C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABIDJAN 001241

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/18/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL EAID MARR IV
SUBJECT: SPECIAL REP BADINI OPTIMISTIC ABOUT OPA; FOCUS
SHIFTING TO ELECTION

Classified By: AMB. WANDA NESBITT FOR REASONS 1.4 (b/d)


1. (C) Summary: Ambassador discussed recent developments
with the Ouagadougou Political Accord with the Facilitator,s
special representative, Boureima Badini, on December 14.
Badini confirmed that the complementary accords were meant to
keep pressure on the parties, but said he was satisfied that
Gbagbo and Soro both are doing what,s necessary to remove
obstacles to progress. Badini believes Gbagbo is more
confident now than he once was of his ability to win a
presidential election and is now eager to have all the
necessary elements in place. Hence his willingness to
restructure the negotiating teams in a way that excludes
Interior Minister Tagro. Badini was optimistic that the
parties would meet the deadlines laid out in the
complementary accords, including progress on DDR before the
end of December. Ensuring that the identification process is
carried out correctly remains key to the overall success of
the OPA. End Summary


2. (C Amb. Nesbitt and PolCouns called on Special
Representative Badini to discuss the 2nd and 3rd
complementary agreements to the OPA. Many read the 2nd
complementary agreement as ratifying the decision to select
SAGEM as the technical operator for the identification
process, but Badini sees its significance as clarifying that
SAGEM will be the primary operator. He confirmed that
Interior Minister Tagro had wanted SAGEM to be subordinate to
the National Institute of Statistics (Institut National de la
Statistique - INS). The opposition parties strongly oppose
this because INS Director General Matthieu Meleu is widely
viewed as being solidly in the FPI/Gbagbo campa and the
parties doubt he would ensure a fair process. Badini said
Gbagbo,s camp wants to control the identification process
because they are concerned about the potential for large
numbers of northerners (non-Gbagbo supporters) to be added to
the electoral rolls. The OPA, however, clearly gives the
lead role to the technic

al operator; for the INS to supervise
SAGEM would contravene the OPA. Badini seemed confident that
the 2nd complementary accord settled the issue of SAGEM vs.
the INS. Local media reports, however, continue to suggest
otherwise. Embassy will keep a close eye on this issue.


3. (C) Regarding the specifics of the identification
process, Badini said that SAGEM will start with the 2000
electoral list and set up offices (up to 11,000) around the
country to register voters. He stressed that everyone on the
electoral list, regardless of whether they currently have
identification papers or not, will be required to appear at a
SAGEM office and provide biometric data in order to be
documented to vote in the next election. According to
Badini, individuals who have received &jugements
suppletifs8 after going to an audience foraine will not be
able to go directly to SAGEM to register. They will still
need to get a certificate of nationality. (Comment: If
accurate, this could be a huge point of contention. One of
the main selling points of the audiences foraines was the
notion that individuals would be able to register to vote
based solely on a document issued thru the audiences
foraines. Birth certificates issued by an audience foraine
will apparently be sufficient documentation to register.)


4. (C) Badini acknowledged that the opposition political
parties have legitimate complaints about the 2000 electoral
list having been tampered with. However, he believes they
should concentrate more on getting their voters to be
documented by SAGEM. Badini believes the political parties,
especially the PDCI and FPI, have not paid attention to how
their voters are affected by the identification process. They
tend to think of it as a process that affects only those from
the north and need to do a better job of mobilizing their
constituents to register. Badini also expressed grave
concern that the presidential election would be a very bitter
campaign and would make the post-electoral period especially
fragile. He said there is &real hatred8 among Gbagbo,
Ouattara and Bedie, and that the latter in particular may go
to great lengths to try to win. He thought the Forces
Nouvelles would accept a Gbagbo victory as long as the
identification process continued to operate but was concerned
about how the militias in west would react to a result they
didn,t like. Badini also wondered about Soro,s fate and
thought it would facilitate reconciliation if Gbagbo kept him
on as Prime Minister.


5. (C) Asked if he thought the parties were fully committed
to the OPA, Badini said yes. He was also quite optimistic
that they would meet most of the very ambitious deadlines in
the 3rd complementary agreement. He saw a direct link
between the government's willingness to pay rebel soldiers an
as yet to be determined sum of money and the rebels'
willingness to return control of customs and other revenue

ABIDJAN 00001241 002 OF 002


sources to the central government. In Badini's view, this is
one of the most important elements of the 3rd complementary
agreement as it gives both sides a strong incentive to follow
through on their commitments. Badini also seemed confident
that there would be progress on DDR before the end of the
year. He believes that the parties are well on their way to
resolving the ranks issue and said he would not be surprised
if Forces Nouvelles (FN) officers were allowed to retain
their ranks in exchange for agreeing to immediate retirement.
Badini said that his office, UNOCI, and the French Licorne
forces will observe the disarmament process to ensure it
takes place and that he expects the Ivorian forces to supply
him with a timeline for completion of the process as soon as
they establish one.


6. (C) Badini,s optimistic view of the situation was based
in large part on his assessment that President Gbagbo is now
confident that he will win the election and is therefore
ready to take action to remove obstacles to an election. He
cited Gbagbo,s willingness to agree to PM Soro,s proposal
that Ministers no longer be allowed to serve on the
negotiating teams as an important sign of the President's
commitment to the OPA. Badini confirmed that Tagro played a
deleterious role in the negotiations and not just in terms of
the SAGEM issue. According to Badini, Tagro and others like
him (most notably National Assembly President Mamadou
Koulibaly) continue to view Soro as a rebel and demean him,
rather than show him the respect he is entitled to as Prime
Minister. Badini noted that Soro had given up three members
of his negotiating team (the Minister of Justice, the
Minister of Tourism and the Minsiter of Solidarity and War
Victims) in order to get rid of Tagro, but had succeeded.
The next meeting of the OPA Evaluation and Monitoring
Committee will be January 17, in Ouagadougou, but this time
representatives of the international community will be
invited as well.


7. (C) Comment: Embassy finds Badini,s assessment of the
situation to be consistent with that of many observers in
Abidjan. While important details still need to be sorted
out, the selection of SAGEM has raised hope that the
identification process will indeed begin soon. If this
happens and the process is done well, most eligible voters
could indeed be documented by June 2008. Both the President
and the political parties are shifting their attention to
election preparations; we have noticed far less attention to
the audiences foraines, for example, than one would expect
given the high profile of the identity issue. Meanwhile, the
government is slowly returning to the north and appears to be
regaining control there. As it does, commerce and other
normal activities are beginning to pick up. There is a
palpable sense that things are moving forward, and mostly in
the right direction, but anxiety about whether things will
still look as good tomorrow remains quite strong.

NESBITT