Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ABIDJAN141
2007-02-07 14:41:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abidjan
Cable title:  

COTE D'IVOIRE'S DIRECT DIALOGUE UNFOLDS;

Tags:  IV PGOV PREL 
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VZCZCXRO0636
PP RUEHPA
DE RUEHAB #0141/01 0381441
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 071441Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2562
INFO RUEHOU/AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU PRIORITY 0276
RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 1524
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABIDJAN 000141 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2017
TAGS: IV PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: COTE D'IVOIRE'S DIRECT DIALOGUE UNFOLDS;
EXPECTATIONS HIGH

REF: ABIDJAN 128

Classified By: EconChief EMassinga, reasons 1.5 (b, d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABIDJAN 000141 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2017 TAGS: IV PGOV PREL SUBJECT: COTE D'IVOIRE'S DIRECT DIALOGUE UNFOLDS; EXPECTATIONS HIGH REF: ABIDJAN 128 Classified By: EconChief EMassinga, reasons 1.5 (b, d) ¶1. Summary. Direct talks between the President's representatives and their New Forces counterparts kicked off in Ouagadougou on February 5. No substantive negotiations were held, but despite this, participants and observers were upbeat. Apparently an agenda for the much-anticipated direct Gbagbo/Soro talks (scheduled for sometime in the week of Feb 12) was established. President Compaore told UN High Representative for Elections Gerard Stoudmann that he plans to proceed with a realistic negotiating strategy twinning a genuine identification process with a modified disarmament plan that would proceed through an elections campaign and end with actual weapons collection after the vote takes place. Compaore, summit participants and international observers were upbeat. While we remain somewhat more cautious than our colleagues in the international community, perhaps at this juncture there is sufficient will (or perhaps the parties have exhausted their options sufficiently) for real progress to be possible. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) On February 5 in Ouagadougou, President Blaise Compaore, new ECOWAS Mediator of the Ivorian crisis and two Burkinabe ministers (MFA Ouedrago and Security Minister Bassole) convened representatives of President Gbagbo and Forces Nouvelles leader Soro for the second round of prepatory talks before the leaders themselves are to meet directly. Gbagbo and Soro, who had been scheduled to lead their respective delegations but not engage directly, chose (not unexpectedly) to skip this session entirely. President Gbagbo attended a dinner on behalf of Koffi Annan in Accra over the weekend while Soro remained in Bouake. ¶3. (SBU) Gbagbo's team was led by advisor Desire Tagro and aided by FPI Youth Wing leader Navigue Konate, along with Ambassador to the U.N. Alcide Djedje. The FN side was captained by Minister of Solidarity and War Victims Louis Dacoury-Tabley (and effectively FN Number 2) along with Spokesman Sidiki Konate, Deputy Communications Director Alain Lobognon, and Justice Minister Mamadou Kone. Parties reportedly presented prepared positions, most of which were available in the February 6th edition of state-owned (and Gbagbo-controlled) Fraternite Matin; Tagro supposedly pointedly asked "those who had ta
ken up arms" to clearly state their grievances, not-so implicitly accusing the NF of unjustifiably taking the country through its prolonged crisis. ¶4. (C) Contacted directly by Emboffs while he remained in Ouagadougou, the FN's Lobognon laughed off Tagro's commentary and was upbeat with regards to the overall meeting. He said the meeting went well and set the stage for upcoming meetings between Soro and Gbagbo. Asked about the substance of the meetings, Lobognon indicated that the main outcome was to fix an agenda for direct Gbagbo/Soro talks. The date for these talks was not fixed, but is likely to be during the week of February 12. ¶5. (C) UN High Representative for Elections Gerard Stoudmann attended the meeting on the margins, and met with President Compaore and all the delegations. Contacted upon their return from Ouaga, a well-placed source in Stoudmann's office indicated that many concerns had been alleviated in talks with Compaore. Specifically, Compaore believes the threat of snap elections, mentioned by President Gbagbo repeatedly in the immediate wake of the adoption of UNSCR 1721, is effectively off the table. The FPI is no longer mentioning this possibility and Stoudmann believes it to be a dead letter. ¶6. (C) Compaore, apparently well-versed in the subject, told Stoudmann that he will be intensively engaged in the Ivorian dossier over the coming weeks, and that he will base his mediation strategy on a two-pronged approach. The first will be a Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration process that will produce actual disarmament only after elections; preregroupment and cantonment would take place before, but actual collection of weapons would wait until after the vote. The second major element would be a serious, genuine identification effort aimed at registering between 1 and 1.5 million new citizens in a 7-8 month timeframe (which, coincidentally, matches the timeframe presented by PM Banny in his weekend interviews with major newspapers). Stoudmann's staff reported the atmosphere in Ouaga to be positive, and that Compaore was on "our wavelength." Stoudmann and his team are to return to Ouaga on Feb 7th at Compaore's request. ¶7. (C) Comment. These direct talks, long in coming since ABIDJAN 00000141 002 OF 002 they were announced in December, have generated a considerable amount of excitement and enthusiasm among both the international community and the Ivorian political class. The international community, even seasoned and effective interlocutors such as Stoudmann, might be expecting too much from these talks, perhaps because other options seem to be going nowhere. While we believe hopes for a rapid, painless breakthrough to be somewhat unrealistic, there do appear to be elements in place that could lead to genuine progress. We suspect these talks will take longer and engender more uneven results than observers want to believe, particularly given the track record of poor implementation of agreements. However, the two major parties may at last be recognizing they cannot wish the other out of existence and that they will have to forge a compromise solution to end the crisis. End Comment. Hooks

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