ARMENIA AND IRAN: KOCHARIAN WISHES HE HAD A

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 YEREVAN 000715 SIPDIS NSC FOR MERKEL DEPARTMENT FOR EUR (BRYZA) AND EUR/CARC (ROOD) E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/25/2016 TAGS: PREL ENRG KNNP IR AM SUBJECT: ARMENIA AND IRAN: KOCHARIAN WISHES HE HAD A DIFFERENT NEIGHBOR REF: YEREVAN 693 Classified By: Ambassador John M. Evans for reason 1.4 (b, d) Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) With U.S. concerns about Iran peaking, so are Armenia's concerns about how the U.S. and the international community will respond to Armenia's attempts to maintain a vestige of neighborly relations with its southern neighbor. As Armenia had only two open international borders, President Kocharian told the Ambassador, Iran would be essential to any long-term economic development for Armenia. One could not pick one's neighbors, Kocharian said, and Ahmadi-Najad was likely to be Iran's leader for years to come. Kocharian told the Ambassador that Iran was insisting on a presidential visit to seal a deal essential for Armenia's energy security. The Ambassador told Kocharian that this was "not the time for business as usual" and pressed him to consider the broader political and security goals of the international community and urged Armenia to be a part of this effort. Washington would find it very difficult to understand any steps which would give the impression that Armenia seeks to lend international legitimacy to the highly irresponsible actions of the current Iranian leadership. End Summary. Pressing the Armenians on the Reactor Safety Conference -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) The Ambassador met with President Kocharian on May 24 to convey our concern that Armenia would host the 12th Annual Forum of State Nuclear Safety Authorities of the Countries Operating VVER-type Reactors in June to which Iran was invited to attend as an observer (ref). The Ambassador also met earlier on the same day with Deputy Foreign Minister Kirakossian to discuss details of the same issue. ¶3. (C) The Ambassador told Kirakossian that the USG was doubly disappointed, as the GOAM had originally signaled it would not be holding the conference. Kirakossian expressed his regret that the previous decision had been reversed. He told the Ambassador that Russia had refused to hold the conference in Armenia's place and that other states-members had also refused to take Armenia's turn. He added that the decision to invite Iran as an observer was not taken in Armenia and that there were other states parties engaged in this process. Kirakossian told the Ambassador that the issue had occasioned a meeting including the MFA, the Ministry of Energy, the Chair of Armenia's Atomic Energy Commission and Vartan Ayvazian, Minister of Nature Protection. It was Ayvazian, reported Kirakossian, who successfully appealed to Kocharian to have the decision reversed, since no other state-party had agreed to host. Ambassador: "No Time for Business as Usual with Iran" -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) Kocharian told the Ambassador that he had, indeed, given an instruction to try to find a way out of hosting the conference. Referring to statements made by U/S Burns, the Ambassador said that this was "not the time for business as usual with Iran." The USG regretted that Armenia planned to move ahead with the conference. He gave Kocharian a statement by A/S Rademaker which clearly laid out the flaws and contradictions in statements made by the Government of Iran with regard to their plans to develop nuclear energy. He underscored to Kocharian that the type of reactor Iran sought to bring on line was not even of the same type as that which the other states-members of VVER reactors now manage. Kocharian said that he would prefer "not to have this headache," but that the decision had been made to host the conference. Kocharian: Project with Iran for Armenia's Energy Security -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) Kocharian broadened the discussion to include other aspects of Armenia's relationship with Iran in this difficult time. Armenia's energy security depends on completing a complicated, expensive deal involving Iran and Russia. The three parts of the policy are interlocked, he explained, and without any one of the parts, the entire policy would fail. Armenia sold a still-incomplete gas-fired power plant to RAO-UES with a guarantee of investment so the unit will be highly efficient. The second part of the policy is the pipeline from Iran, which is still under construction. The third part of the policy is the construction of a high-voltage transmission line to Iran. This part is essential, Kocharian explained, because it is what makes the other two economically viable. When the project is complete, energy security for the entire region, including for Georgia, he stressed, would be enhanced. Iran Insisting on Kocharian Visit to Close Deal -------------- -- ¶6. (C) Kocharian told the Ambassador that Iran is now holding up the deal for the high-voltage line until he makes a visit to Iran. The Energy Minister had signed the deal, Kocharian said, but the agreement required the approval of Iran's Parliament and of several banks, and the Iranians were insisting that he needs to be present for the event. He had been putting off the visit -- which Kocharian said should have taken place in April -- but the Iranian Embassy in Yerevan was contacting his staff twice a week with requests to confirm a date. Wishing Armenia Could Choose Different Neighbors -------------- --- ¶7. (C) Kocharian said that Iran was Armenia's neighbor and, as much as he would like to, he could not change that. Ahmadi-Najad was elected for four years; would the U.S. ask Armenia not to have a relationship with its neighbor for such a long period? What if he were re-elected? He was convinced that Iran would not change its policy on moving forward with nuclear research; the issue had become one of national pride, and reason no longer entered into their decision-making process. Kocharian said that he had had frank discussions with Rafsanjani; perhaps he would be able to serve as a conduit for key messages to Iran from the international community. ¶8. (C) What concerned him most, Kocharian told the Ambassador, was the likelihood that Armenia would suffer for the misfortune of having Iran as a neighbor. He was concerned that the U.S. would punish Armenia should he travel to Iran, but hoped that the U.S. would consider Armenia's position. "So what if the President of a little country visits Iran; that does not constitute a threat to U.S. national security. Would not a response to such a visit be an emotional reaction?" asked Kocharian. Ambassador: Hard to Understand Visit to Iran -------------- ¶9. (C) The Ambassador urged Kocharian to think beyond Armenia's immediate economic interests and consider the work the entire international community was trying to accomplish. We were not asking Iran to do anything it should not be prepared to do already; surely abiding by international treaties was not a shameful thing. It would be difficult to understand, the Ambassador cautioned, if Armenia's leader were to travel to Iran at this time. A visit by a lower-level leader, like the Minister of Energy, would be far easier to explain. A visit of a head of state was always taken for its symbolic value. ¶10. (C) Kocharian acknowledged that he understood how problematic a visit would be. He told the Ambassador that if he could get the deal done without a visit, he would surely not go. If he had to go to Iran, he would limit the scope of the visit, and would try to have it downgraded to a "working visit" without all the accompanying events which Iran wanted to include. Kocharian pledged to let us know in advance if his plans to visit Iran became concrete. (Note: We understand from other sources that the timeframe under consideration is July. End Note.) Comment -------------- ¶11. (C) Kocharian has decided that he has no choice but to host the nuclear safety conference to which Iran is invited. As it appears that this conference will go ahead, we suggest an approach to all states-members to urge them to deliver a strong message during the conference. Kocharian's plea for understanding on Armenia's relationship with Iran is understandable from a local perspective, but not from a broader viewpoint. We were disappointed that Kocharian did not agree that the international community's broader political and security goals should outweigh Armenia's shorter-term economic needs. Armenians, Kocharian included, fear the loss of what they view as their lifeline to the south. EVANS