POST CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR POSSIBLE NATURAL GAS

C O N F I D E N T I A L YEREVAN 001697 SIPDIS SIPDIS FOR EUR-IO/EX, S/ES-O/CMS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2011 TAGS: AMGT ABUD ADCP ENRG AM SUBJECT: POST CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR POSSIBLE NATURAL GAS CRISIS REF: YEREVAN 1687 Classified By: CDA A.F. Godfrey, for reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) Reftel outlined the risks that the political crisis between Russia and Georgia may result in a cutoff of Russian natural gas supplies to Armenia this winter. Our contacts suggest that if such a cutoff takes place, it would likely be of relatively short duration, as it was in January 2006. This should create no serious problems for post operations. However, there remains a significant possibility of an extended interruption in gas supplies to Armenia, which would be more problematic. Armenia has sufficient gas reserves on hand to last anywhere from 2-4 weeks, depending on a number of variables, especialy the weather and how aggressively the GOAM acts to curtail energy consumption. ¶2. (C) Embassy Yerevan's NEC and post's residential housing pool rely primarily on electrical power (significantly derived from the Hrazdan gas-fired power plant). Post has approximately 2-3 weeks supply of diesel fuel on hand to power back-up generators at the NEC and embassy residences. Anticipating the possible need, post used a significant tranche of end-of-year funds to purchase diesel fuel on the local market; leaving us with roughly 100,000 liters on hand. ¶3. (C) Should an interuption in gas supplies occur, post should have--between Armenian national reserves and our own resources--at least 4 weeks to prepare alternatives for the event of an extended energy crisis. While such an eventuality is highly unlikely, prudence suggests that we alert the Department that options may include authorized or ordered departure, and/or the need to request emergency funding from the Department to purchase additional quantities of diesel fuel. GODFREY