ARMENIANS CAUGHT IN HEADLIGHTS ON IRAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 YEREVAN 000751

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR (BRYZA) AND EUR/CARC (ROOD)
DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR NEA/IR; NSC FOR MERKEL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV KNNP IR AM
SUBJECT: ARMENIANS CAUGHT IN HEADLIGHTS ON IRAN

REF: A. STATE 87682


B. YEREVAN 715

Classified By: Amb. John Evans, for reasons 1.4. (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Ambassador met with President Kocharian late
June 1 to deliver ref A points on Iran, and with Deputy
Foreign Minister Kirakossian the following day. Kocharian
had no immediate reaction except to repeat his concerns about
the heightening tensions over Iran's nuclear program, to
lament his country's geographical situation, to wonder at the
behavior of the current Iranian regime, and to say that he
"needed to talk to Vartan" -- Foreign Minister Oskanian. DFM
Kirakossian understood the need for Armenia to join in the
international chorus and promised to work on a statement, but
as of COB June 2 we had not seen anything. FM Oskanian is
expected to return to Yerevan June 3. END SUMMARY


2. (C) Kocharian took aboard the points in our demarche
without comment. He then made a number of points consistent
with earlier conversations we had had on the subject (e.g.
Ref B). In particular he said that he had developed no
personal relationship yet with new Iranian President
Ahmadi-Nejad, and did not have any feel for what kind of
person he was -- and, by the way, that he had not yet set
dates for a trip to Tehran. He said that, in his opinion,
Iranian National Security Advisor Larijani was a more
rational actor than Ahmadi-Nejad, and that there might be a
chance to talk sense to him.


3. (C) Kocharian said that Armenia really had not formulated
its approach to the problem of Iran's nuclear ambitions; he
had just hoped the issue would "go away" and admitted
"frankly, we have been avoiding the issue." He asked
questions suggesting he was not fully convinced whether the
Iranian regime was seriously pursuing a nuclear weapons
capacity or was just blustering for international and
possibly domestic political effect. The Ambassador reviewed
the evidence, including Iran's long history of not playing it
straight with IAEA inspectors and concealing material facts,
and referred Kocharian back to the persuasive arguments made
by A/S Rademaker in Vienna (Ref. B). Kocharian wondered why
Iran did not simply pull out of the NPT regime if it truly
intended to obtain a nuclear capability. He mentioned India,
Pakistan and Israel. The Ambassador noted that Iran was a
signatory to the NPT, which made its current behavior
illegal, but that, legalities aside, the international
community did not want to see a nuclear-armed Iran.
Kocharian agreed heartily with this assessment, saying "we
certainly do not welcome the idea of a nuclear Iran on our
own border." On the U.S. requests for public support of our
diplomatic move, Kocharian said he would have to talk to
Vartan Oskanian, the Foreign Minister, who was traveling.


4. (C) NOTE: Ambassador John Ordway saw Foreign Minister
Oskanian June 1 during the latter's visit to Kazakhstan, and
has reported to us that Oskanian reacted positively to the
idea of a supportive public statement. Oskanian also shared
with Amb. Ordway his thought that Armenia might do better to
accede to Iran's invitation for Kocharian to visit Tehran in
mid-July, rather than continue stalling on it. Oskanian is
still traveling, but we have contacted his top aide, AmCit
Salpi Ghazarian, who has said she would attempt to contact
Oskanian en route and obtain his input. Ghazarian was certain
that Armenia would eventually welcome publicly the "shift in
USG position," which she said went some distance to allay
"real fears" in Armenia. Oskanian is due to return briefly to
Yerevan on Saturday, June 3, and it may well be that his
presence is a necessary condition for a statement to be
issued. END NOTE.


5. (C) The Ambassador encouraged President Kocharian, in
addition to responding quickly and positively to our specific
requests regarding public statements and keeping the
spotlight on Iran's need to choose, to think of other ways in
which he might be helpful to the international community's
efforts to resolve the problem of Iran's behavior on the
nuclear issue. Kocharian made no promises, but said again,
"I have to talk to Vartan."


6. (C) When we met with DFM Kirakossian, we shared
representative samples of what other relevant governments
(e.g., Russia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine) had already said in
public about Iran's need to choose and the U.S. move.
Ambassador also gave Kirakossian a hand-written list of the
many governments that have already welcomed the U.S.
announcement. Kirakossian promised to take the matter under
review, but said that he had to meet with Foreign Minister
Oskanian on Saturday morning, June 3.

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7. (C) COMMENT: The presence -- or at least input -- of
Fletcher School grad Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian seems
to be the necessary, and heretofore missing, ingredient here.
We have asked the Foreign Ministry press spokesman to notify
our press officer immediately if a statement is issued over
the weekend. END COMMENT
EVANS