CROATIAN PM SANADER SAYS HE CANNOT SUPPORT THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L ZAGREB 001392 SIPDIS SIPDIS FOR EUR/SCE SAINZ AND BALIAN E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/20/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV HR BK SUBJECT: CROATIAN PM SANADER SAYS HE CANNOT SUPPORT THE ORIGINAL BOSNIAN CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM PACKAGE Classified By: Ambassador Robert A. Bradtke for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: It would not be possible for him to support the Bosnian constitutional reform package from last spring, PM Ivo Sanader told the Ambassador November 20. Doing so would pit him against half the BiH Croatian community as well as the Catholic church, and would damage him both at home and within the region, he continued. It is in both USG and regional interests to have a strong, Western-oriented Croatian Prime Minister, he argued; supporting the package would completely undermine him. He asked that the USG consider "minor changes" to the package that would make it more palatable to the BiH Croats. ¶2. (C) Prime Minister Sanader called in the Ambassador November 20 to discuss Croatian views on the Bosnian constitutional reform package, and the letter he is expecting from Undersecretary Burns on the topic. The Ambassador replied that while he expected to have formal instructions soon, the letter was not yet ready. That said, the Ambassador expected that Washington would continue to support the original reform package; discussion of a second package could begin immediately after the first was completed. ¶3. (C) Sanader said that of the three major Bosnian Croat groups -- HDZ, HDZ-1990, and the Catholic Church -- two of them opposed the U.S.-brokered constitutional reform package. HDZ leader Covic was the only one in favor, he continued, and that was because he was hoping support for the package would somehow help him avoid the consequences of his corruption trial. There is no way that Sanader could support the package under these circumstances, since it would cost him politically in both BiH and Croatia. ¶4. (C) Sanader recalled the discussion of Bosnia during his lunch with Vice President Cheney October 18; BiH Croats already have the feeling that they are losing status vis a vis the other communities; we cannot allow their status to be weakened further, he said, or they will begin to see their futures outside of BiH. A worst case scenario could see large numbers of Bosnian Croats emigrating to Croatia or Western Europe, which would lead to the destruction of BiH. HDZ-1990 leaders Raguz and Ljubic, and Cardinal Puljic had told him that only small changes to the package would be required to satisfy the Croats in this regard. ¶5. (C) Ambassador replied that the USG still sees no alternative to the original constitutional reform package. Once the first package has been adopted serious consideration could be given to subsequent changes. If the package is opened for the Croats then the RS will want to make their own changes as well. ¶6. (C) Sanader disagreed, noting that he has a good relationship with RS leader Dodik and thinks he can work something out. He noted that he had recently spoken with Dodik, who planned to come to Zagreb in mid-December. ¶7. (C) Comment: Sanader clearly wants to be helpful to the USG on BiH, and genuinely wants to see the country become more stable. However, he is facing difficult parliamentary elections within the next year and feels supporting the package would be very damaging, since he would incur the wrath of the many Bosnian Croats who can vote in Croatian elections, or of their allies on the center-right of domestic Croatian politics. BRADTKE