N-K: KOCHARIAN'S PRIME-TIME INTERVIEW

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 YEREVAN 000315 SIPDIS SENSITIVE DEPT FOR EUR/CARC, EUR/SNEC E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PGOV AJ AM SUBJECT: N-K: KOCHARIAN'S PRIME-TIME INTERVIEW -------------- KOCHARIAN TALKS ABOUT N-K AND RAMBOUILLET -------------- ¶1. (SBU) In a rare, 45-minute television interview aired live on March 2, President Kocharian addressed Nagorno-Karabakh and OSCE-Minsk Group-led negotiations at Rambouillet in February. Looking fully at ease and in complete control of the scene, Kocharian answered questions from a carefully selected group of journalists. Kocharian said the failure to reach agreement on a settlement at Rambouillet was "not tragic." Expectations of some, including the Co-Chairs, were inflated, he noted. He praised the work of the Co-Chairs, however, and looked forward to continuing negotiations. He dismissed the suggestion that the "government" of Nagorno-Karabakh should become a party to negotiations. Kocharian also speculated what Armenia might do were the negotiations to break down irretrievably. -------------- FULL TEXT OF KOCHARIAN'S INTERVIEW -------------- ¶2. (U) The full text of Kocharian's March 2 interview follows (informal embassy translation). Begin text: Question: Mr. President, the Karabakh settlement topic again appeared on the front pages of Armenian media outlets. It happens from time to time. When, with the assistance of the Co-Chairs the topic becomes "hot," expectations increase. After the negotiations in Rambouillet, a phase of disappointment started again. Expectations had grown, the population hoped that some interesting agreements might be reached, but now it has turned into a deep disappointment. How do you evaluate the talks in Rambouillet, and how do you see the further "road" to a settlement? President Kocharian: Nothing tragic happened in Rambouillet. We could not reach an agreement on one important principle. But during all our meetings there always had been issues and points on which we would find some common ground, and there were issues on which we were not able to agree. The question is, where does this disappointment come from? I am confident that it is based on exaggerated expectations. We should explain why the expectations were high. First of all, there were optimistic announcements prior to the Rambouillet meeting which were voiced by mediators and officials from different international organizations. There was also simply the fact that we had a dedicated meeting in Rambouillet. Until then, for two years, all our meetings were held parallel to other international events, where presidents of different countries gathered together. Within the frameworks of those meetings we were also holding separate negotiations on Karabakh. No expectations, in contrast to this particular case, were anticipated back then. The invitation of the French President and his involvement also added to this anticipation. All this together created a certain psychological atmosphere -- everybody expected some culmination, a solution, which did not happen. In reality the negotiation process did not correspond to expectations. This is certain. There might be another question raised. Why was this atmosphere created? This also has a clear answer. It is linked to the fact that many hopes are linked to the year of 2006. There are no elections in Armenia and Azerbaijan. 2007 and 2008 are going to be difficult for Armenia and the issue might become a hostage of the pre-election atmosphere. There was a serious enough impact of the intention to find principles of regulations before the G-8 meeting in Saint Petersburg. This was a serious factor, and the Co- Chairs thought that if they came to the G-8 meeting with an agreement on the settlement principles, this would be the best guarantee; the international community would do its best to support the implementation of agreements. From all points of view: security issues, economic assistance, financial aid and of course, political. All these timeframes were pushing to accelerate the process. Actually, this is the reason, and the desire was to a certain extent supported by the possibility of what the sides would win if they came to an agreement. This failed. What are we going to do now? We will continue negotiations. After the meeting of the foreign ministers the negotiations' speed will become clearer. I tried to explain what the expectations were and where the disappointment came from. Question: So, excuse me, this was not Key West? President Kocharian: No. Question: The Co-Chairs created for themselves an atmosphere of expectations and therefore they must work to make them come true. Are they actually doing this? President Kocharian: They certainly do. They had hopes also because there were agreements on a number of principles. But, we had no expectations that we would overcome the disagreements around that one issue. I had no great expectations here. For that reason, in Sweden I said, "with cautious optimism," and even added "I am very cautiously optimistic." It should be objectively stated that we had some positive achievements, but settlement of the conflict is such a complex issue that we can agree upon, for instance, about 15 principles or points -- and disagreement on one issue will mean that the process will not start. Or we will have to review the whole package. Or we must find solutions to that one issue. Question: Mr. President, do you consider the current format of the negotiations the best? Is it not necessary for Nagorno-Karabakh also to be included in the negotiations? Perhaps there will be favorable conditions for us if, instead of the leaders of the Republic of Armenia, NKR leaders negotiate with Azerbaijan. President Kocharian: I think there is a certain misunderstanding about this. Karabakh in reality takes part in the negotiation process. Karabakh's direct participation has an asymmetric nature and is not a full participation. When the Co-Chairs come to Armenia, they always meet with the Karabakh authorities. The OSCE Chairman in Office necessarily meets. There has not been a single meeting with the Azeri President, before and after which I would not consult with the NKR president. The same takes place during the meetings of the Foreign Ministers. Karabakh is involved, is part of the process, but does not participate in the format of the Armenian and Azeri Presidents' meetings. Now, regarding the second part of the question: we must try to understand the format, which in reality does not correspond to the format of the conflict. In reality, the format of the conflict is Nagorno- Karabakh-Azerbaijan, with Armenia's active involvement. The format of the negotiations is somewhat different and does not correspond to the format of the conflict. The format that we have today . . . does it bring only negative consequences, or does it also have a great positive potential? For instance, what is "negative?" First of all, that Azerbaijan is trying to use this format in parallel with trying to accuse Armenia of aggression and capturing of territories. This is the negative factor. I will clearly say that those facts do not interest anyone anymore. Everybody knows the essence of the conflict and everyone understands that Azerbaijan's refusal to negotiate with Karabakh comes rather from a psychological complex. This is connected with the consequences of the war. This is a clear situation for everyone. This negative factor is somewhat neutralized by a thorough understanding of the nature of the conflict. What do we gain from this situation? First and foremost: Armenia can defend the interests of the Armenian side with much greater efficiency. During the negotiations the status of the sides is very important, and it is much easier to disregard the interests of an unrecognized republic, than the interests of a recognized state. There is an issue of status at the negotiation table. Second: Again, as an active side of the negotiations, I have far greater opportunities to present the Karabakh issue at all meetings, as one who bears direct responsibility for the negotiations. The same refers to the Armenian Minister of Foreign Affairs. Probably nobody doubts that it is hard to compare the level of the Armenian President and the Foreign Minister's meetings, with the level and frequency of the NKR president and Foreign Minister's meetings. Thus, we have had a first-hand opportunity for years to actively represent the Karabakh issue, and not act as a facilitator. This is also a great resource. The third advantage: the involvement of the Armenian President increases the level of responsibility of Armenia toward N-K, with all Armenia's potential -- in diplomacy, economics, and defense -- to strive for the regulation of this problem. Is this a serious situation? Of course, yes. Those three circumstances explain the fact that Armenian participation has had a positive result in terms of getting proposals which can serve as bases for the negotiations. Otherwise, it would be easier for me to say, "You know, the Armenian side agrees with any decision which is negotiated with N-K," and to move aside. This has been done before. At that time we were getting proposals that could not serve as foundations, and should have been rejected right from the start. This came from the different statuses and appropriate application of the negotiation process. So, what shall we do? I think we should work towards a more active involvement of N-K in the negotiation process. Of course, the best would have been to have the Armenian, Azeri and N-K presidents sit around the negotiation table. N-K should be represented by its legal authorities and not as "Armenian-Azeri" communities as was attempted in the early 1990s. This is the worst. The best is the participation of three sides. Now we should try to work towards involving Karabakh more. Not replacing Armenia or decreasing its role. Otherwise, as a result we will have great losses. Addressing directly the N-K population I will say, "You should worry when the Armenian President starts to avoid taking on this responsibility, tries to move aside and takes on the role of onlooker. You should worry at that point. It would mean either that the Armenian President does not believe in a positive outcome, or does not have enough strength to move the process ahead. Reporter: In this regard we have nothing to worry about. President Kocharian: No, but recent statements and developments show that there are people who either do not understand these nuances or try to fish for something for different agendas. Question: Recently in Armenia, as well as abroad, an idea is circulating that the regulation of the Kosovo conflict has mechanisms, which might be successfully applied in Armenia as well. Is this possibility acceptable for us? President Kocharian: I will try to answer this question in a larger context. Generally, I consider as very positive the tendencies which exist nowadays in the world regarding the regulation of similar conflicts. There is much more attention being paid to the principle of self-determination of nations. If we try evaluating in retrospect the conflicts which have been settled in recent years, we will see that all of them adhere to this principle -- the independence of Eritrea and Eastern Timor by means of referendum. Nobody doubts what will be the result of the Kosovo conflict settlement. Montenegro is awaiting a referendum. The question of the Palestinian state does not leave any doubts either, even for the authorities of Israel. Another example is the treaty signed in Sudan on the North- South conflict. The principle of the settlement of all of these conflicts is the application of the right to self-determination. In this respect, year after year our position in the negotiation process becomes stronger. Today it is much easier to talk about N-K conflict resolution with the external world from that point of view. The tendencies are positive and everyone understands that the principle of territorial integrity -- while very important -- is often used as tool for justification of violence against national minority groups. From this point of view I look very positively on the continuation of the negotiation process, since the current examples, beyond doubt, create an opportunity for the Armenian side to work more effectively in this direction. Question: In my first question I referred to the work of the Co-Chairs. I would like to go into further details. Years ago there was an impression that they were hindering each other's work. Later you mentioned that they work together and that their collaboration is very successful. How do you evaluate the work of the Co-Chairs? Also, please address the statement of the Russian President made in Azerbaijan. What is your opinion? President Kocharian: As to the work of the Co- Chairs, I am sure they are doing the best they can within the framework of their mandates. Today they are called upon to support the sides in finding a solution, and I keep asking myself what I would do in their place to offer support. And I have a hard time answering this question. They are able to act only within the framework of their authorities. There is no evidence of any contradiction or attempt to take away initiatives from each other. There has not been such a thing for the past seven to eight years, not to mention the last one to two years. This may be the reason why we, regardless of all the difficulties, have nevertheless come a long way. This is also the reason why we had Key West where we came close, and we had Rambouillet when in reality we were very close as well. As to the statement of the Russian President, I know what reaction it caused in Armenia. I have not felt any pressure aimed at imposing anything on me, any imperialistic tones during that conversation. It was a friendly exchange of opinions. As to what happened in Baku ... During the discussion, the Russian President had an impression that the obstacle which led to failure in Rambouillet could be overcome. Because of those impressions he immediately told the press that he would make an invitation call. This is only a manifestation of the goodwill of someone who sincerely wishes that the issue can come to some kind of solution. I also understand why Armenia's reaction was as it was. Probably because the majority had the impression that there was an agreement reached regarding some issues in Baku, which they wanted to try and impose on Armenia, a decision unfavorable for Armenia, containing elements of betrayal. I want to say that it is not so, and that our relations with Russia and personal relations with the Russian President simply exclude such possibilities. We have not established an exact date for our meeting, but we have discussed over the phone many details regarding the settlement of the issue. We agreed to be in touch and set up a date for meeting on this issue. Can you see now what assumptions can arise around a simple issue, even when no one ever had bad intentions? I believe the Russian President did not even think that whatever he said at the press conference could have such an effect in Armenia. I am sure that he could not even have imagined such a reaction. Question: In an interview with one Turkish newspaper, the president of Azerbaijan stated that official Baku preferred not to follow the route of finding solutions to difficult decisions, but simply to keep delaying the process, because "time works in favor of Azeri side." What is your attitude toward this statement? What will Armenia's strategy be? President Kocharian: If the Azeri side is sure that time is working in its favor, then why do they participate in the negotiation process at all? If they participate purely as an act, this is a possibility. This could be explained by the failure in Rambouillet. But there could be another explanation here. Each solution presupposes having to make difficult decisions -- both in Azerbaijan as well as in Armenia and Karabakh. A situation has arisen, and there are some issues, and it seems that all sides have adjusted to it. Changes in this situation will create new issues both for internal and other structures which will require new decisions. And if you are not ready to exercise sufficient political will to make decisions, then one of the good explanations for that, of course, will be that time is working for us, so why should we opt now for certain solutions if we might have better solutions in future. I could say the same thing, thus substantiating the position of avoiding a solution. They say "We have oil, we can get rich by oil (always comparing the Armenian budget to the Azeri budget) and from stronger positions we can force them to make the decision we want." I would like to discuss the substance of that question. Having oil does not mean having an efficient economy and an army worthy of battle. In any case, the world's experience shows that the most developed countries are not those who have oil. I just don't think that linking these two questions is correct. We could even say the opposite. In many oil countries, the oil factor demoralizes the economy in terms of growth in corruption, and creation of a clan economy. Something else is also obvious. The oil factor also diminishes the dedication to reforms. In this case, we should speak about an efficient economy and the thoroughness of reform. This, and not simply the volume of oil resources, will define the competitiveness of a country in the region. You know, when we speak about moral factors, for example, in Armenia it is impossible that society would ever make a hero of a criminal who beheaded a sleeping man with an axe. This is just impossible. I am sure, that a society which is in this kind of psychological state, could not ever be successful. This is our greatest advantage and strength. Question: Mr. President suppose the negotiations fail for some reason. They enter a deadlock and stop. What will be the reaction of the Armenian side? President Kocharian: That would be the worst-case scenario, but the Armenian side must be ready for that as well. I would not like to go deep into the details of that scenario, in the context of certain tactical failures. In Rambouillet, something did not work, we will still continue to negotiate. There are chances for moving forward. If a certain moment comes when Azerbaijan clearly says that time is on their side and "we will strengthen our army and later will solve the Karabakh issue with the right of force..." then our actions will be as follows. First: de jure recognition of the NKR by the Republic of Armenia. Second: creating a legal foundation for the Republic of Armenia's responsibility for the security of N-K's people. A number of agreements would be signed, which would mean that any aggression toward N-K were an aggression against Armenia. Third: of course, strengthening of the security zone, which currently is formed around Karabakh. Strengthening of the security zone would be based on new approaches, to be exact. I don't want to open a parenthesis here. And, of course, a more active process would begin in terms of our response to defense issues. Most importantly, realizing that there is such a situation, we must work better, carry out more thorough reforms in Armenia in order to be more competitive in the region, and to ensure economic growth and the formation of a productive economy. I am sure that our people have capacity within them. I have no doubt about that. Reporter: Thank you, Mr. President for an interesting interview. President Kocharian: Thank you. The issue was being discussed a lot, and I thought that such a meeting would provide the opportunity to offer important clarifications on a number of issues. End Text. EVANS