COTE D'IVOIRE: U.S. POLICY FOR BREAKING THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABIDJAN 000043 SIPDIS SIPDIS KINSHASA FOR BRAZZAVILLE E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/09/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON EFIN ASEC IV SUBJECT: COTE D'IVOIRE: U.S. POLICY FOR BREAKING THE POLITICAL STALEMATE REF: HOOKS/CARTER EMAIL 09/14/06 Classified By: POL/ECON Jim Wojtasiewicz, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary. The continuing political stalemate in Cote d,Ivoire, as the clock winds down on any chance of elections this year, poses the question: what can the United States do to re-energize the peace process? We do not believe the United States should try to take the lead -- among other things this might only give an excuse to the French to cut and run, and to the Ivoirian political actors to avoid taking ownership of their own crisis. Rather, we should try to play a catalytic role through a two-track strategy. On the diplomatic front, we should enhance our collaboration with the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). As a first step, we should consult closely with the AU and ECOWAS and offer to host in collaboration with them a meeting in Washington with key Ivoirian political players. We strongly urge a senior-level visit to Cote d,Ivoire soon, at least at the level of Assistant Secretary. We should also encourage the French, frankly and at senior levels, to lower their profile and stop making it look like they are focusing solely on getting rid of President Gbagbo. On a second track, we should enhance our own efforts to support the gradual institutional reintegration of the country, perhaps starting by encouraging the return of the banking sector to the North. Continuing to expand the outreach of U.S. programs into the North would also contribute significantly to this process. To successfully play this kind of catalytic role, we must be prepared with the will and the means for a long-term endeavor. End Summary. ¶2. (C) The continuing political stalemate in Cote d,Ivoire, as the clock winds down on any possibility of holding the already twice postponed elections this year, poses the question: what can the United States do to re-energize the peace process? ¶3. (C) The Ivoirian peace process is at a stalemate. Neither the President nor the political opposition nor the rebel FN (Forces Nouvelles) are capable of decisively moving the center of gravity in their favor, or of decisively marginalizing the other parties. However, the international community is equally incapable of decisively affecting the political dynamic to bring the country out of its crisis. Until something (as yet undetermined) creates greater political will to compromise among the principal players, the situation is (unfortunately) not yet ripe for resolution. ¶4. (C) However, this does not mean that we could or should simply wait on the sidelines until the political class here "gets its act together." The stakes for Cote d'Ivoire, the region and the U.S. are too high. While we do not believe the United States should try to take the lead in mediating the conflict (as most Ivoirian political leaders seem to wish),our interests do compel us to remain engaged and to seek to play a catalytic role in ending the crisis. The key is to recognize that we must be prepared for such a catalytic role to be a long-term endeavor. ¶5. (C) We propose a two-track approach. The first track would be to engage more closely with the AU and ECOWAS to advance the peace process here. On the second track, we could increase our own efforts to gradually reintegrate the country's institutions, thus facilitating functional if not political reconciliation and reunification. Track One: the Diplomatic Front -------------- ¶6. (C) Although, or even precisely because, the international community's efforts to steer Cote d'Ivoire towards peaceful reconciliation are not bearing fruit, the United States must continue to engage on this level. We should be careful not to appear to be trying to take the lead. For one thing, this could give the French the opportunity they seem to be looking for to cut and run. For another, one of the key reasons why this crisis is so protracted and intractable is the lack of maturity among the Ivoirian political elite and their chronic unwillingness to take ownership of their own future. An African-led approach is best, engaging directly with the Ivoirian parties. However, we should do all we can to encourage more robust African mediation. ¶7. (C) President Compaore, as ECOWAS chairman, President Sassou as the current AU Chair, and the new AU Chair who will ABIDJAN 00000043 002 OF 003 replace Sassou merit special attention. We should look for opportunities to approach them at senior levels, to encourage more pro-active African mediation and to underscore U.S. readiness to support their efforts. In particular, the appointment of the new AU Chair will offer an opportunity to invigorate the participation of the AU. We should seek ways to strengthen the role of the AU and to encourage it to take ownership of the process. For example, the AU can act as a clearinghouse for sanctions or other resolutions pertaining to Cote d'Ivoire before they are presented in the UNSC. In addition, one tangible way to show our support would be to offer to host a meeting in Washington, in collaboration with the AU and ECOWAS, with representatives of key neighboring countries and Ivoirian political actors. This would be a highly useful follow-up to the meeting President Sassou plans to host January 15 with similar participants. The level at which participants would be invited, and the level at which the meeting would be hosted in Washington, would remain to be worked out. ¶8. (C) Greater attention to Cote d,Ivoire by senior U.S. officials would also pay significant dividends. We urge Washington to consider a visit to Cote d,Ivoire soon, by a senior official at the level of at least Assistant Secretary. Such a visit would demonstrate the strength of U.S. commitment, and would also provide an excellent opportunity to drive home the message that the United States does not favor any side in this crisis, but we do believe it is essential and urgent for the Ivoirians to take their future in their own hands, and we stand ready to do all we can to support regional efforts to help them do this. ¶9. (C) We should also engage with the French, frankly and at a senior level, to urge them to lower their profile and take a more nuanced approach. French interests here are not served by seeming to focus solely on getting rid of Gbagbo. We should be prepared for the French to counter by accusing the United States of seeking to undermine everything they try to do to resolve the crisis here, and to warn that if the crisis is not resolved soon, they will withdraw their forces. Track Two: Long-Term Gradual Reintegration -------------- ¶10. (C) Cote d'Ivoire is slowly, haltingly reintegrating at an institutional if not political level. Efforts to reintroduce national administration to the North have yielded some fruit, especially but not only in the health and education sectors. NGOs and international humanitarian agencies are contributing significantly to this process. So are we, as we expand PEPFAR, OFDA, public diplomacy and our other programs into the North. We propose that the United States expand its efforts to support the institutional reintegration process. With greater focus on this long-term approach, patience, and modest (but critical) new resources, this second track can help stitch this country together, in spite of its shortsighted leaders. Over time, perhaps years, the country's leaders will eventually be forced to recognize the emerging reality on the ground. ¶11. (C) One sector which would make a major contribution to the institutional reintegration of the country and the economic revival of the North is banking. Both the FN and the political opposition are calling for banks to return to the North. Sources in the banking industry tell us they are considering doing so, though they would need to work out security arrangements with the FN. We should encourage, perhaps even publicly, the dialogue between the banks and the FN on this issue. ¶12. (C) We should also continue expanding our own outreach into the North. The Embassy is respected throughout the country for the breadth and scope of its outreach, and we want to build on that. Besides continuing to expand our PEPFAR and OFDA outreach, we plan to hold America Days, offering Embassy cultural and information programs in cities throughout Cote d'Ivoire. We might also consider establishing an American Corner in the Northern capital of Bouake, as we have done elsewhere in the country. We would also urge an increase in our ESF funding, to increase U.S. support for democracy and human rights throughout Cote d,Ivoire. The reverse, zeroing out ESF funding as we have seen in preliminary FY 08 budget figures, would fundamentally undermine the strength of our commitment here. Comment -------------- ABIDJAN 00000043 003 OF 003 ¶13. (C) Cote d'Ivoire's political problems are some of the most deeply rooted in Africa, despite the absence of open conflict at the moment. We do not believe the United States should try to take the leading role here, but if the means and will are available we could play a more active role to help break the cycle of drift the country finds itself in. The key is to bear in mind that this needs to be a sustained, long-term effort. End Comment. Hooks