DEMOCRATIC REFORM STRATEGY FOR THE UAE: ENGAGEMENT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ABU DHABI 001154 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ARP, NEA/PI, NEA/PPD ALSO FOR R, S/P, DRL, AND ECA E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/11/2017 TAGS: KDEM KMPI PGOV ELAB PHUM KPAO AE SUBJECT: DEMOCRATIC REFORM STRATEGY FOR THE UAE: ENGAGEMENT WITH THE "RULING BARGAIN" REF: A. 05 ABU DHABI 2173 ¶B. ABU DHABI 1016 ¶C. ABU DHABI 949 ¶D. ABU DHABI 1018 ¶E. ABU DHABI 1127 ¶F. ABU DHABI 1096 Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: This message updates the Mission's first Democracy Strategy dated May 2005 (Ref A). Despite progress made over the last two years in the area of democratic reform )- including the country's first limited election of half of the advisory Federal National Council (FNC) -) the UAE leadership remains dynastic. According to the UAE Constitution, the ruling Supreme Council is composed strictly of the hereditary rulers of each of the seven emirates, who then select the UAE president from among their own members; both presidents in UAE's history have been rulers of Abu Dhabi. The FNC remains a consultative body without the ability to initiate or veto legislation. The closed nature of the government is not limited to the federal level; the UAE has no popularly elected representatives or local governments, no political parties, and no labor unions. The policy-level operations of government remain somewhat opaque although there is an increasing effort to increase transparency in the functioning of some government ministries and agencies. No formal methods have been established for public participation. Nonetheless, the UAEG and its principal rulers enjoy a high degree of political legitimacy among UAE citizens due in part to (A) informal political participation such as the "open majlis" in the ruler's court of each of the seven emirates and to (B) successful long-term policies that have distributed the country's significant oil wealth in support of education, social welfare, and employment opportunities for UAE citizens. ¶2. (C) Summary continued: The U.S. should continue to encourage a UAE reform strategy based around four essential pillars of democracy: (1) political participation, (2) an active and independent press, (3) government transparency, and (4) an independent judiciary. Advancing reform in the UAE requires a two-fold approach: quiet but frank diplomacy pressing senior leadership to allow greater public participation, and a bottom-up strategy to instill a "culture of democracy" that helps citizens understand, value, and prepare to participate in a more open and democratic system. End summary. Overview -------------- ¶3. (C) The UAEG relies on a consensus-based decision-making process through the co-existence of traditional and modern forms of government. All laws must be unanimously approved by the Supreme Council which is composed of the rulers of each of the seven emirates. Informal mechanisms such as the "open majlis" that allow nationals to voice opinions and seek redress have historically provided direct access to the country's rulers and a degree of government responsiveness to its citizens. Senior UAE leaders often cite demographic challenges as a reason that greater democratic reform has not occurred; UAE citizens constitute less than 20 percent of the population, while guest workers -- primarily from South Asia and the Arab world -- constitute the majority of the resident population. ¶4. (C) The UAE's overall prosperity and the commitment of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi to use its sizeable wealth to satisfy the needs of UAE's small citizenry constitute the "Ruling Bargain" and partially explain the absence of significant popular pressure for political reform. However, as the UAE population continues to grow and becomes an increasingly modern society, these traditional mechanisms are becoming less effective. Although senior UAE leaders appear to be disposed to the idea of greater political participation, their primary concern remains political stability. They perceive long-term economic prosperity to rely heavily on the perception by foreigners of the UAE as a safe place to do business. The leadership have stated in private conversations that they will not jeopardize the security environment for so-called democratic gains, citing in particular a perceived "security threat" related to trade unions or political participation by the sizable expatriate worker population. ¶5. (S) Operational power at both the federal and ABU DHABI 00001154 002 OF 004 emirate-level is concentrated in the hands of only a few Emirati families; the two most important of which are the ruling families of Abu Dhabi (Al-Nahyan) and Dubai (Al-Maktoum). UAE President Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed is an Al-Nahyan, and is only the second president in the country's 35-year history -- the first being his father, Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al-Nahyan (1918-2004). Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al-Nahyan (MbZ) is the Crown Prince of oil-rich Abu Dhabi Emirate and Deputy Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces; his full brother, Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al-Nahyan (AbZ),is Minister of Foreign Affairs. Another brother, Sheikh Hazza bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, is the UAE's National Security Advisor and Director of State Security while Sheikh Saif bin Zayed al Nahyan, a half-brother, is Minister of Interior. Another MbZ full brother, Sheikh Hamdan bin Zayed Al-Nahyan (HbZ),is Deputy Prime Minister and until early 2006 Minister of State for Foreign Affairs. Meanwhile, Mohammed bin Rashid Al-Maktoum (MbR) is the Vice President, Prime Minister, Ruler of Dubai, and titular Minister of Defense. MbR, in his capacity as Ruler of Dubai, maintains personal control (working through a select group of trusted deputies) over Dubai's booming economic sector. In this regard, MbR maintains significant leverage within the federal structure, although Dubai continues to receive petrodollar subsidies from Abu Dhabi along with the five other smaller emirates. Any democratic reform strategy would be absolutely dependent on the consent of President Khalifa, MbZ, and MbR. Strategies for Reform -------------- ¶6. (C) The U.S. should encourage the leadership (Abu Dhabi's Al Nahyan and Dubai's Al Maktoum ruling families) to introduce representative government/elections and engage with and support the nascent civil society groups working toward this goal. We should focus our efforts and programming funds in support of the four essential pillars of (1) increased political participation, (2) development of an active and independent press, and (3) support of government transparency and (4) an independent judiciary. With the exception of increased political participation, these strategies appear to pose little direct threat to the security environment as described by senior UAE leaders, and may have more immediate potential. ¶7. (C) Advancing reform in the UAE requires a two-fold approach: quiet but frank diplomacy encouraging senior leadership to allow greater public participation, and a bottom-up strategy of instilling democratic culture and preparing members of the populace to understand, value, and participate in a more open democratic system. For reform to succeed in this country, it must be seen as a home-grown phenomenon. Close identification with the United States may undermine rather than advance reforms; Minister of State for Federal National Council Affairs Anwar Gargash specifically said that U.S. Government or NGO technical assistance would not be sought or accepted in the run-up to the 2006 FNC elections, as it would "undermine" the process in the eyes of the public. Programming that targets professional development of the press and judiciary may be particularly effective. Goal: Increased Political Participation -------------- ¶8. (C) Each emirate is semi-autonomous and is governed by a hereditary leader. The laws and courts of each emirate are established by the rulers of the emirate and are loosely coordinated with federal practices. Some emirates maintain their own police forces and immigration services; Ras al-Khaimah and Dubai have totally separate court systems, while the other five emirates adhere to a somewhat unified federal courts structure. All natural resources, and the funds derived thereof, are owned by the respective emirate government and not by the UAE. Significant changes that affect power structures or control over revenues are unlikely to occur. The best opportunities for introducing democratic ideals, principles, and practices is at the grass-roots level where there is little perceived threat to existing power structures or revenue streams. The most obvious targets are the establishment of popularly elected municipal councils, the expansion of student councils at universities, and the creation of active parent-teacher associations. These targets would introduce democratic principles while allowing a large number of Emiratis to gain valuable experience in engaging in public policy making processes, and raising a generation of citizens with an expectation that they can participate in government in a way that affects them directly. Efforts to ABU DHABI 00001154 003 OF 004 "instill" civic participation material in the UAE school curriculum as a part of ongoing education reform are already underway. Abu Dhabi established a municipality for the Western Emirates as a way of giving local nationals some control over local spending, but has also established management control over many development projects in the poorer northern emirates -- rather than funneling cash to the rulers and relying on them to implement projects. ¶9. (S) One traditional path to political parties, as seen in the West, comes as an outgrowth from labor unions. Given the fact that an overwhelming majority of the UAE population -- and labor market -- are foreign nationals, and the fact that UAE leaders have repeatedly stated that labor unions are an issue of "national security", this path is largely closed to reform efforts in the UAE. Another path to political parties that is common to this region is as an outgrowth of professional associations, NGOs, and religious networks. The UAE government has already allowed the creation of "professional organizations" which now need to be expanded and empowered. These professional organizations provide an opportunity for the U.S. to push for small reforms and empowerment of a group that is largely Emirati in composition and that the UAEG does not perceive as a significant threat to the stability of established power structures. For example, on June 13, 2007, two hundred and twenty (220) Emirati women graduated from a two-year UNIFEM-UAE General Women's Union "Enhancing the Role of Women Parliamentarians" program, including nine female FNC members (Ref B). Over time, empowered professional organizations could provide the foundation for true labor organizations and eventually for political parties. ¶10. (S) The UAE has also permitted the establishment of one civil society organization that functions like an independent NGO: The UAE Human Rights Association. Supporting the creation and strengthening of NGOs in the UAE would also expand Emirati experiences of civic and political engagement and activism. ¶11. (C) Political Participation Benchmarks for 2008: -- At least one municipality announces elections for a popularly elected governing council. -- A second popularly elected student council is formed at an institution of higher education. -- The Ministry of Social Affairs proposes legislation granting greater power and autonomy to professional organizations. Goal: Development of an Active and Independent Press -------------- -------------- ¶12. (C) A cornerstone of any open and free society is an active and free press. Although the UAE government does not actively censor the press other than forbidding direct criticism of the ruling families, there is heavy self-censorship among both journalists and editors. Like much of the workforce, most journalists (though not all columnists and editors) are expatriate foreign nationals on term contracts and effectively subject to deportation if their contracts are not renewed. Programming that targets the creation of a more professional press corps such as training in English language, direct interviewing techniques, and investigative reporting, will foster confidence in their abilities and result in a press that is more prepared to pursue independent stories instead of relying heavily on wire services and official statements. Building on the tactics outlined in paragraph 9 (above) the U.S. should support activities that strengthen the independence, competence, and civil society profile of the already recognized UAE Journalists Association. The U.S. should also work with the recently-ensconced $10 billion Mohammed bin Rashid Foundation, which seeks to improve education, including journalism training, throughout the Muslim world. A variety of programs should be targeted towards influencing the slowly increasing number of editors, columnists and op-ed writers who are UAE nationals (often academics) and although not subject to deportation are subject to other forms of government pressure. ¶13. (C) The U.S. should continue to press for adoption of a robust press freedoms law. Among other problems, current UAE law denotes "defamation" as a criminal offense rather than a civil infraction. In February 2006, the UAE Journalists Association completed draft freedom of the press legislation ABU DHABI 00001154 004 OF 004 modeled largely after U.S. press rights, and prepared with the assistance of MEPI-funded experts from the U.S. This draft was submitted to the UAE government, but no action has taken place; the Ministry of Information was dissolved in February 2006 and replaced by a semi-independent National Media Council. It is not clear which government entity currently holds action on the proposed freedom of the press law. ¶14. (C) Press Benchmarks for 2008: -- The proposed Press Freedoms Law is enacted. Goal: Transparency/Judicial Independence -------------- ¶15. (C) Transparency is based on the idea of the public knowing how decisions are made. There is significant overlap between the need for transparency and public participation. In addition to encouraging popularly elected municipal councils and student councils, the U.S. should encourage public -- perhaps online -- discourse within those bodies, as well as bodies that are not popularly elected. Abu Dhabi Emirate's National Consultative Council already posts its agenda online and allows for the public to submit comments online, and has actively sought out training and technical assistance from the Embassy and is clearly open to U.S. programming opportunities. Similar practices should be encouraged in all emirates, the Federal National Council, and among ministries that generate legislation. As a first step, the UAE should be encouraged to publish (in Arabic and English) its relevant laws and regulations online as soon as they are promulgated. As a necessary second step, we should encourage efforts by federal ministries to solicit public comments on draft legislation, such as the Ministry of Labor recently did with its draft labor law amendments. Currently, the UAE or the individual emirates communicate with select stakeholders on draft legislation, but only on a confidential basis. ¶16. (C) In many instances, ministries have expressed a willingness to share information with the Embassy but have been either unable to or have been prohibited from doing so. The issuance of sovereign bond ratings for Abu Dhabi Emirate (Ref C) is likely to produce greater transparency on economic information-sharing than has traditionally been the case. The U.S. should pursue opportunities to highlight technical training and expertise in the creation of modernized record keeping within federal ministries, municipal bodies, and emirate administrations. Political will is often wasted if capabilities to follow through are lacking. ¶17. (C) Similar to the challenges facing the press corps and the labor market as a whole, the UAE Judiciary is largely made up of foreign nationals -) Egyptians, Sudanese, Yemenis, Mauritanians, Syrians -- who are working on fixed-term contracts. As a result, judges are unlikely to pursue any action that will generate displeasure with the ruling bodies that oversee the renewal of their contracts. The U.S. should press for better training for local UAE national judges, a system of tenure for judges, or perhaps some form of professional association that will give judges a stronger sense of independence in making their judgments. ¶18. (C) Transparency/Judicial Independence Benchmarks for 2008: -- The UAEG publishes all legislation in both Arabic and English online at the same time that laws are published in the Official Gazette. In a June 24 meeting with the UAE Ministry of Justice under secretary, Emboffs were told that in the near future the UAE will publish on a website all laws in both languages. (Ref F) -- An official UAEG body solicits public comment on draft legislation. SISON