PM BANNY: POLITICAL GRIDLOCK

C O N F I D E N T I A L ABIDJAN 000008 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/04/2017 TAGS: IV PGOV SUBJECT: PM BANNY: POLITICAL GRIDLOCK REF: ABIDJAN 1317 Classified By: AMBASSADOR AUBREY HOOKS FOR REASONS 1.4 B/D. ¶1. (C) In a meeting with the Ambassador on January 3, Prime Minister Banny stated that Cote d'Ivoire is basically in political gridlock. All the political actors are waiting to see what will happen next. He characterized President Gbagbo's five proposals for dealing with the crisis as non-proposals and unrealistic. He noted that what President Gbagbo did not say was more important than what he did say, and President Gbagbo had said nothing about the identification process or the role of the Prime Minister in carrying out the proposals. He added that credible elections were not possible without a credible identification process to repair the gaps that occurred in the electoral process in ¶2000. PM Banny also noted that Forces Nouvelles leader Soro's caveated response (yes to dialog, but within the framework of UN Resolution 1721) to President Gbagbo's call for a direct dialog with the Forces Nouvelles was a clever response that said little, especially since President Gbagbo and Soro have long maintained direct contact with each other. ¶2. (C) The PM asked his advisor Leon Koffi to read to the Ambassador a letter which Forces Nouvelles Chief of Staff General Bakayoko sent to General Ouassenan Kone, head of the national DDR committee, announcing that the Forces Nouvelles were suspending their participation in talks with the FANCI Defense Forces as of January 2 and effective until further notice. The PM commented that this came as a surprise to him and he did not know what had provoked the Forces Nouvelles to make such a decision. The Ambassador pointed out that the identification process and the DDR/military restructuring process were supposed to occur concomitantly, and the decision of the Forces Nouvelles to suspend their participation in military talks could serve as a convenient pretext for the President's camp to block further progress on the identification process. The PM acknowledged that that was true. However, the PM said he planned to act as if he were deaf and blind, ignoring the political rhetoric, in an effort to implement the program which all political actors had already accepted; it is their program that he is trying to carry out. The PM informed the Ambassador that President Gbagbo was scheduled to sign a decree nominating magistrates who would serve on the mobile identification teams (audiences foraines) at the time that the PM and the Ambassador were meeting. The Prime Minister conceded, however, that the political impasse could easily block his best efforts to maintain some momentum. ¶3. (C) The Prime Minister commented that President Gbagbo, during his December 19 speech announcing his five proposals, made an oblique reference to the formation of a new government. The PM said that such a step would take President Gbagbo and all the political actors outside of UN Resolution 1721. The PM said he was not afraid of such a prospect. He commented candidly that doing so might even have a salutary effect given that the country is currently in gridlock. He noted that a drastic step may be necessary to break the current mindset. ¶4. (C) COMMENT: Cote d'Ivoire is currently experiencing a political harmattan, where visibility is reduced to practically zero. Everyone, including the Prime Minister, is waiting for the air to clear to regain their bearings. The decision of the Forces Nouvelles to suspend their participation in military talks blows more sand into the air and will contribute to blocking the political process. The PM's comment about breaking the current mindset may indicate that he is coming to the conclusion that his efforts are going no where and that a solution to the political equation depends on the addition of a new (undefined) variable. Hooks