PRESIDENT GBAGBO ON THE OUAGA PEACE AGREEMENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABIDJAN 000281 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2017 TAGS: IV PGOV PREL SUBJECT: PRESIDENT GBAGBO ON THE OUAGA PEACE AGREEMENT Classified By: AMBASSADOR AUBREY HOOKS FOR REASONS 1.4 B/D. ¶1. (C) In a meeting with the Ambassador on March 14, President Gbagbo made the following points concerning the Ouaga Peace Agreement (OPA): -- Gbagbo and Soro signed the Ouaga Peace Agreement and therefore all those associated with Gbagbo and Soro are committed to its implementation. -- The motivation for the OPA was the fact that the Government is not functioning and Cote d'Ivoire has not been governed for months. -- Soro has already told Gbagbo that he wants to be prime minister, but in the media he is being very coy. -- Gbagbo cannot work with PM Banny, who wants to run against Gbagbo in the next presidential elections. -- Soro and Desire Tagro, Gbagbo's press spokesman, are currently hammering out a power-sharing arrangement, which will be difficult but which should be completed within a few days. -- Gbagbo will sign on Monday, March 19, a decree to set up the Integrated Command Center for the two armed forces. -- President Blaise Compaore will submit the OPA to the ECOWAS Ministerial meeting taking place March 16-17, and then submit the OPA to President Kufuor for the endorsement of the AU Peace and Security Commission, which will in turn forward the agreement in the form of a draft resolution to the UN Security Council. -- French PM de Villepin came to realize that President Chirac's policies towards Cote d'Ivoire would not work, and de Villepin had at times supported Gbagbo against Chirac's policies. -- Gbagbo has no problem with the UNOCI, which can in fact contribute to moving the peace process forward. -- Gbagbo has not been feeling well lately, due largely to the stress of negotiations. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) In a meeting with the Ambassador on March 14, President Gbagbo said that he sought the Ouaga Peace Agreement (OPA) because he wanted to put an end to the situation where Cote d'Ivoire was not being governed. That has been the case for a number of months. The Ambassador noted that both President Gbagbo and Forces Nouvelles Secretary General Guillaume Soro had signed the agreement, SIPDIS but in the past those who did not sign, such as National Assembly deputies and members of President Gbagbo's FPI party, disavowed agreements or distanced themselves from the agreement. President Gbagbo said this would not be the case with the OPA and members of the National Assembly and FPI leaders had already assured him of their support for the OPA. ¶3. (C) President Gbagbo said that Soro wants badly to become Prime Minister and Soro had already told Gbagbo that he would accept the job. Gbagbo noted that Soro is acting coy (comme une jeune fille) in talking to the press, but there is no doubt that Soro wants the job. President Gbagbo remarked that Soro has two problems: (1) the need for extensive patronage to take care of those around him, and (2) Soro is thinking about his political future. When the Ambassador pressed the point, President Gbagbo admitted that he too had to take care of his own supporters, but he commented that he had already named so many people to ministerial positions that he no longer had as many obligations as Soro. Furthermore, he is approaching the end of his political career, and only has one more election to win. ¶4. (C) President Gbagbo commented that he would not be able to continue working with Prime Minister Banny. He allowed as how he had misjudged Banny. He said it was understood that Banny would not run for President against Gbagbo in the next elections, but rather wait for presidential elections in five years. However, Gbagbo saw that Banny was already running an election campaign, and Gbagbo learned that Banny planned to resign as Prime Minister a few months before elections and announce that he was therefore eligible to run against Gbagbo in the presidential elections because he would not be responsible for organizing the elections. Gbagbo said Banny's underhanded way of doing things was simply unacceptable. ¶5. (C) The Ambassador asked where negotiations with Soro on ABIDJAN 00000281 002 OF 002 a power-sharing arrangement now stood. President Gbagbo replied that his spokesman Desire Tagro was in charge of negotiating the deal with Soro. Gbagbo noted that the negotiations would be difficult, but a deal will be reached in a few days. In response to the Ambassador's question about Soro's authority as prime minister, President Gbagbo observed that the prime minister's authorities are outlined in the constitution. When the Ambassador noted that President Gbagbo had found ways of neutralizing both PM Banny and his predecessor Seydou Diarra, Gbagbo acknowledged that was the case and added that all of these issues would be part of the deal being negotiated with Soro. The Ambassador remarked that President Gbagbo's speech to the nation on December 19 and his speech to the diplomatic corps on January 22 suggested that he would be negotiating directly with Soro. President Gbagbo confirmed that such had been his intention, but his advisors had strongly recommended against it, and in the end he had acquiesced. He noted in retrospect that that had been the right decision. ¶6. (C) President Gbagbo informed the Ambassador that he would sign a decree setting up the Integrated Command Center for the two armed forces, as stipulated in the annex of the OPA. The decree will be issued on Monday, March 19 after he meets with Generals Mangou and Bakayoko. ¶7. (C) In response to the Ambassador's question about next steps for ECOWAS and the African Union to endorse the OPA, President Gbagbo said he was not sure, and he immediately placed a call to ECOWAS President Compaore to seek clarification. President Compaore told President Gbagbo that the ECOWAS Ministerial Meeting on March 16-17 would endorse the OPA. President Compaore plans next week to send the OPA to President Kufuor in Kufuor's capacity as AU President, and President Kufuor will submit the OPA to the AU Peace and Security Commission (PSC). President Compaore informed President Gbagbo that the PSC would likely endorse the OPA by the end of next week, or the following week at the latest, and send the OPA to the UN Security Council in the form of a draft resolution. ¶8. (C) When the Ambassador asked President Gbagbo about his views towards UNOCI, President Gbagbo said that he had no problem with UNOCI, which can in fact contribute to implementing the OPA. He said he would address this issue more specifically after the power-sharing deal is reached with Soro. ¶9. (C) President Gbagbo frequently digressed from talking about the OPA to castigating the French Government. The only new information in his remarks was his relationship with PM Dominique de Villepin. He commented that de Villepin came to realize that President Chirac's policies of trying to get rid of Gbagbo would not work and de Villepin had reached out to Gbagbo. He revealed that de Villepin had asked him to lobby President Chirac to name de Villepin prime minister, something which Gbagbo had done. Chirac commented that de Villepin was a nervous type, but Gbagbo assured Chirac that de Villepin was up to the job. Furthermore, Gabonese President Bongo had arranged for Gbagbo and de Villepin to meet in Libreville where they reached an understanding on Frenco-Ivorian relations. Contrary to President Chirac, De Villepin sometimes showed understanding of President Gbagbo's policies. ¶10. (C) President Gbagbo commented that his health had not been very good lately. He ascribed his malaise to the stress of negotiations. He reminisced that he had fallen ill after defending his doctoral thesis due to stress. He remarked that he was getting more rest now and was already feeling somewhat better. ¶11. (C) COMMENT: President Gbagbo loves to talk and will wander from subject to subject unless respectfully brought back to the issue at hand. However, he was somewhat less ebullient than usual. It is interesting that his advisors did not want him to meet one-on-one with Soro, perhaps out of fear that he would give the store away and not protect their interests. But Gbagbo does not have a sterling reputation for keeping his word, and it remains to be seen whether he will respect the deal he is negotiating with Soro, especially when it comes to the day-to-day running of the government and dealing with sensitive issues such as identification and voter registration and control over government finances. Hooks