Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06YEREVAN1264
2006-09-13 06:09:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Yerevan
Cable title:  

THE POLITICAL BUZZ: A SNAPSHOT OF LOCAL ANALYST

Tags:  PGOV KDEM AM 
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VZCZCXRO1331
RR RUEHDBU
DE RUEHYE #1264/01 2560609
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 130609Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY YEREVAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3906
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 YEREVAN 001264 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR EUR/CARC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2016
TAGS: PGOV KDEM AM
SUBJECT: THE POLITICAL BUZZ: A SNAPSHOT OF LOCAL ANALYST
VIEWS


Classified By: Pol/Econ Chief Stephen Banks for reasons 1.4 (b,d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 YEREVAN 001264 SIPDIS SIPDIS FOR EUR/CARC E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2016 TAGS: PGOV KDEM AM SUBJECT: THE POLITICAL BUZZ: A SNAPSHOT OF LOCAL ANALYST VIEWS Classified By: Pol/Econ Chief Stephen Banks for reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Garik Tsarukyan's new "Prosperous Armenia" faction is the hottest political topic, with divided views over the extent to which this pro-government faction is independent of the ruling Republican Party. Local analysts are generally pessimistic about chances for fair parliamentary elections in 2007. Few believe, despite rumors, that the elections will be held earlier than May 2007, as planned. None believe that President Kocharian genuinely wants to step down from the presidency, but most are convinced he will do so. We have not heard convincing theories of why Kocharian will meekly step aside, if he would much rather remain in office, rather than amend the consitution to allow his reelection. A minority view is that Kocharian will take his cue from President Putin's example, and might indeed seek to amend the constitution and remain if Putin does it first. END SUMMARY ¶2. (C) Newly arrived polchief has met with a range of independent political analysts to get a broad picture of the current Armenian political situation. Following is a distillation of key themes that emerged. -------------- "DODI GAGO" THE MAN OF THE HOUR -------------- ¶3. (C) Political watchers are fascinated by the sharp rise to political prominence of the wealthy local businessman Garik Tsarukyan (also known as "Dodi Gago"; an insulting nickname SIPDIS which Tsarukian dislikes),at the head of his new "Prosperous Armenia" faction. Tsarukyan is viewed as a simple man, despite being very rich, and as one of the few Armenian oligarchs with fairly clean hands. He has won widespread public admiration for his philanthropy--which tend to be highly publicized, one-time donations of money or goods to this or that struggling school, orphanage, clinic, or elderly widow. These bursts of largesse have cemented Tsarukian's image as a rare man who makes a difference in real people's lives. Overnight, Prosperous Armenia has become the chief alternative to the dominant Republican Party, especially with Artur Baghdisarian's Orinats Yerkir (Rule of Law) party's falling fortunes. Prosperous Armenia is presumed to offer its supporters a real possibility of being part of a future ruling coalition (with all the pat
ronage benefits that implies) while at the same time--thus far--offering a more wholesome public image than the well-entrenched Republican Party now offers. ¶4. (C) Poll results from the International Republican Institute (septel) confirm Prosperous Armenia's burgeoning popularity. IRI conducted parallel surveys in May and August 2006, which among other things asked voters for whom they would vote if elections were held the following Sunday. In May, Prosperous Armenia came in fourth, as the top choice of 9 percent of respondents. By August, Prosperous Armenia had shot to number one, as the first choice of 27 percent of respondents. Baghdisarian's Orinats Yerkir was the big loser over the four-month period, slipping from number one, with 12 percent, to number three, with just 5 percent. Over the same time period Tsarukyan's personal favorability rating climbed ten points, from 70 to 80 percent, boosting him from second most popular to the most popular Armenian politician. (NOTE: More complete survey results will be reported septel. Complete results have been e-mailed to EUR/CARC and INR/REA, and will be posted on Embassy Yerevan's SIPRNET website. END NOTE) ¶5. (C) Prosperous Armenia remains quite nascent organizationally. Tsarukyan is benefactor-in-chief and guiding vision, but is expected to remain somewhat above the rough and tumble of actual political work. The organizational and political brains of the organization is supposed to be veteran MP Viktor Dallakian, who recently left the opposition Justice Bloc. Everyone knows that Dallakian is to be the day-to-day leader of Prosperous Armenia, but Dallakian has coyly chosen, for whatever reason, to delay formally joining the movement and beginning work. Dallakian is seen as an unobjectionable sort who has the experience and skills to actually manage a party structure, while Tsarukyan is viewed as more of a broad-brushstrokes guy. Tsarukyan's heart (and pocketbook and rolodex) might be in the right place, but even most admirers would not consider him particularly articulate or deep-thinking. Indeed, Tsarukyan's regular-guy style is part of what many Armenians find endearing, but many may also be reassured that Dallakian will be there to support Dodi Gago as a capable chief operating officer. YEREVAN 00001264 002 OF 003 ¶6. (C) The juiciest question for pundits concerns the precise nature of Prosperous Armenia's relationships with President Kocharian, Defense Minister (and presumptive presidential successor) Serge Sargsian, and the dominant Republican Party. One school of thought is that the new movement is all a sham. Tsarukyan's warm ties to the ruling political circles are well known. According to this theory Kocharian and Sargsian--having dumped the uppity Artur Baghdisarian as the tame, in-house opposition--are now putting forward Tsarukyan as another friendly, quasi-opposition faction to recreate a veneer of pluralism to a ruling coalition that is in fact controlled by Kocharian/Sargsian loyalists. Adherents of this view, who include some of the most bitter opposition pols, repeat old rumors that Baghdisarian and his party were the creation of Serge Sargisian's shadowy money, and Prosperous Armenia is just a new iteration of a gambit used to great effect once before. ¶7. (C) A rival theory hypothesizes some divergence of interests between Kocharian and Sargsian, (whose political alliance has heretofore been rock-solid),as the reality of presidential succession looms nearer. With Sargsian moving to consolidate control of the Republican Party, Kocharian may feel some need for an "insurance policy" of his own to protect his interests in retirement. Thus, these theorists suggest, Kocharian has quietly backed Tsarukyan's creation to become a purely pro-Kocharian faction in a future ruling coalition, so that the soon-to-be-ex president will not be wholly dependent on the future goodwill of his picked successor. A variation on this hypothesis is that while Kocharian and Sargsian may remain close political friends and allies, the Republican Party/Prosperous Armenia rivalry may be the expression of ruling-elites' intramural competition at lower levels of the hierarchy, and that the top two men have chosen, for reasons of their own, to let this play out a bit. (NOTE: Sargsian formally joined the Republican Party earlier this summer (previously, like Kocharian, he had eschewed membership in any party),making it clear for the first time that the Republican Party would be Sargsian's chosen vehicle for the upcoming elections in 2007 and 2008. This fact alone has shifted the political dynamic, discouraging other would-be political climbers--such as the Prosecutor-General--from jumping further into the political space vacated by Baghdisarian. END NOTE) -------------- -------------- FREE AND FAIR IN '07? NOT HARDLY! SAY LOCAL PUNDITS -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) Local analysts were overwhelmingly pessimistic that the upcoming parliamentary elections would be free and fair. One analyst felt that the best opening for a relatively fair outcome would be if the ruling circles quarrel amongst themselves and fail to unite around an election-rigging strategy (e.g. the Kocharian-Sargsian rivalry theory). ¶9. (C) One rumor making the rounds is that the government would try to wrong-foot the opposition or international monitors by calling snap elections as early as January. Most serious analysts downplay the possibility, noting that President Kocharian would have to stretch constitutional principles to do so, and this would be doubly brazen in light of the fact that the recent batch of constitutional amendments Kocharian's government pushed last fall through explicitly restrict the president's power to do this. Though some of the pertinent articles of the new rules are not yet technically in force until after the 2007 elections, it would be seen as conspicuously brazen of the president to take advantage of a loophole he had just ostensibly worked so hard to close. Local political observers think whatever advantage might come of such a ploy would not be worth the backlash, domestically or internationally. (COMMENT: The rumor has been so often repeated as to be worth squelching. We share the view that calling early elections would be a bizarre and improbable move by the president. END COMMENT -------------- ROBERT KOCHARIAN: THE ARMENIAN CINCINNATUS? -------------- ¶10. (C) There is little consensus over exactly what Robert Kocharian may plan to do once stepping down from the presidency in 2008, as the constitution requires and as he has publicly committed to do. Not one of the local political analysts we spoke with believed that Kocharian planned to step down out of a sincere desire to settle down into a quiet, well-earned retirement. Yet almost all were confident that Kocharian would indeed step down as promised, and would not seek to change the constitution to allow another term. YEREVAN 00001264 003 OF 003 The pundits thought Kocharian felt he had no choice but to step down, though none could articulate a very clear idea of where this unavoidable constraint might come from. Some had a vague idea that the international community would not allow it. One analyst thought that Kocharian would watch President Putin, and if Putin successfuly orchestrated his way into an extended presidential term, than Kocharian would feel he could get away with it too. Analysts presume that Kocharian will remain a highly-influential behind-the-scenes political force. However, none think that Kocharian will remain the de facto ruler, with Sargsian serving only as a titular president. Sargisian will be his own man and will have full presidential power. (The "fact" that Sargsian will be the next president is taken as such a given as hardly to be worth mentioning.) Sargsian's accession, therefore, inevitably will mean a lesser role for Kocharian and a reversal of the power dynamic between the two old comrades-in-arms. Few have a clear idea what this will look like in practice. Some even think that Kocharian will turn to running his financial interests more or less full-time. ¶11. (C) President Kocharian's national security adviser, Garnik Isaghulian, told us over lunch that Kocharian and Sargsian remain close personal and political friends, and there is no daylight between them. That said, he commented there would be genuine competition between Prosperous Armenia and the Republican Party. Isaghulian said that Kocharian had not actually allied himself with Prosperous Armenia; he had simply declined to block the new movement's emergence and was in a "wait and see" mode about where things would lead with the new faction. Isaghulian, too, thought that the president would have prefered to remain in office, were that possible, but was sure Kocharian would step down on schedule. Isaghulian claimed friendship with both the president and the defense minister, and thought that Sargsian was the best man to take over the presidency. (He was not so indelicate, at least on a first meeting with a foreign diplomat, as to suggest that Sargsian's accession was in the bag). -------------- COMMENT: IS THE CYNICISM JUSTIFIED? -------------- ¶12. (C) Independent Armenian political analysts seem in a cynical mood. The parliamentary election is seen as merely the opening act for the presidential succession performance soon to take the stage. Most pundits seem to think "the fix is in" and all that remains to be seen is how the ruling circles will divide up the spoils among themselves. There are questions which challenges this gloomy consensus: Just why is Kocharian stepping down anyway? As long as he was railroading constitutional changes through during last November's questionable referendum, why not make that change, too? He might have thought this would be a bridge too far in terms of international opinion, and this would have some consequences. Alternatively, maybe the pundits are wrong, and he's simply tired of his center-stage role as president, and ready to hand off the baton to his old ally. In any event, the slow-motion transfer of presidential power, now in its early stages, may yet have unpredictable side-effects, as political actors each contend for larger roles. GODFREY

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