministry of Foreign Affairs had responded, clearly laying out its case. Ambassador also urged MbR to push for rapid ratification of the export control law by the rulers of the individual emirates, noting that Cabinet and Federal National Council approval had already taken place. Mil-Mil Cooperation -------------- ¶10. (SBU) Ambassador thanked MbR and MG Suwaidan for the ABU DHABI 00001180 003 OF 003 UAEG's support for the U.S. military in Jebel Ali and Fujairah ports and Al-Dhafra Air Base. She also noted our intention to transition from Fujairah's civil airport to the Minhad air station in accordance with the UAE's desire, and stated that we will need to seek occasional exceptions to this policy in the future. MbR briefly consulted with MG Suwaidan about the UAEG decision to have U.S. military forces stop using civil fields. ¶11. (S) Ambassador also raised USG concerns about the Dubai Diamond Exchange and irregularities with the Kimberly Process (septel). SISON