ARMENIAN BODY POLITIC: FEARING A DEAL ON N-K

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 YEREVAN 000189 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/SNEC, EUR/CACEN E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV AJ AM SUBJECT: ARMENIAN BODY POLITIC: FEARING A DEAL ON N-K REF: 05 YEREVAN 583 Classified By: Amb. John M. Evans for reasons 1.4 (b, d). -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Despite the fact that only a handful of people in the GOAM have any concrete information about the state of the discussions on Nagorno-Karabakh (N-K),the Armenian political class is clearly concerned that a deal might well be in the works. In contrast to senior government officials' public efforts to lay the groundwork for a potential settlement, opposition politicians, think-tankers and intelligentsia, as well as various N-K representatives have markedly increased the negative tenor of the rhetoric surrounding a possible settlement recently. End Summary. -------------- -------------- MINISTER OF DEFENSE LAYS THE GROUND FOR COMPROMISE -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) In a series of public statements, including a long interview with the Russian-language "Golos Armenii," Minister of Defense Serzh Sargsian clearly underlined the need to compromise. He commented, "The idea of giving up land is not dear to me, but peace is expensive." Although he continued to note that Armenia was not placing all its hopes in a peaceful solution to the conflict, the overall tone of Sargsian's comments was clearly aimed at preparing the Armenian public for the possibility of a settlement, and for the necessity of compromise in order to achieve peace. (Note: Since his first use of the word "concessions" during National Assembly hearings on N-K in March 2005, Sargsian has consistently sounded moderate, even conciliatory, notes in his public comments on the issue. End Note.) -------------- OPPOSITION MAY NOT BE WILLING TO SIGN ON -------------- ¶3. (C) Although in one-on-one conversations the opposition leaders we've met have all said that they would support, or at least not impede, a solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict even if it meant supporting President Kocharian (and the only thing that unifies the various factions of the opposition is an almost visceral hatred of Kocharian),in public they've been much less temperate. Member of the National Assembly and leader of the Democratic Party Aram G. Sargsian (not to be confused with Republic Party leader Aram ¶Z. Sargsian) has called any settlement that might involve the 
deployment of peacekeepers "treason" because, he insists, the "deployment of peacekeepers presumes NATO forces" which would harm Armenia's interests with Iran and would harm Armenia's relationship with Russia. While other opposition leaders construct their public arguments with a somewhat larger nod to reason, they nonetheless argue that the current round of negotiations cannot be serious because Kocharian and his allies "could never negotiate seriously." -------------- THINK-TANKERS AND N-K REPS OUT OF THE LOOP -------------- ¶4. (C) In a series of recent public seminars and symposia, organized by international NGOs as well as local Armenian groups, think-tankers and self-appointed members of the intelligentsia have bemoaned the fact that they are not an integral part of the process. While it might be easy to trivialize some of their comments (including a long diatribe by one prominent university professor excoriating a report he subsequently admitted he hadn't actually read),the fact remains that Yerevan's political class is, for the most part, not invested in any resolution in which they have not been involved. The same is largely true for representatives from Nagorno-Karabakh, who complain bitterly that they are not "party" to any discussions on their fate. -------------- NATIONAL ASSEMBLY RELEASES ITS REPORT -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Nearly a year after the National Assembly hearings on Nagorno-Karabakh (reftel),the National Assembly issued its final report, clearly attempting to carve out a more significant role for itself in any possible upcoming resolution to the conflict. The report put heavy emphasis on the issue of the status of N-K and on the principle of self-determination. In particular, the report stipulated that "(the) status issue was and remains the main issue of the conflict, its main subject. The status must express utmost correctly and completely the historic, legal and political realities of the problem and take into account the character and quality of relations existing between the conflicting sides." -------------- COMMENT: FEAR OF SUCCESS -------------- ¶6. (C) With the increasing public activity by both Presidents Kocharian and Aliyev, the Armenian public, while maintaining a definite cynicism about the possibility for resolving the conflict, is clearly nervous that the status quo might change. Even among those people who are most likely to agree that Armenia can only "fulfill its destiny" once the conflict is resolved, the uncertain nature of a possible resolution has left many Armenians prefering the current situation over an uncertain future with "no guarantees." EVANS