N-K: KOCHARIAN'S PRIME-TIME INTERVIEW

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 YEREVAN 000315

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SUBJECT: N-K: KOCHARIAN'S PRIME-TIME INTERVIEW


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KOCHARIAN TALKS ABOUT N-K AND RAMBOUILLET
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1. (SBU) In a rare, 45-minute television interview
aired live on March 2, President Kocharian addressed
Nagorno-Karabakh and OSCE-Minsk Group-led
negotiations at Rambouillet in February. Looking
fully at ease and in complete control of the scene,
Kocharian answered questions from a carefully
selected group of journalists. Kocharian said the
failure to reach agreement on a settlement at
Rambouillet was "not tragic." Expectations of some,
including the Co-Chairs, were inflated, he noted.
He praised the work of the Co-Chairs, however, and
looked forward to continuing negotiations. He
dismissed the suggestion that the "government" of
Nagorno-Karabakh should become a party to
negotiations. Kocharian also speculated what
Armenia might do were the negotiations to break down
irretrievably.

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FULL TEXT OF KOCHARIAN'S INTERVIEW
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2. (U) The full text of Kocharian's March 2
interview follows (informal embassy translation).
Begin text:

Question: Mr. President, the Karabakh settlement
topic again appeared on the front pages of Armenian
media outlets. It happens from time to time. When,
with the assistance of the Co-Chairs the topic
becomes "hot," expectations increase. After the
negotiations in Rambouillet, a phase of
disappointment started again. Expectations had
grown, the population hoped that some interesting
agreements might be reached, but now it has turned
into a deep disappointment. How do you evaluate the
talks in Rambouillet, and how do you see the further
"road" to a settlement?

President Kocharian: Nothing tragic happened in
Rambouillet. We could not reach an agreement on one
important principle. But during all our meetings
there always had been issues and points on which we
would find some common ground, and there were issues
on which we were not able to agree.

The question is, where does this disappointment come
from? I am confident that it is based on
exaggerated expectations. We should explain why the
expectations were high. First of all, there were
optimistic announcements prior to the Rambouillet
meeting which were voiced by mediators and officials
from different international organizations. There
was also simply the fact that we had a dedicated
meeting in Rambouillet. Until then, for two years,
all our meetings were held parallel to other
international events, where presidents of different
countries gathered together. Within the frameworks
of those meetings we were also holding separate
negotiations on Karabakh. No expectations, in
contrast to this particular case, were anticipated
back then. The invitation of the French President
and his involvement also added to this anticipation.
All this together created a certain psychological
atmosphere -- everybody expected some culmination, a
solution, which did not happen. In reality the
negotiation process did not correspond to
expectations. This is certain. There might be
another question raised. Why was this atmosphere
created? This also has a clear answer. It is
linked to the fact that many hopes are linked to the
year of 2006. There are no elections in Armenia and
Azerbaijan. 2007 and 2008 are going to be difficult
for Armenia and the issue might become a hostage of
the pre-election atmosphere. There was a serious
enough impact of the intention to find principles of
regulations before the G-8 meeting in Saint
Petersburg. This was a serious factor, and the Co-
Chairs thought that if they came to the G-8 meeting
with an agreement on the settlement principles, this
would be the best guarantee; the international
community would do its best to support the
implementation of agreements. From all points of
view: security issues, economic assistance,
financial aid and of course, political. All these
timeframes were pushing to accelerate the process.
Actually, this is the reason, and the desire was to
a certain extent supported by the possibility of
what the sides would win if they came to an
agreement. This failed. What are we going to do
now? We will continue negotiations. After the
meeting of the foreign ministers the negotiations'
speed will become clearer. I tried to explain what
the expectations were and where the disappointment
came from.

Question: So, excuse me, this was not Key West?

President Kocharian: No.

Question: The Co-Chairs created for themselves an
atmosphere of expectations and therefore they must
work to make them come true. Are they actually
doing this?

President Kocharian: They certainly do. They had
hopes also because there were agreements on a number
of principles. But, we had no expectations that we
would overcome the disagreements around that one
issue. I had no great expectations here. For that
reason, in Sweden I said, "with cautious optimism,"
and even added "I am very cautiously optimistic."
It should be objectively stated that we had some
positive achievements, but settlement of the
conflict is such a complex issue that we can agree
upon, for instance, about 15 principles or points --
and disagreement on one issue will mean that the
process will not start. Or we will have to review
the whole package. Or we must find solutions to
that one issue.

Question: Mr. President, do you consider the
current format of the negotiations the best? Is it
not necessary for Nagorno-Karabakh also to be
included in the negotiations? Perhaps there will be
favorable conditions for us if, instead of the
leaders of the Republic of Armenia, NKR leaders
negotiate with Azerbaijan.

President Kocharian: I think there is a certain
misunderstanding about this. Karabakh in reality
takes part in the negotiation process. Karabakh's
direct participation has an asymmetric nature and is
not a full participation. When the Co-Chairs come
to Armenia, they always meet with the Karabakh
authorities. The OSCE Chairman in Office
necessarily meets. There has not been a single
meeting with the Azeri President, before and after
which I would not consult with the NKR president.
The same takes place during the meetings of the
Foreign Ministers. Karabakh is involved, is part of
the process, but does not participate in the format
of the Armenian and Azeri Presidents' meetings.
Now, regarding the second part of the question: we
must try to understand the format, which in reality
does not correspond to the format of the conflict.
In reality, the format of the conflict is Nagorno-
Karabakh-Azerbaijan, with Armenia's active
involvement. The format of the negotiations is
somewhat different and does not correspond to the
format of the conflict. The format that we have
today . . . does it bring only negative
consequences, or does it also have a great positive
potential? For instance, what is "negative?" First
of all, that Azerbaijan is trying to use this format
in parallel with trying to accuse Armenia of
aggression and capturing of territories. This is
the negative factor. I will clearly say that those
facts do not interest anyone anymore. Everybody
knows the essence of the conflict and everyone
understands that Azerbaijan's refusal to negotiate
with Karabakh comes rather from a psychological
complex. This is connected with the consequences of
the war. This is a clear situation for everyone.
This negative factor is somewhat neutralized by a
thorough understanding of the nature of the
conflict. What do we gain from this situation?
First and foremost: Armenia can defend the
interests of the Armenian side with much greater
efficiency. During the negotiations the status of
the sides is very important, and it is much easier
to disregard the interests of an unrecognized
republic, than the interests of a recognized state.
There is an issue of status at the negotiation
table. Second: Again, as an active side of the
negotiations, I have far greater opportunities to
present the Karabakh issue at all meetings, as one
who bears direct responsibility for the
negotiations. The same refers to the Armenian
Minister of Foreign Affairs. Probably nobody doubts
that it is hard to compare the level of the Armenian
President and the Foreign Minister's meetings, with
the level and frequency of the NKR president and
Foreign Minister's meetings. Thus, we have had a
first-hand opportunity for years to actively
represent the Karabakh issue, and not act as a
facilitator. This is also a great resource. The
third advantage: the involvement of the Armenian
President increases the level of responsibility of
Armenia toward N-K, with all Armenia's potential --
in diplomacy, economics, and defense -- to strive
for the regulation of this problem. Is this a
serious situation? Of course, yes. Those three
circumstances explain the fact that Armenian
participation has had a positive result in terms of
getting proposals which can serve as bases for the
negotiations. Otherwise, it would be easier for me
to say, "You know, the Armenian side agrees with any
decision which is negotiated with N-K," and to move
aside. This has been done before. At that time we
were getting proposals that could not serve as
foundations, and should have been rejected right
from the start. This came from the different
statuses and appropriate application of the
negotiation process. So, what shall we do? I think
we should work towards a more active involvement of
N-K in the negotiation process. Of course, the best
would have been to have the Armenian, Azeri and N-K
presidents sit around the negotiation table. N-K
should be represented by its legal authorities and
not as "Armenian-Azeri" communities as was attempted
in the early 1990s. This is the worst. The best is
the participation of three sides. Now we should try
to work towards involving Karabakh more. Not
replacing Armenia or decreasing its role.
Otherwise, as a result we will have great losses.
Addressing directly the N-K population I will say,
"You should worry when the Armenian President starts
to avoid taking on this responsibility, tries to
move aside and takes on the role of onlooker. You
should worry at that point. It would mean either
that the Armenian President does not believe in a
positive outcome, or does not have enough strength
to move the process ahead.

Reporter: In this regard we have nothing to worry
about.

President Kocharian: No, but recent statements and
developments show that there are people who either
do not understand these nuances or try to fish for
something for different agendas.

Question: Recently in Armenia, as well as abroad,
an idea is circulating that the regulation of the
Kosovo conflict has mechanisms, which might be
successfully applied in Armenia as well. Is this
possibility acceptable for us?

President Kocharian: I will try to answer this
question in a larger context. Generally, I consider
as very positive the tendencies which exist nowadays
in the world regarding the regulation of similar
conflicts. There is much more attention being paid
to the principle of self-determination of nations.
If we try evaluating in retrospect the conflicts
which have been settled in recent years, we will see
that all of them adhere to this principle -- the
independence of Eritrea and Eastern Timor by means
of referendum. Nobody doubts what will be the
result of the Kosovo conflict settlement.
Montenegro is awaiting a referendum. The question
of the Palestinian state does not leave any doubts
either, even for the authorities of Israel. Another
example is the treaty signed in Sudan on the North-
South conflict. The principle of the settlement of
all of these conflicts is the application of the
right to self-determination. In this respect, year
after year our position in the negotiation process
becomes stronger. Today it is much easier to talk
about N-K conflict resolution with the external
world from that point of view. The tendencies are
positive and everyone understands that the principle
of territorial integrity -- while very important --
is often used as tool for justification of violence
against national minority groups. From this point
of view I look very positively on the continuation
of the negotiation process, since the current
examples, beyond doubt, create an opportunity for
the Armenian side to work more effectively in this
direction.

Question: In my first question I referred to the
work of the Co-Chairs. I would like to go into
further details. Years ago there was an impression
that they were hindering each other's work. Later
you mentioned that they work together and that their
collaboration is very successful. How do you
evaluate the work of the Co-Chairs? Also, please
address the statement of the Russian President made
in Azerbaijan. What is your opinion?

President Kocharian: As to the work of the Co-
Chairs, I am sure they are doing the best they can
within the framework of their mandates. Today they
are called upon to support the sides in finding a
solution, and I keep asking myself what I would do
in their place to offer support. And I have a hard
time answering this question. They are able to act
only within the framework of their authorities.
There is no evidence of any contradiction or attempt
to take away initiatives from each other. There has
not been such a thing for the past seven to eight
years, not to mention the last one to two years.
This may be the reason why we, regardless of all the
difficulties, have nevertheless come a long way.
This is also the reason why we had Key West where we
came close, and we had Rambouillet when in reality
we were very close as well. As to the statement of
the Russian President, I know what reaction it
caused in Armenia. I have not felt any pressure
aimed at imposing anything on me, any imperialistic
tones during that conversation. It was a friendly
exchange of opinions. As to what happened in Baku
... During the discussion, the Russian President
had an impression that the obstacle which led to
failure in Rambouillet could be overcome. Because
of those impressions he immediately told the press
that he would make an invitation call. This is only
a manifestation of the goodwill of someone who
sincerely wishes that the issue can come to some
kind of solution. I also understand why Armenia's
reaction was as it was. Probably because the
majority had the impression that there was an
agreement reached regarding some issues in Baku,
which they wanted to try and impose on Armenia, a
decision unfavorable for Armenia, containing
elements of betrayal. I want to say that it is not
so, and that our relations with Russia and personal
relations with the Russian President simply exclude
such possibilities. We have not established an
exact date for our meeting, but we have discussed
over the phone many details regarding the settlement
of the issue. We agreed to be in touch and set up a
date for meeting on this issue. Can you see now
what assumptions can arise around a simple issue,
even when no one ever had bad intentions? I believe
the Russian President did not even think that
whatever he said at the press conference could have
such an effect in Armenia. I am sure that he could
not even have imagined such a reaction.

Question: In an interview with one Turkish
newspaper, the president of Azerbaijan stated that
official Baku preferred not to follow the route of
finding solutions to difficult decisions, but simply
to keep delaying the process, because "time works in
favor of Azeri side." What is your attitude toward
this statement? What will Armenia's strategy be?

President Kocharian: If the Azeri side is sure that
time is working in its favor, then why do they
participate in the negotiation process at all? If
they participate purely as an act, this is a
possibility. This could be explained by the failure
in Rambouillet. But there could be another
explanation here. Each solution presupposes having
to make difficult decisions -- both in Azerbaijan as
well as in Armenia and Karabakh. A situation has
arisen, and there are some issues, and it seems that
all sides have adjusted to it. Changes in this
situation will create new issues both for internal
and other structures which will require new
decisions. And if you are not ready to exercise
sufficient political will to make decisions, then
one of the good explanations for that, of course,
will be that time is working for us, so why should
we opt now for certain solutions if we might have
better solutions in future.

I could say the same thing, thus substantiating the
position of avoiding a solution. They say "We have
oil, we can get rich by oil (always comparing the
Armenian budget to the Azeri budget) and from
stronger positions we can force them to make the
decision we want." I would like to discuss the
substance of that question. Having oil does not
mean having an efficient economy and an army worthy
of battle. In any case, the world's experience
shows that the most developed countries are not
those who have oil. I just don't think that linking
these two questions is correct. We could even say
the opposite. In many oil countries, the oil factor
demoralizes the economy in terms of growth in
corruption, and creation of a clan economy.
Something else is also obvious. The oil factor also
diminishes the dedication to reforms. In this case,
we should speak about an efficient economy and the
thoroughness of reform. This, and not simply the
volume of oil resources, will define the
competitiveness of a country in the region.

You know, when we speak about moral factors, for
example, in Armenia it is impossible that society
would ever make a hero of a criminal who beheaded a
sleeping man with an axe. This is just impossible.
I am sure, that a society which is in this kind of
psychological state, could not ever be successful.
This is our greatest advantage and strength.

Question: Mr. President suppose the negotiations
fail for some reason. They enter a deadlock and
stop. What will be the reaction of the Armenian
side?

President Kocharian: That would be the worst-case
scenario, but the Armenian side must be ready for
that as well. I would not like to go deep into the
details of that scenario, in the context of certain
tactical failures. In Rambouillet, something did
not work, we will still continue to negotiate.
There are chances for moving forward. If a certain
moment comes when Azerbaijan clearly says that time
is on their side and "we will strengthen our army
and later will solve the Karabakh issue with the
right of force..." then our actions will be as
follows. First: de jure recognition of the NKR by
the Republic of Armenia. Second: creating a legal
foundation for the Republic of Armenia's
responsibility for the security of N-K's people. A
number of agreements would be signed, which would
mean that any aggression toward N-K were an
aggression against Armenia. Third: of course,
strengthening of the security zone, which currently
is formed around Karabakh. Strengthening of the
security zone would be based on new approaches, to
be exact. I don't want to open a parenthesis here.
And, of course, a more active process would begin in
terms of our response to defense issues.

Most importantly, realizing that there is such a
situation, we must work better, carry out more
thorough reforms in Armenia in order to be more
competitive in the region, and to ensure economic
growth and the formation of a productive economy. I
am sure that our people have capacity within them.
I have no doubt about that.

Reporter: Thank you, Mr. President for an
interesting interview.

President Kocharian: Thank you. The issue was
being discussed a lot, and I thought that such a
meeting would provide the opportunity to offer
important clarifications on a number of issues.

End Text.
EVANS