KOCHARIAN WON'T CONDEMN REFERENDUM, STILL HOPES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 YEREVAN 000074

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2016
TAGS: PREL EAID PGOV PHUM AM
SUBJECT: KOCHARIAN WON'T CONDEMN REFERENDUM, STILL HOPES
FOR MCC SUPPORT

Classified By: Ambassador John M. Evans for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

Summary
--------------


1. (C) In a January 17 meeting with President Kocharian, the
Ambassador pressed for a clearer GOAM acknowledgement of
shortcomings in the November 27 constitutional referendum.
The January 12 response to Millennium Challenge Corporation
CEO Danilovich from FM Oskanian was a principled statement,
and while it gave strong assurances of GOAM commitment to
hold clean elections in 2007 and 2008, it did not answer the
MCC call to investigate allegations of improprieties.
President Kocharian told the Ambassador that he remained dead
set against making any public statement critical of the
conduct of the referendum, although he admitted that the
turnout figures were likely inflated. Any such statement,
Kocharian argued, would weaken Armenia's new constitution and
would, by extension, undermine all of Armenia's democratic
institutions. Armenia's election law was based on a system
of checks and balances; when most of the opposition parties
pulled their representatives out of electoral commissions at
all levels, the system collapsed, Kocharian complained
bitterly. Citing President Bush's pledge to support leaders
working to build democracy, the Ambassador pressed Kocharian
to ensure all relevant government structures worked with U.S.
programs aimed at building Armenia's democratic institutions.
End Summary.


2. (C) On January 17 the Ambassador and DCM met with
President Kocharian to discuss USG expectations regarding
Armenia's eligibility for funding from the Millennium
Challenge Corporation. The Ambassador thanked President
Kocharian for Foreign Minister Oskanian's detailed January 12
response to MCC CEO Danilovich's December 16 letter. While
Oskanian's letter (forwarded to EUR/CACEN) did much to assure
the USG of Armenia's commitment to ensuring Armenia's
elections in 2007 and 2008 meet democratic standards, the
letter did not respond adequately to the MCC challenge to
acknowledge allegations of wrongdoing during the November
referendum and to make a high-level public commitment to
investigate such allegations.


3. (C) Kocharian said that while other Armenian leaders had
made statements which -- to varying degrees -- called the
results of the referendum into question, he, as Armenia's
president, could not do so without calling into question the
very validity of the Republic's constitution, and, by
extension, the validity of Armenia's democratic institutions
and any future elections held under the rules established by
the revisions approved in the November 27 ballot. He
complained bitterly about the opposition's decision to pull
out of electoral commissions across Armenia. Armenia's
electoral law relied on checks and balances, Kocharian
explained, and when the opposition pulled all of its members
from the 1800 or so local-level electoral commissions
throughout Armenia, only those parties advocating passage of
the referendum were left.


4. (C) Kocharian said that with the exception of the few
precincts called into question by observers from the Council
of Europe, there were no official complaints registered with
the proper authorities. None of the parties who had spoken
out about alleged problems, including the opposition, the
Speaker of the Parliament, or the hundreds of local observers
trained for three years by NDI, filed a single complaint. By
that measure, he continued, Armenia should be proud to have
conducted the "most proper referendum" held in Europe in
recent memory. He acknowledged that even he privately
questioned the reported turnout of one and a half million
voters, but without a formal complaint to act on, the
Prosecutor General could take no action. He said that he had
instructed the Prosecutor General to write letters to all of
the news outlets and politicians who had made allegations of
ballot-stuffing, requesting that they present their evidence
for further investigation and prosecution. The Prosecutor
received no responses.


5. (C) Kocharian said that he was concerned that the USG
might be using MCC funding to ask Armenia to carry out random
arrests. He asked rhetorically whether he should round up
all of the election officials who worked during the
referendum and ask for 50 patriotic volunteers to go to jail
so that the MCC criteria would be met and the development
assistance would flow. "The MCC is your program, and it is
your money, so you must do what you will," said Kocharian.
He said that he was convinced that the harm to Armenia caused
by making a statement which called the legitimacy of the
constitution into question was greater than the good the MCC
Compact would bring to Armenia.


6. (C) The Ambassador said that the USG was not asking
Kocharian to overturn the results of the referendum and,
citing the relevant law, pointed out that both Oskanian's
letter and Kocharian's own exposition were incorrect: the
GOAM could institute an investigation into election results
without a formal complainant. President Bush -- who launched
the MCC -- declared his readiness to support leaders who were
bringing their countries closer to democracy, the Ambassador
explained, and we believe a recognition of some of the
shortcomings of the referendum would strengthen, not weaken
Armenia's democracy.

Comment
--------------


7. (C) Oskanian's January 12 letter fulfils most of the USG
requirements set out in the MCC letter. Kocharian's own
response from December 22 to Ambassador Danilovich made a
firm commitment to sustaining democratic reforms and made a
pledge to cooperate with us and others "in order to improve
the political processes leading up to the elections of 2007 -
2008." Still missing from the GOAM responses, obviously, is
any commitment to acknowledge officially the shortcomings of
the referendum and any pledge to carry out an investigation
to determine responsibility for the apparently grossly
inflated turnout results.


8. (C) In deciding how to proceed, the USG needs to balance
the benefit to regional stability which would be gained
through implementation of the MCC Compact against the
desirability of the GOAM's taking responsibility for rigging
the November 27 referendum. We should also factor in the
significant investment already made in preparing the Compact
to this point. The MCC funding is a significant incentive,
but also one that we believe should be used effectively. We
would support an MCC board decision to move forward with
compact signing and implementation, but not without keeping
the pressure on the Armenians on the democracy building
front. Our focus has now shifted squarely to preparing for
elections in 2007 and 2008. We are sure that strong outside
motivation like the MCC funding will aid our work in building
democratic institutions here.


9. (C) We think the next step is for the MCC to respond to
Oskanian's letter by announcing a board decision to move
toward a compact signing. In this response, which we believe
should be sent to President Kocharian, we propose that we
describe Oskanian's statement of "regret that the referendum
had become the occasion for doubt and irregularities" as the
GOAM public acknowlegement we sought. We also ask that the
letter make a call for the GOAM to re-commit to close
cooperation with the USG and other entities seeking to
improve democratic institutions in preparation for upcoming
elections.
EVANS