WHO TRIED TO KILL SORO? THE SPECULATION IS WELL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABIDJAN 000719 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE PASS TO USTR TREASURY FOR D. PETERS USAID FOR C GARRETT, S. SWIFT ADDIS FOR US AMB TO AU E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/03/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO IV SUBJECT: WHO TRIED TO KILL SORO? THE SPECULATION IS WELL UNDERWAY REF: A. ABIDJAN 705 ¶B. ABIDJAN 691 Classified By: EMassinga, Acting PolEconChief, Reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) Summary. Since the June 29 attack on Prime Minister Soro, the rumor mill has gone into overdrive. The facts remain scarce, adding fuel to the unending speculation. The suspects are numerous, ranging from the most obvious (disaffected members of the Forces Nouvelles) to the absurd (ONUCI and French),the unlikely (RDR) to the possible (the Presidential camp). Possible motives, like the Ivorian political scene itself, are manifold and intricate. Regardless of the true authors, the clear winner to date has been President Gbagbo, as his one-time "equal" (Soro) is now saddled with a fractured and bickering military and political structure. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Since the events of June 29 in Forces Nouvelles-held Bouake (reftel A),speculation throughout Cote d,Ivoire regarding the true authors and motives of the attack has moved into high gear. Abetted by the lack of hard information on the attackers and the assault itself, the rumor mill and conspiracy theorists are having a field day. The ongoing theorizing and growing public finger-pointing is largely irresponsible and is already weakening the Prime Minister and the Forces Nouvelles as a whole. Had the attack succeeded (which it very nearly did),the results could potentially have led to a reignition of overt conflict. -------------- The Facts (Or Lack Thereof) -------------- ¶4. (SBU) What is known is that at 10:30am, the Fokker 100, lent by the Presidency to the Prime Minister for the latter to preside over the investiture of magistrates destined to oversee the audiences foraines (mobile identification courts) in Bouake, had landed and was taxiing when it came under attack by concealed assailants. Press reports, based on information coming from Licorne and ONUCI officials based at the Bouake airport, said three RPG rounds were fired, but at least one failed to explode. Widely-seen photos of the aircraft after the attack showed one large RPG-sized hole in the middle of the central cabin, and gruesome interior photos showed that the blast killed one passenger instantly, while �0A;the other four dead and more than a dozen injured were presumably hit by associated flying shrapnel. ¶5. (SBU) The rest of the events surrounding the attack remains shrouded in uncertainties. Multiple reports indicate small arms fire accompanied the RPG barrage, but apparently no heavy machine-gun fire was used, as might be expected in an attempt to destroy a 100-seat jet aircraft. Forces Nouvelles Minister of Tourism (and reputed #3 in the group) said in his post-attack press conference that signs that the assailants had dug foxholes and encamped at least overnight were found, indicating some level of preparation. However, the plane was not attacked while on its final approach, when it would presumably be more vulnerable to a catastrophic hit, and no surface-to-air weapons were employed. ¶6. (SBU) The pilot managed to direct the plane to ONUCI-protected facilities, according to press reports and many eyewitnesses on the plane, but why the attackers failed to continue fire is unclear; there is no evidence that either ONUCI or nearby Licorne troops on site engaged with the attackers. Forces Nouvelles Deputy Force Commander Wattao publicly claimed to have saved the day by arriving on the scene with loyal units, even carrying the PM on his back to a waiting vehicle (according to his own accounts). ONUCI forces remain publicly circumspect about their role during the attack, but did report protecting the PM during his extraction from the scene and during the rest of the day in Bouake. Konate said just subsequent to the attack that "several soldiers" were arrested and "some materiel was recovered at the scene," but it was unclear if the arrestees were taken into custody at the airport or during sweeps conducted in Bouake later in the day. On July 2, Le Jour, a daily journal that leans against the President's FPI, reported that Saint-Clair Kone, a "member of the Forces Nouvelles Army Command" was arrested in connection with the attack on the PM, but no further details were offered. Soro, unhurt, made a statement on June 30 and called for an ABIDJAN 00000719 002 OF 003 international investigation, promising to speak at greater length in the coming days, and remaining in Bouake until July ¶2. -------------- Suspects -- The Forces Nouvelles -------------- ¶7. (C) The most obvious set of suspects come from the Forces Nouvelles itself. On the day following the attack, state-owned newspaper Fraternite Matin ran a quasi-news story pointing the finger (without any proof or justification) at I.B. Coulibaly, the erstwhile leader of the rebellion which evolved into the Forces Nouvelles, and currently exiled in Benin (although he has made noises about returning in the post-Ouaga political framework). Indeed on June 29, the very day of the attack, I.B. Coulibaly was the subject of an extensive report in L,Inter, a generally pro-opposition independent paper which argued a successful peace process depended on Soro coming to terms with the man he edged out to lead the FNs. Separately, Embassy sources indicate that ComZone "Big" (a.k.a. ComZone "Osama Bin Laden" in Touba) was sacked for unknown reasons two weeks ago and "reassigned" to Bouake. ComZones Cherif Ousmane of Bouake and Kone Zakaria of Seguela were slammed by some in the press for accusing PM Soro of betraying the movement and being disloyal to the FNs, all supposedly at the behest of I.B. Coulibaly (however, both had already stoutly and publicly rejected such accusations before the attack). All in all, several princes of the Forces Nouvelles, long subjects of speculation concerning their disposition towards the Ouaga Accord and Soro,s acceptance of the Prime Ministership, have more than enough motive to be prime suspects. ¶8. (C) While suspicion should rightly be directed here, not all the facts comport with the theory. First, some observers close to the opposition (notably the RDR) look at the relative amateurishness and lack of sophistication of the attack in arguing against the notion that veteran, effective commanders such as Cherif Ousmane (who blunted a major FANCI offensive in 2004 and also tracked down and killed feared Liberian mercenary Sam Bokarie) and Kone Zakaria were the authors. Perhaps more tellingly, such observers believe that if one or a cabal of ComZones were plotting to eliminate Soro for selling out to the President, why not wait until July 5 for the planned "Flame of Peace" disarmament ceremony, where both Soro and Gbagbo were scheduled to appear together? -------------- Suspects -- The RDR -------------- ¶9. (C) The RHDP alliance of the PDCI and RDR has undergone a series of strains with its former Forces Nouvelles allies in the past months since the Ouaga Accord,s signature. The RDR has in particular found itself at odds with the PM,s camp, seeing several prominent stalwarts break ranks and join the FPI in the midst of RDR-FNs bickering. Thus, it comes as no surprise to hear some accusations of RDR complicity in the attack. (Note: Post attaches little credibility to such speculation. While nothing can be ruled out in the Ivorian political maze, neither the RDR nor its leader Alassane Ouattara strike us as possessing either the ruthless cadres or savoir faire to attempt such an audacious effort. End Note) -------------- Suspects -- The French, ONUCI -------------- ¶10. (C) Newspapers close to the President,s FPI have been quick to point the finger at ONUCI and the French Licorne force. Using specious logic, weak circumstantial evidence and stretching the intemperate, ill-considered allusion to the "suspicious presence and inaction of French troops" at the Bouake airport made by Sidiki Konate just after the incident, Notre Voie and Le Courrier d,Abidjan directly accused France of being behind the attack, and the latter alleges that "the Forces Nouvelles" themselves suspect France and Cherif Ousmane are the masterminds. From within the FNs, Wattao made repeated, lurid claims of ONUCI complicity in the attack ("I have proof") while also slamming Licorne, only two weeks after being seen angrily complaining about the French's "interference" in 2002-03. (Note: These patently absurd ABIDJAN 00000719 003 OF 003 statements, combined with his cartoonish claims to have saved the PM, make Wattao look foolish. However, his very public comments show obvious discord within the most senior ranks of the FNs, and worryingly demonstrate some measure of FNs hostility towards the impartial forces, a development that cannot help but delight the hardline factions in the President,s camp. End Note) -------------- Suspects -- The President,s Camp -------------- ¶12. (C) President Gbagbo made the right statements in his address to the nation: "we cannot turn back from peace process... This has been a terrible crime against the Ivorian people." Ble Goude, the President,s de facto emissary to the North, has been lavish in his praise of the Forces Nouvelles, handling of the situation and the group,s support among the people of the region. Defense Minister N,Guessan was sent to Bouake to "lend support to the PM." Despite these adept moves, the President himself let slip that had the PM been injured or held by his attackers, he might have been compelled to send the army to "free" Soro. The slip of the tongue only fueled the suspicion of Gbagbo,s opponents that he, or perhaps Simone Gbagbo, formulated the June 29 attack to either kill or "scare" the PM. ¶13. (C) Comment. The facts are simply too scarce to support any of the rumors or suspicions running rampant in Abidjan. However, regardless of whether he or someone from his entourage was the author, it is plainly evident to most observers that Gbagbo has been able to profit handsomely from the attack. The Forces Nouvelles have been fractured by the event, and are pointing fingers at one another while key leaders also foolishly accuse the international community. Soro remains for the time being in Bouake and its extended environs, perhaps indicating some level of reluctance to return back to the President,s home turf. On July 2, Soro attempted to regain his footing by speaking to audiences in the northern city of Ferkessedogou on the vital importance of continuing the peace process, as well as noting in a public meeting with Acting SRSG Abou Moussa that controversies over security at the Bouake airport should be handled directly, not through the media (implicitly telling Wattao and others in the FNs to keep quiet). ¶14. (C) Comment Continued. The balance of power with Gbagbo that Soro claimed was his strength has shifted more in the President,s favor. Furthermore, the incident will impede the return of civil servants and especially magistrates and prefects, already reluctant to return to the North due to their concerns over security, despite the very recent restart of "redeployment bonuses" (reftel B). In a July 3 meeting with the diplomatic corps and senior UN representatives, we will see what steps the PM intends to take to more fully recover from the political fallout over the attack on his life. End Comment. HOOKS