CROATIA PROSECUTES ARMS SMUGGLER

S E C R E T ZAGREB 000215 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/PRA, EUR/SCE, NP/ECNP, INR/SPM E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2016 TAGS: PARM PREL ETTC IR HR SUBJECT: CROATIA PROSECUTES ARMS SMUGGLER REF: A. 05 ZAGREB 1919 ¶B. 05 ZAGREB 1473 ¶C. 05 STATE 163798 Classified By: Poloff Justin Friedman, reasons 1.4 (b) & (d) SUMMARY and COMMENT -------------- ¶1. (S) Croatian authorities finally brought suspected arms proliferator Sinisa Adrinek to trial on February 16 for attempting to sell software for a weapons guidance system to Iran. Although interagency cooperation improved somewhat (ref A),Croatian authorities appear to have temporarily lost Adrinek's trail, allowing him to visit Tehran briefly, but apparently without the software he was attempting to smuggle. This incident has highlighted for the GoC several important gaps in their legal code and law enforcement coordination. Post is working via the EXBS and ICITAP programs to help the GoC fill those gaps. END SUMMARY and COMMENT. SMUGGLER FINALLY ARRESTED -------------- ¶2. (C) Chief State Prosecutor Mladen Bajic briefed Poloff several times over the past two weeks on the status of the criminal case against Sinisa Adrinek. Adrinek was detained in December (ref A) following his attempt to leave Croatia for Iran with a laptop computer containing missile fire control software. Bajic told us the subsequent search of Adrinek's office and home did not turn up any copies of the software. On Friday, February 10, a warrant was issued and Adrinek was arrested at approximately 1600 the same day. On Thursday, February 16, Adrinek appeared in a Varazdin County court, pleading not-guilty to charges of attempting to evade customs inspection. According to Bajic, Adrinek was released from detention but his passport was confiscated. Where Was He? -------------- ¶3. (S) What is not clear are Adrinek's whereabouts prior to his arrest. Initially, Bajic told us that Adrinek had slipped police surveillance and left Croatia. GoC authorities were able to confirm he had traveled to Tehran when Adrinek called his wife and was heard complaining about his hotel. Subsequently, Bajic walked back from this assertion, stating that it was not clear whether Adrinek had left Croatia. When Adrinek was arrested in Croatia, he had air tickets to Dubai, scheduled to leave on Tuesday, Feb. 14. What Went Wrong -------------- ¶4. (S) Following the December detention, Adrinek was not arrested and charged, pending the police investigation. A key delay appears to have been that the Ministry of Defense did not deliver until February 8, a formal declaration that Adrinek's software was indeed a military product. Bajic believes that the police (Ministry of Interior, known by the Croatian acronym, MUP) had the authority to arrest and hold Adrinek back in December while conducting its investigation. However the MUP had shied away from this step, waiting for the State Prosecutor to make a determination of what charges would be filed. In the interim, the MUP and POA (Counter Intelligence Agency) had placed Adrinek under surveillance which he has able to elude. What Next? -------------- ¶5. (C) Adrinek is charged with trying to avoid Customs inspection of controlled goods which carries a maximum penalty of eight years in prison. Bajic believes he will get at most two years. The State Prosecutors office is also looking at bringing charges against Adrinek of damaging national security, but that may be harder to prove. For Bajic, the next steps are to follow up on his lessons learned review (reftel) with MUP, Ministry of Defense and POA leadership to improve coordination between the intelligence services (including military intelligence) and the police. ¶6. (S) The other, broader challenge for the GoC is to address the holes in the criminal and economic crime codes that this case has exposed. The GoC needs to strengthen criminal conspiracy statutes to allow prosecution of "one man shows" like Adrinek, as well as brokering activities. Penalties for violation of military and dual use export controls need to be stiffened. And most importantly, the capacities of enforcement authorities ) particularly the Customs and MUP ) to work collaboratively to detect and investigate this kind of activity need to be strengthened. ¶7. (S) Post is working to support the State Prosecutors and the Ministry of Economy through the EXBS program to review key legislative changes on brokering currently in draft form. Also through EXBS, we are working to include counter-proliferation in the new basic training being implemented for all Customs officers. Through the ICITAP program and in cooperation with the EU, we are providing hands on training in developing interagency law enforcement task forces to investigate and prosecute criminal conspiracies. FRANK